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Abstract 
 
Software design flaws account for 50% software security vulnerability today. As attacks on 
vulnerable software continue to increase, the demand for secure software is also increasing 
thereby putting software developers under more pressure. This is especially true for those 
developers whose primary aim is to produce their software quickly under tight deadlines in order 
to release it into the market early. While there are many tools focusing on implementation 
problems during software development lifecycle (SDLC), this does not provide a complete 
solution in resolving software security problems. Therefore designing software with security in 
mind will go a long way in developing secure software. However, most of the current approaches 
used for evaluating software designs require the involvement of security experts because many 
software developers often lack the required expertise in making their software secure.  
In this research the current approaches used in integrating security at the design level is 
discussed and a new method of evaluating software design using neural network as evaluation 
tool is presented. With the aid of the proposed neural network tool, this research found out that 
software design scenarios can be matched to attack patterns that identify the security flaws in the 
design scenarios. Also, with the proposed neural network tool this research found out that the 
identified attack patterns can be matched to security patterns that can provide mitigation to the 
threat in the attack pattern. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to Thesis 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 As software applications continue to expand into all areas of our business and private lives, 
they have become an essential part of our day to day lives. It is now common to find software 
applications running our airplanes, communication and transportation systems, bank 
transactions, business supply chains, medical equipment, house appliances and enterprise 
management systems. Therefore, it is very important that software function properly in the 
production field today given the dependence of our society on technology. 
 
 In essence, confidentiality, availability, reliability, safety and integrity are essential properties 
that must be at the core of software applications today. Many companies investing heavily on 
software applications now take into serious consideration these software properties in order to 
ensure that they are not investing into software riddled with security vulnerabilities that will 
pose a great risk to their business. As a result, the quality of software applications is becoming 
more and more important in the software industry as software consumers demand for reliable 
software that will continue to function correctly and meet the security demands of today. 
 
  This is no surprise because the rate at which software vulnerabilities are discovered and 
exploited currently is quite alarming. Several software vulnerabilities are being published each 
week and many business organisations are paying dearly for poor quality software. The 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) 2007 security survey report revealed that the cost of 
cybercrime has doubled in the past year. It confirmed that companies reported average annual 
losses of $350,424 up sharply from the $168, 000 reported in the previous year (Richardson, 
2007).  
 
  An earlier report by The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2002 
revealed that poor quality software cost the US economy $59.5 billion per year (Cusumano, 
2004). In the last decade, the damage reported due to Code Red virus in 2001 was estimated to 
be at $2.62 billion and that of Melissa virus in 1999 to be $1.1 billion. The year 2000 Love bug 
was also estimated to be at $8.75 billion (Erbshloe, 2002). Also, the cost of software security 
breaches in the US for 2011 was estimated to be $48 billion (Jaspreet, 2012). The financial loss 
due to Sony security breach was estimated to be $171 million for new protection, legal cost, 
fines, and customer support programmes (James, 2011). Notable among Microsoft financial 
losses due a security flaws is the $200 million loss during its campaign for .Net because of the 
discovery of a security hole in Visual C++ .Net (Telang and Wattal, 2004). 
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 Apart from the financial losses reported by companies due to software vulnerabilities, they are 
also negatively affected when the software vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. This in turn 
erodes their customers’ confidence, create an in-ability to attract and retain customers and 
further cripple their reputation as they may face class-action lawsuits. To aggravate this issue, 
David Rice an instructor at the SANS Institute in an interview with Forbes.com proposed that a 
vulnerability tax should be created on software based on the number and severity of its security 
flaws in order to force software industries to mend its buggy ways (Greenberg, 2008). 
 
  Software security flaws have been attributed to defects unintentionally introduced during 
SDLC especially during the design and the implementation phase. Therefore, it is now an on-
going challenge for the software industries to look into ways through which software defects 
can be reduced during SDLC in order to produce more secured software. In view of this, Martyn 
Thomas, Professor of Software Engineering at Oxford University commented that “the only way 
to reduce costs and to keep projects within plans is to dramatically reduce the error rate at 
every stage in the development.” By doing this he said that “the product is not only cheaper, 
but higher quality: more secure, more reliable, and easier to maintain” (Croxford, 2005). 
 
1.2. Motivation 
Security vulnerabilities have been discovered in from time to time in various software 
applications after they are deployed. Consequently software security holes have become 
common and this problem is growing. Malicious attackers have been taken advantage of these 
vulnerabilities to break into critical systems of cooperate bodies causing havoc with great 
consequences. In dealing with this problem the underlying factors causing software 
vulnerabilities making software insecurity need to be addressed. It has been argued that 
security flaws pose the most concern among the factors making software insecure. According 
to Noopur Davis, the analysis of Software Engineering Institute (SEI) on programs produced by 
thousands of developers reveals that even experienced developers inject numerous defects 
during SDLC. In line with this view, Frank Piessens stated that “analysis of causes of actual 
incidents shows that many software vulnerabilities can be traced back to a relatively small 
number of causes: software developers are making the same mistakes over and over again”  
(Piessens, 2002). These mistakes constitute the security flaws which cause software insecurity. 
 
  In the requirement phase of the SDLC for example, Frank stated that software flaws can be 
introduced because of the absence of risk analysis where software are developed without any 
security issues in mind or when there is a biased risk analysis (i.e. when risk analysis is carried 
out by only one stakeholder of a given information system) or due to the presence of 
unanticipated risks. Davis further affirmed that design and architectural flaws such as 
inadequate authentication, invalid authorization, incorrect use of cryptography, failure to 
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protect data, and failure to carefully partition applications are causes of software insecurity. In 
a broader view, Alan Paller the director of research at the SAN Institute in his comment on the 
causes of the vulnerabilities stated that it is a result of poor coding, testing and sloppy software 
engineering (Davis, 2005). Thus, at every phase of SDLC, security flaws can be introduced into 
software products.  
 
  To therefore ensure that software is built securely, Software security has been suggested as a 
way for building more secured software by integrating security into every phase of software 
development Lifecycle (SDLC). This approach views security as an emergent property of the 
software and much effort is dedicated into weaving security into the software all through SDLC 
(McGraw, 2003) 
 
  Reportedly, 50% of security problems in software products today have been found to be 
design flaws (McGraw, 2006). Design-level vulnerability has been described as the hardest 
category of software defect to contend with. Moreover, it requires great expertise to ascertain 
whether or not a software application has design-level flaws which makes it difficult to find and 
automate (Hoglund and McGraw, 2004). To further buttress this fact, Paul (2011) applying 
Pareto principle to software security, states that 80% of software defects arises from the 20% 
of software design flaws. Therefore by finding and fixing the flaws found during the design 
stage Paul argued that this will considerably mitigate the threat on the software being 
developed. 
 
  In line with this argument many authors have argued that it is much better to find and fix flaws 
during the early phase of software development because it is more costly to fix the problem at 
a late stage of software development and much more costly when the software has been 
deployed (Spampinato et.al, 2008, Mockel and Abdallah, 2011, Gegick and Williams, 2007).  To 
ensure that security is integrated during the design phase of SDLC, many techniques such as 
architectural risk analysis, threat modelling, attack trees, attack patterns, use of security tools 
and other approaches have been proposed (see chapter 2 for further discussion). 
 
   However, due to limitations of these techniques, the main motivation for investigating the 
applicability of neural network to software security is highlighted below in the aims and 
objective of this research work. 
 
 Aim 
This research aims at investigating how neural networks can be applied as a tool to evaluate 
Software designs with regards to its security and also propose possible solutions to the 
identified flaws in the software design. This will enable software developers to have a 
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feedback on the security of their software design before the implementation phase of the 
software development lifecycle.  
 
 Objectives 
 To identify current techniques used for integrating security into software design and 
their limitations 
 To design and train a neural network to match attack patterns to software design 
scenarios as a means of identifying security flaws in the design scenarios.  
 To propose possible solutions to the security flaws identified in design scenarios by 
training a second neural network to match possible security patterns that can mitigate 
the threat in the attack pattern matched to the software design scenario. 
 To analyse the performance of the trained neural networks by observing their mean 
square error (MSE), number of epochs and training time. 
 To find out the optimal performance of the neural networks by conducting statistical 
analysis on the performance of the networks when different training optimization are 
applied to the networks. 
 To carry out a validation study to investigate the ability of the neural networks in 
matching attack patterns to software design scenarios and in matching security design 
patterns to attack patterns. 
 To compare the proposed neural network approach with current approaches used in 
integrating security software design during SDLC and also carry a case study to 
demonstrate how the proposed approach can aid software developers to in integrating 
security into software design. 
 
Method 
  This thesis documents the creation and design of a neural network that can be used as a tool 
for the evaluating software design for security flaws and also suggest possible mitigation.  
Previous researches have shown various ways in which neural network has been used in the 
area of security. Neural network based applications has been used successfully in the area of 
network security such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), misuse detection systems and 
firewalls (Ahmad et. al, 2006, Bivens et.al, 2002).  Also in the field of application security, neural 
network has been proposed to be used as virus detection system and authentication system 
(Cannady, 1998, Joseph et.al, 2009). The success of neural network in its usage in these 
applications and its ability makes it a good candidate for predicting security flaws from software 
design.  
 
  With this in mind, this research adopts the creation and design approach which is based on the 
following five process steps 
 Awareness of Problem: This step of the creation and design process deals with the 
recognition of the problem which may come from multiple sources. This could be from 
previous researches which have identified areas of further research or from studying allied 
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discipline where there is an opportunity for new findings that would lead to generation of 
knowledge. In this research, the problem that has been identified by previous research as 
mentioned earlier is that 50% of security flaws have been identified to be as a result of 
software design flaws. To address this problem, this research investigates further into two 
research work carried out by Michael Gegick and Laurie Williams (2006) and Wiesauer and 
Sametinger (2009). The outcome of this process step is a proposal for a new research 
endeavour (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007) 
 Suggestion: During this process step, suggestions are offered on how the problem identified 
in the first step is to be addressed based on current knowledge or theories in the domain 
area where the problem has been identified. This step has been described as a creative leap 
from curiosity in which tentative ideas offering new functionality are envisioned to provide 
solution (Oates, 2006). The suggestion this research is offering to address the problem of 
software design flaws is finding how Neural Networks can be used to evaluate software 
design in order to help software designers reduce the flaws in their software designs to a 
minimum before they are implemented. This will in turn reduce the security flaws in the 
software products. The knowledge generated during this step is the tentative design of the 
solution. 
 Development: The tentative design proposed in the previous process step is implemented 
during this process step. The way the tentative design will be implemented depends on the 
nature of the artefact to be developed.  In order to design the Neural Network suggested as 
a solution to the problem identified in this research, various issues will be considered. Some 
of these issues includes deciding the best architecture of the Neural Network (e.g. Feed-
forward network or Feed-back network), how the neural network is to be trained to 
recognise flaws in software design and how the data used for the training data is going to 
be collected and processed. The development of the artefact in this step is the contribution 
to knowledge. 
 Evaluation: The artefact developed either fully or partially is evaluated during this process 
step based on its expected functionality specified in the suggestion (i.e. the second process 
step) to examine its performance and observe any deviation from expectations. In this 
research work, the experimental approach will be used to evaluate the developed Neural 
Network (This is discussed further below). The outcome of the experiment during this stage 
results into new knowledge. 
 Conclusion: At this final step of the design process, the result of findings during the process 
steps are written up and the knowledge gained are identified (Oates, 2006). The knowledge 
gained according to Vaisgnavi and Kuechler, 2007 can be categorized as “firm” meaning 
“facts that have been learned and can be repeatedly applied or behaviour that can be 
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repeatedly invoked” or as “loose ends” that is “anomalous behaviour that defies 
explanation and may well serve as the subject of further research.”  
  For training the neural network to evaluate the security of software design, data was collected 
from various online vulnerability databases (see chapter 3 for further discussion) and this 
formed the primary method of data collection. Secondary data was collected from various 
research works discussed in chapter four and five and from the review of literature on software 
security and neural networks. Information from the literature review provides an evaluation on 
what has been done in previous research and also open us questions which needs to be 
addressed. 
 
1.3. Common Security Flaws in Software Design 
  Many software vulnerabilities have been linked to flaws in the software design. Preventing 
these flaws from being introduced during the design phase of SDLC will help software 
developers make their software more secure and save them from making mistakes that will be 
very costly to correct if the flaws are detected at a later stage of the SDLC. Some of the flaws 
attributed to software design include: 
 
1.3.1 Weak Access Control 
  Access control is the way in which an application grants access to its content and functions to 
different users (Hu, Ferraiolo, Kuhn, 2006). Granting and revoking privileges is a typical way of 
providing access control. Privileges are described as what allows specific users to access the 
application to do only what they are allowed to do (Connolly and Begg, 2005) When 
authorization of users of a software application is not done properly, this could lead to various 
security breaches. This design flaw allows users or systems to perform actions that they should 
not perform. The presence of security flaw is not difficult to discover and exploit. All it would 
take the attacker is to request for access to functions or content which normally he does not 
have any privilege to access. If he is granted access, he would have discovered a flaw in the 
access control that can be exploited and the consequence can be disastrous (CWE, 2013). In this 
case, the attacker would have access to unauthorized content that is not properly protected 
which he may be able to change or delete, execute arbitrary code or manipulate the application 
especially if he is granted an administrator (Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), 
2010). 
 
1.3.2 Weak Authentication 
  Most applications use log-on passwords to authenticate users. However, a flaw in the 
authentication routine could be exploited by attackers to impersonate legitimate users (OWASP 
2010). This flaw could be in the form of exposed account passwords or session IDs. The attack 
on Gawker’s database system in 2010 is an example of an attack that exploits this vulnerability 
as the firm had no password policies for her internal users (Chickowski, 2010). 
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1.3.3 Failure to Validate Input 
The lack of input validation in a software system also jeopardizes its security. This is a security 
weakness in which an application allows foreign inputs which subverts the legitimate use of a 
subsystem (Pomraning, 2005). Due to this, a malicious attacker taking the advantage of an un-
enforced and unchecked assumption an application makes about its inputs could inject 
malicious code into the application. The purpose of the injected code typically is to bypass or 
modify the originally intended functionality of the application. This attack becomes more 
disastrous if the functionality bypassed is the security of the application. Attacks exploiting this 
vulnerability could crash or confuse the software application and it could also enable attackers 
to gain access to sensitive information or manipulate the database maliciously. Web-based 
applications are noted mostly to be liable to these attacks as they need to collect data from 
users. The flaw occurs when user supplied data are accepted without proper validation. This is 
abused by attackers who supply malicious data that could contain code, arbitrary query strings 
or commands to be processed further by the application, which assumes the input is valid 
(OWASP, 2010) (Jones, 2010). 
 
  For different applications, this flaw is exploited by different attacks. Notable among them is 
the SQL injection which is particularly widespread and dangerous. It is a technique used to 
exploit web sites that construct SQL statements from user-supplier inputs to query backend 
database systems. In this attack, an unsuspecting web application blindly accepts malicious 
database queries which are then forwarded to the database to be executed with the privileges 
of the application (Shulman, 2006). In this way an attacker can gain unrestricted access to an 
entire database and can therefore corrupt or destroy the content of the database. This flaw is 
also exploited by the cross-site scripting (XSS) attack which is also known as the HTML Injection. 
This occurs when an attacker send a malicious script in form of a script through web 
applications to different end user. By running malicious script, the attacker can access any 
cookie, session token or any other critical information on the end user’s browser. 
 
1.3.4 Weak Encryption 
  Software applications are also open to attacks when the encryption algorithms used for 
protecting their data are not strong enough. This weakness could be exploited by attackers 
using brute force to access the data. The OWASP report on the top ten application security risks 
of 2010 states that ‘many web applications do not properly protect sensitive data, such as 
credit cards, SSNs, and authentication credentials, with appropriate encryption or hashing. 
Attackers may steal or modify such weakly protected data to conduct identity theft, credit card 
fraud, or other crimes’ (OWASP 2010). Another factor contributing to the cause of this flaw is 
that sometimes the encryption keys are not generated and stored securely. Attackers find the 
keys easily and compromise all the data that has been protected. According to Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) a few areas in which developers make mistake leading to 
insecure storage includes the following 
• Failure to encrypt critical data  
• Insecure storage of keys, certificates, and passwords  
• Improper storage of secrets in memory  
• Poor sources of randomness  
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• Poor choice of algorithm  
• Attempting to invent a new encryption algorithm  
• Failure to include support for encryption key changes and other required maintenance 
procedures 
 
1.4. Challenges in Integrating Security into Software Design 
  There are various challenges facing the integration of security into software design. Some of 
these challenges underpin the reason why neural network has been proposed as tool for 
integrating security into software design. These challenges are discussed below. 
 
1.4.1 Need for Security Experts 
  There is need for security expert to be involved during SDLC for all the current approaches 
used to develop secure software application. For instance, conducting architectural risk analysis 
requires the involvement of security experts who will help in identifying the threats to the 
software technology, review the software for any security issues, investigate how easy it is to 
compromise the software’s security, analyse the impact on assets and business goals should the 
security of the software be compromised and recommend mitigating measures to either 
eliminate the risk identified or reduce it to a minimum (McGraw 2006). 
 
  As a result, the existing gap between security professionals and software developers is a 
challenge that must be addressed in order to integrate security into software during SDLC. The 
disconnection between this two has led to software development efforts lacking critical 
understanding of current technical security risks (Pemmaraju and McGraw, 2000). And as the 
environment in which software are deployed becomes more hostile, ignoring security during 
SDLC means releasing software with many security defects that could have been avoided.  
 
  One of the reasons for this gap is because the goals for the two groups are different. The 
developers, trained to think of functions and features, focus on the functionality of their 
product and on-schedule delivery. Moreover, security is often thought of as a feature and not 
as an emergent system property and developers who intend to integrate security into their 
products often lack the requisite knowledge required in doing so (McGraw 2002). This critical 
knowledge is possessed by security professionals who have over the years observed system 
intrusions, dealt with malicious attackers and have studied software vulnerabilities in minute 
detail because this has been their focus. However, because few security experts are software 
developers themselves, their security solutions tend to be limited to reactive techniques such 
as installing software patches and maintaining firewalls (Pemmaraju and McGraw, 2000).  
 
  Recognising that developers lack the knowledge and training necessary to assess and improve 
the reliability, safety and security of software products, some of the current approaches 
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includes training for developers on security issues. Even then, security experts outside the 
development team still need to be involved during the software development especially when 
very sensitive software systems is being developed or when new technologies is being used. 
External security experts will also help in finding any assumptions that has being made about 
the target system that may pose security risks (Wiseman, 2006).  As the skills of both software 
developers and security experts both complement each other in building more secure software 
application it is therefore very important to find avenues for interdisciplinary cooperation 
between the two groups (Kenneth and McGraw, 2005).  
 
1.4.2 Process issues 
  To integrate security into the software design most of the current approaches uses a high level 
architectural design of the target system in order to allow the developers to view the overall 
component of the system and know how they are connected and how they work. However, this 
conflict with some software development processes like extreme programming (XP) that sees 
no need for spending time up front thinking through the architectural design of the target 
system before the production coding begins. This is because the architecture of the system is 
taken to evolve spontaneously as the code base evolves (Stephens, 2002) and it is also claimed 
that the code is the design (McGraw, 2006).  
 
  Any software development process similar to XP that spend little or no time on developing a 
comprehensible high level architectural design of the target system is therefore likely to come 
up with software design flaws which may not be discovered until the software is deployed. The 
unit tests conducted during the SDLC may catch the code-level bug but not the wrongness of 
the design (Stephens, 2002). This problem is exacerbated when the development process 
migrate to the often repeating ‘code-test-debug’ phase which could potentially introduce lots 
of bugs as dependent code is broken when changes are made to the code during each iteration 
and this could in turn lead to severe cost and timescale overruns (Croxford, 2005). 
 
  The high level architectural design of the target system is very important if security is to be 
integrated into the software design. This is because it encompasses everything about the target 
system and also documents both the functional and non-functional design decision (Stephens, 
2002). At the implementation phase, the big picture of the whole system which the high level 
architectural design provides help the developers to know how the components fit together.  
Thus when the unavoidable changes are to be made to the software during development, the 
high level architectural design will serve as a roadmap that will help the developers to trace out 
the overall impact of such changes so that flaws in the software design can be avoided. 
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1.4.3 Tight budget and time to market constraints 
  Tight budget and time to market are other issues that also pose challenge into integrating 
security into software. Many times software developers find themselves working under 
pressure in fast internet time in order to meet the deadline for releasing their software product 
to the market. Integrating security into software during SDLC during such intense pressure in 
today’s competitive software market is often seen as too lofty or unattainable and thus a waste 
of time and money by development managers. It is also observed that the management of 
some software projects have warmed up to software development processes like XP who see 
the lack of up-front design as a way of saving money (Stephens, 2002).Therefore software 
developers are forced to live within their development manager’s schedule, feature priority and 
resource constraints (Pemmaraju, Lord and McGraw, 2000).  
 
  However, from previous research it is argued that maintenance and evolution costs account 
up to 90% of software cost (Koskinen, 2003). Also, from a total cost of ownership (TCO) point of 
view, by spending more during SDLC to build more secured software reduces the cost of 
maintenance and this subsequently lowers the TCO. In this view Gary McGraw the CTO Cigital 
Inc stated that “managers who choose to focus all of their attention on minimizing only the 
development part of the TCO (often to the detriment of the maintenance part) have a tendency 
to create poor software faster (resulting in an exploding TCO); while those managers who 
understand the TCO equation properly can let the development expenses rise a little even as 
the TCO moves down.” (McGraw, 2008)   
 
  It is also important to note that the maintenance cost is separate from the cost of risks such as 
litigation, reputation, brand damage and other risks involved in producing insecure software. As 
a result, the development management can indeed estimate the future cost of maintenance 
and resolving security flaws after the software has been released and trade this off with early 
investment in integrating security into the software during SDLC (McGraw, 2008). A good 
reason for this is because resolving software security problems after delivery has been 
observed to be 100 times more expensive than finding and resolving them during the 
requirement and design phase of SDLC as shown in the chart below (Boehm and Basili, 2001). 
This further contributes into reducing the TCO of the software.  
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Figure 1. 1: Real Cost of Software Security (Berg 2007) 
 
  With regards to time to market also, it has been observed that software projects which aim at 
producing near defect free software consistently meet their schedule, thereby avoiding the cost 
involved with delayed releases (Davis, 2005). Contrary to the views that sees integrating 
security into software during SDLC as slowing down time to market, building secure software 
given the right level of expertise can sometimes be designed more rapidly than other software 
system with little or no security at all (McGraw and Viega, 2001).  
 
1.4.4 Tools and technologies for software design analysis 
  Unlike implementation tools, design tools and technologies for automated analysis of software 
security at the architectural level has been slow in coming. This is still an area where many 
researches are currently being undertaken. Because design-level defects are the hardest 
category of defects to deal with, finding them as been particularly hard to automate (Hoglund 
and McGraw, 2004).  Most of the tools and technologies which are currently available to 
support software developers in analysing software design for flaws are not widely in use. For 
these reasons finding software flaws during SDLC still require great human expertise. 
 
1.4.5 Massively distributed system 
  It is not uncommon today to find complex software applications running on thousands of fat 
clients connected simultaneously to banks of central servers in the client-server architecture. 
The growth and complexity of software systems today alone already pose security concerns 
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because as software systems become larger, bugs cannot be avoided (McGraw, 2002). This 
problem is exacerbated as these complex software systems become massively distributed, with 
servers and thousands of users interacting all at the same time. This pushes the limit of 
software technology especially with regards to state and time thereby posing a serious 
challenge to software security today.  
 
  Security risks arise when the state and time of complex software systems in a distributed 
environment become entangled with complex trust models as they share their state among 
distributed processors with different level of trustworthiness (Hoglund and McGraw, 2007). For 
instance, in transaction based systems which are commonly used in the e-commerce set up; the 
functionality state of the system is distributed among many components running on several 
servers. Therefore, with the continuous use of massively distributed systems trust models get 
more complex. Synchronizing and tracking state will also continue to be an on-going challenge. 
 
   The move to web services such as software oriented architecture (SOA), web 2.0 and web 3.0 
all the more increase the potential security risks involved in controlling states over trust 
boundaries. As complex software systems are constructed from mashing up data and 
functionality all over the web, defining trust boundaries during software design becomes a 
more challenging endeavour as it becomes more difficult to tell which data can be trusted and 
which piece of functionality will actually do what they say they do (McGraw, 2008). The massive 
data mash-up provided by web services on the web poses security concern as they become 
more exposed because malicious attackers can take the advantage to falsify data, provide 
services that don’t do what they claim and also infiltrate legitimate services. Thus, issues such 
as revoking identities, privacy and figuring how to evolve trust over time remain open 
challenges (McGraw, 2008). 
 
  Consequently, all these call for serious consideration by software developers during software 
design. As client software can misbehave or  can be manipulated by malicious users, implicit 
trust assumptions has become a serious security risk which must be dealt with at the design 
phase. Trust model boundaries for modern software architectures when confused can also 
generate security problems especially when there is a misunderstanding of what should trust 
what in the models (Hoglund and McGraw, 2007), (Miller, 2008). For instance, trust model 
boundaries can become confused when defining trust zones in software systems exhibiting the 
n-tier architecture relying on several third party components and programming languages in a 
distributed environment (McGraw, 2006).  Unfortunately, these are the software technologies 
running our banking applications, e-commerce systems, online games and other critical systems 
today. And with the move to web services, integrating security into the software design for 
these technologies has become even more challenging. 
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1.5. Thesis Overview 
  Chapter two covers discussion on previous researches and technologies that are related to this 
research work from authoritative sources. To set the background for this research work, much 
effort has been dedicated into discussing current approaches used in securing software. The 
approaches include the use of security best practices, security oriented software development 
methodologies, network Security, application Security, formal methods and security tools.  
Discussion on neural networks and its application to areas of security that is related to this 
research work is also presented. Chapter three discusses the proposed neural network 
approach. The model overview for this research work is presented and each and module of the 
model overview is discussed. Chapter four and five demonstrates the implementation of the 
proposed neural networks. Demonstration on the data collection, data encoding, the neural 
network architecture and training are presented. Chapter six presents the result, analysis and 
discussion on the performance of the neural network. A statistical analysis on the performance 
of the neural network is also conducted. Chapter seven provides a summary to this research 
work and also highlights its benefits and limitations along with suggestion on future work. 
  
1.6. Chapter Summary 
  This chapter has provided a general back background to this research work. It was noted that 
most security flaws are caused by software design defects and the need for integrating security 
in the early phase of SDLC based on the fact that it is cheaper to find and fix the security flaws 
at this time has been highlighted. The common security flaws in software design includes: weak 
access control, weak authentication, failure to validate input and weak encryption. Some of the 
challenges for integrating security into software design were also presented. The creation and 
design methodology as has been discussed as the method that will be adopted for the research 
work. The process steps in this approach have been presented. In the next chapter, a literature 
review will be conducted on the current approaches for integrating security into software 
design. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Software insecurity is a big concern to the software industry and to most consumers (Rice, 
2007). To resolve the problem, many techniques have been suggested and implemented for 
integrating security into software applications during software development and after the 
software has been deployed. In this chapter, a literature review is conducted on some of the 
techniques used to secure software application during the design phase of the SDLC. Some of 
the commonly used techniques for providing security after the software has been deployed are 
also reviewed. 
 
2.2. Integrating security into software design 
Some of the security vulnerabilities caused by architectural and design defects includes 
incorrect use of cryptography, failure to protect data, inadequate authentication, failure to 
carefully partition applications and invalid authorization (See chapter 1 for further discussion). 
Most of these defects have been attributed to oversight leading to defect types such as 
declaration errors, logic errors, loop control errors, conditional expressions errors, failure to 
validate input, interface specification errors, configuration errors, and failure to understand 
basic security issues (Davis, 2005). In order to integrate security into software design, different 
approaches are currently being used in the software industry. Some these approaches are 
discussed below. 
  
2.2.1 Architectural Risk Analysis 
Architectural risk analysis is used to identify vulnerabilities and threats to a software system at 
the design phase of SDLC, which may be malicious or non-malicious in nature. It examines the 
preconditions that must be present for the vulnerabilities to be exploited by various threats and 
assesses the states that the system may enter after a successful attack on the system. One of 
the advantages of architectural risk analysis is that it enables developers to analyse a software 
system component by component, tier by tier and environment level by environment level in 
order to apply the principles of measuring threats, vulnerabilities and impacts at each level 
(McGraw, 2004). This functional decomposition of the system allows for a desktop review of 
potential vulnerabilities and also enables the developers to design the high-level architectural 
view of the system. Higher-level architectural design is also called the forest-level view and it 
allows the developers to see the big picture of the system thereby enabling them to know how 
the components are connected and how all the moving parts work (McGraw, 2006). During 
architectural risk analysis, the high-level design view is used to consider the following important 
factors: 
 
a) The Assets 
These are the resources that need to be protected and these could be in form of data, system 
components or even a complete system (McGraw, 2004). Traditionally, security practitioners 
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have been concerned about the confidentiality, integrity, availability and auditability of the 
assets; however, they also vary in how they are critical in various business organizations (Hope, 
Lavenhar and Peterson, 2008). For instance, while confidentiality of the data may be the top 
priority to one organization, availability and integrity of data may be the priority of another 
organization. For risk analysis to produce good results, the assets that need protection are 
identified to ensure proper security measures are put in place to protect them. 
 
b)  Threats 
These are agents or actors who are the source of danger to the security of the system when 
they carry out attacks on the system. The attacks could be in the form of denial of service, SQL 
injection or any other form of attack that will eventually compromise the security of the 
targeted system. Some of the well-known threats include crackers, criminals, malicious hackers 
and disgruntled employees who violate the protection of assets of a system for a variety of 
motivations, such as financial gain, prestige, or other motives. Other threats, which are not 
conscious entities, such as hardware failures, natural disasters, performance delays and user 
errors are also considered during risk analysis. While all the threat categories are considered, 
malicious and accidental human activities are mostly considered. 
 
c)  Vulnerability 
“A vulnerability is a defect or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, 
or internal controls that can be exercised and result in a security breach or violation of security 
policy” (McGraw, 2006). Vulnerability can exist in one or more components that make up a 
system and they come in two basic forms, which are: 
 Bugs: These are implementation-level problems, such as buffer overflow, leading to security 
risks. Bugs result from the failure to implement the software architecture correctly and these 
are resolved by fixing the broken lines of code (Hope, Lavenhar and Peterson, 2008). 
Automated source code analysis tools are used mainly in this area to help in removing bugs 
in the source code. 
 
 Flaws: These are deep-seated failures in the software design that lead to a security risk no 
matter how well the software is implemented. As stated earlier, architectural flaws are the 
hardest category of software vulnerability to understand and contend with. As a result, 
human expertise is required to uncover the flaws. 
 
d) Risk 
This is normally calculated as a product of the probability of a threat exploiting a vulnerability 
and the impact on the organization (i.e. risk = probability × impact). Some of the factors used to 
determine this calculation include: the ease of executing an attack, the motivation and 
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resources of an attacker, the existence of vulnerabilities in a system, and the cost or impact in a 
particular business context (McGraw, 2006). 
 
e) Impact 
These are the consequences a business organization must face if there is a successful attack on 
its software technology by a threat exploiting any vulnerability in the system. This could be 
primarily expressed in monetary terms as loss of revenue or in terms of negative effects on the 
business organization marketing abilities in the form of damage to reputation, loss of customer 
confidence, inability to attract and retain customers, loss of market share and delay or failure in 
delivery of services as promised within the service-level agreement (SLA). Secondarily, the 
effects of a failing software technology can include increased maintenance cost, increased 
customer support costs, longer time to market, impact on legal, regulatory and compliance 
matters and higher cost of development (Hope, Lavenhar and Peterson, 2008). 
 
f) Mitigation 
“Risk mitigation refers to the process of prioritizing, implementing, and maintaining the 
appropriate risk-reducing measures recommended from the risk analysis process.” (Hope, 
Lavenhar and Peterson, 2008) Mitigating a risk in a software technology means changing the 
software architecture in one way or another in order to make the system attack-resistant 
thereby reducing the likelihood or the impact of the risk. Mitigation consists of management, 
operational and technical controls prescribed for the software technology with the purpose of 
protecting the system’s software architecture, availability, integrity and confidentiality. These 
controls may set up either to prevent the risk or to detect the risk when it triggers. 
 
McGraw (2006) presents the architectural risk analysis in three critical steps. 
 Attack resistance analysis: This involves the use of known attack information in the form 
of a checklist to identify risks in the architecture during risk analysis. 
 Ambiguity analysis: This involves the activity needed to discover new risks. 
 Weakness analysis: This aims at uncovering weaknesses originating from the use of 
external software platforms. 
 
However, it should be noted that conducting architectural risk analysis requires the 
involvement of security experts because software developers often lack the knowledge 
required to integrate security into SDLC.  
 
There are various risk analysis methodologies for software and these are classified into two 
different groups: commercial and standards-based (McGraw, 2006). Standards-based risk 
analysis methodologies include: 
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 ASSET (Automated Security Self-Evaluation Tool) from the National Institute on Standard and 
Technology (NIST) 
 OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation) from the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) 
 COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) from the Information 
System Audit and Control Association (ISACA). 
 
Commercial risk analysis methodologies include: 
 STRIDE from Microsoft 
 Security Risk Management Guide from Microsoft 
 ACSM/SAR (Adaptive Countermeasure Selection Mechanism/Security Adequacy Review from 
Sun 
 Citigal‘s architectural risk analysis process. 
 
2.2.2 Threat Modelling 
Threat modelling is another important activity carried out at the design phase to describe 
threats to the software application in order to provide a more accurate sense of its security 
(Agarwal, 2006). Threat modelling is an engineering technique that can be used to identify 
threats, attacks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures that could affect a software system 
(Meier, Mackman and Wastell, 2005). This allows for the anticipation of attacks by 
understanding how a malicious attacker chooses targets, locates entry points and conducts 
attacks (Redwine and Davies, et al., 2004). Threat modelling addresses threats that have the 
ability to cause maximum damage to a software application. 
 
A structured method for threat modelling has been defined by Microsoft and this consists of 
the following steps. 
 Identify security objectives: This gives the software developers an idea of the business risk 
decision that needs to be taken thereby helping them to focus the threat modelling activity 
into building the necessary security control and also determines how much effort is to be 
spent on doing this. 
 Create an application overview: This is done by surveying the software system’s 
architecture and design documentation in order to identify the software system’s 
characteristics and actors such as components, data flows and trust boundaries, which in 
turn would help to identify relevant threats. 
 Decompose the application: This involves the decomposition of the software architecture 
in order to obtain a detailed understanding of the mechanics of the software. This would 
help to further identify the features and modules of the system that needs to be evaluated 
for security impact. 
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 Identify Threats: All known threats for the software system are identified during this step. 
Threats identified could then be categorized using the Microsoft threat classification 
scheme: STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of 
service and Elevation of privilege). 
 Identify the vulnerabilities: Following the identification of known threats to the software 
system, possible security weaknesses of the system are identified and these can also be 
categorized using DREAD. DREAD is Microsoft’s classification model for quantifying, 
comparing and prioritizing the amount of risk by each evaluated threat (OWASP, 2008) and 
the acronym stands for Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users and 
Discoverability. 
 
The figure below shows the five major threat modelling steps discussed above. 
 
Figure 2. 1: Microsoft Threat Modelling (Meier, Mackman, and Wastell, 2005) 
 
2.2.3 Dynamic Software Architecture Slicing (DSAS) 
Kim T. et al. introduced the notion of dynamic software architecture slicing (DSAS) through 
which software architecture can be analysed. “A dynamic software architecture slice represents 
the run-time behaviour of those parts of the software architecture that are selected according 
to a particular slicing criterion such as a set of resources and events” (Kim et al., 2000). DSAS is 
used to decompose software architecture based on a slicing criterion. “A slicing criterion 
provides the basic information, such as the initial values and conditions for the ADL execuTable, 
an event to be observed, and occurrence counter of the event”. 
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To begin with, the software architecture is designed using any ADL (architecture description 
language) and then implemented by mapping the behavioural part of the design into program 
statements while retaining the structural properties. During run-time, the components and 
connector information is identified by the Forward Dynamic Slicer when it reads the ADL source 
code from the slicing criterion it receives as input, and executes the ADL execuTable to 
generate a set of partially ordered events. The events relevant to the slicing criterion are then 
filtered and passed to the Forward Architecture Slicer which examines the components and 
ports based on the given slicing criterion in order to compute an architecture slice dynamically. 
When the slicing criterion is satisfied the slice computed up to the event of interest is said to be 
the ‘forward dynamic software architecture slice’. 
 
The main benefit of this approach is that software engineers are able to examine the behaviour 
of parts of their software architecture during run time. However, the trade-off of this approach 
is that it requires the software to be implemented first of all because the events examined to 
compute the architecture slice dynamically are generated while the Forward Dynamic Slicer 
executes the ADL execuTable. 
 
2.2.4 Attack Trees and other related techniques 
This is used to characterize system security by modelling the decision-making process of 
attackers. In this technique, attack against a system is represented in a tree structure in which 
the root of the tree represents the goal of an attacker. The nodes in the tree represent the 
different types of action an attacker can take on or outside the software system to accomplish 
his goal, which may be in the form of bribes or threats (Ralston, Graham and Hieb, 2007), 
(Gegick and Williams, 2006). “Attack trees are used for risk analysis, to answer questions about 
the system’s security, to capture security knowledge in a reusable way, and to design, 
implement, and test countermeasures to attacks” (Redwine and Davis, et al., 2004). 
Attack nets is a similar approach, which includes “places” analogous to the nodes in an attack 
tree to indicate the state of an attack. Events required to move from one place to the other are 
captured in transitions and arcs. Arcs connect places and transitions indicate the path an 
attacker takes. Therefore as with attack trees, attack nets also show possible attack scenarios to 
a software system and they are used for vulnerability assessment in software designs (Gegick 
and Williams, 2006).  
Another related approach is the vulnerability tree, which is a hierarchy tree constructed on the 
basis of how one vulnerability relates to another and the steps an attacker has to take to reach 
the top of the tree (Ralston, Graham and Hieb, 2007). Vulnerability trees also help in the 
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analysis of different possible attack scenarios that an attacker can undertake to exploit 
vulnerability. 
Mouratidis et al. (2007) also propose a scenario-based approach called Security Attack Testing 
(SAT) for testing the security of a software system during design time. To achieve this, two sets 
of scenarios (dependency and security attack) are identified and constructed. Security test 
cases are then defined from the scenarios to test the software design against potential attacks 
to the software system. Essentially SAT is used to identify the goals and intentions of possible 
attackers based on possible attack scenarios. Software engineers are able to evaluate their 
software design when the attack scenarios identified are applied to investigate how the system 
developed will behave when under such attacks. From this, software engineers better 
understand how the system can be attacked and also why an attacker may want to attack the 
system. Armed with this knowledge, necessary steps can be taken to secure the software with 
capabilities that will help in mitigating such attacks. 
Gegick and Williams (2006) have also proposed regular expression-based attack patterns which 
help in indicating the sequential events that occur during an attack. The attack patterns are 
based on the software components involved in an attack and are used for identifying 
vulnerabilities in software design. It comprises an attack library of abstraction that can be used 
by software engineers conducting Security Analysis for Existing Threats (SAFE-T) to match their 
system design. The attack patterns are based on a set of components that have been observed 
in a vulnerability that has been analysed and represented as a sequence of events during an 
attack. For instance the attack patterns begins with an event represented by the component 
used to trigger the attack, followed by successive events in the attack path and terminated by 
the threat target, which is the final objective of the attacker. The following is an example of a 
regular expression-based attack pattern, by the authors: 
(Client +)(Server +)(LogFile +)(HardDrive +) 
This attack pattern consists of four components i.e. Client, Server, LogFile and HardDrive. The 
authors state that the attack pattern can be read as “a series of Client (the start component) 
requests, followed by a series of Server actions, followed by a series of log updates to the 
LogFile, followed by a series of disk writes to the HardDrive (the threat target). The access log 
records an entry for each request and if enough requests are made, then the hard drive can be 
consumed by the access log file”. The figure below is a sample of a system design used to 
illustrate the attack pattern above by the authors. 
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Figure 2. 2: Sample of System Design (Gegick and Williams, 2006) 
 
 
Using the numbered components in the figure above the authors identified two attack paths 
corresponding to (Client +) (Server +) (LogFile +) (HardDrive +), these are 1-2-3-5 and 1-2-4-5. The 
authors affirm that when software developers are able to match the attack pattern to their 
software design, this would enable them to obtain the graphical representation of the attack 
path and the vulnerability. An occurrence of a match indicates that the vulnerability may exist 
in the system being analysed and therefore helps in integrating effective countermeasures 
before coding starts. Another advantage of this approach is that it can be easily adapted by 
developers who are novices on security unlike other approaches discussed above, which would 
need involvement of security experts. However, this approach can generate false-positive 
results when it is used. 
The attack patterns were compared to taxonomies provided by Hoglund and McGraw, 
Landwehr et al. and Krsul. The authors reported that the attack patterns mapped to 62.2% of 
vulnerabilities abstracted by Hoglund and McGraw, 100% to that of Landwehr and 66% to that 
of Krsul. 
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2.2.5 Security Patterns 
Several works have been done based on security patterns since the pioneer work of Yoder et.al, 
1997 who applied design patterns to specific security issues.  Different security patterns have 
been developed by many authors in different context which gave raise to different definitions 
on security pattern (Halkidis, et.al, 2006).  However, most authors define security patterns as 
patterns describing particular recurring security problem in specific context and presents a well-
proven solution to it (Wiesauer and Sametinger, 2009, Laverdiere et.al, 2006, Kiiski, 2007, 
Kienzle and Elder, 2002, Blakley, et.al, 2004).  
 
These are design patterns that encapsulate security expertise solutions to recurring security 
problems that are applied to software designs to achieve security goals, such as availability, 
confidentiality or integrity (Agarwal, 2006) Through the use of security patterns, software 
developers are able to apply expertise worked solutions from security experts on their software 
design. In this way, developers are able to understand the strength and weaknesses of various 
approaches and make informed trade-off decisions on their design. Kienzle and Elder (2002) 
describe the objectives of security patterns as: 
 
 A means of bridging the gap between software developers and security experts.  
 A means of capturing security expertise solutions in form of worked-out solutions to 
recurring problems 
 Intended to be used and understood by software developers who are not security 
professionals 
 Intended to be constructive and educational as it tries to provide constructive assistance to 
software developers in the form of worked-out solutions (and not a checklist of what not to 
do) and also provide the guidance to apply the solutions properly 
 
From objectives above, it can be noticed that the benefits of security patterns is that it provides 
an effective way for software developers who are not expert in security to learn from security 
experts. Since security patterns documents proven solutions to recurring problems in a well-
structured manner that is familiar and easily understood by software developers it also 
enhances reusability of the patterns (Hafiz and Johnson, 2006). Therefore by using security 
pattern, software developers who are not expert in security able to expand their security focus 
from low level implementation to high level architectures (Schumacher, et.al, 2006) 
 
In previous research, many authors describe security patterns for different purposes. This 
includes security patterns for web applications (Steel, et.al, 2005, Kienzle and Elder, 2003), 
security patterns for mobile Java code (Mahmoud, 2000), security patterns for agents systems 
(Mouratidis, et.al, 2003), Security patterns for Voice over IP (VoIP) (Fernandez, et.al, 2007) and 
security pattern for capturing encryption-based access control to sensor data (Cuevas, et.al, 
2008).  To enable software developers to choose the appropriate security pattern addressing 
the security risks in their designs, several authors have proposed different classification scheme 
for security patterns. This include classification based on applicability (Blakley, et.al, 2004), 
classification based on product and process (Kienzle and Elder, 2003) classification based on 
logical tiers (Steel, et.al, 2005), classification based on application domain (Bunke, et.al, 2011) 
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classification based on security concepts (Hafiz and Johnson, 2006), classification based on 
system viewpoints and interrogatives (Zachman, 1987), classification based on confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA) model (Hafiz and Johnson, 2006) and classification based on 
attack patterns (Wiesauer and Sametinger, 2009) 
 
For the purpose of this research work, further investigation was done on research work carried 
out by Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) in chapter four. The motivation behind this research is 
to provide a new taxonomy for security design patterns that will enable software developers 
who are not necessarily expert in software security to easily select and apply them to their 
software design. The authors argued that because software developers without experience in 
security will not be able to apply security design patterns in a correct and effective manner, 
there is a need for pattern selection criteria.  After identifying existing taxonomies and their 
draw backs the authors proposed a new taxonomy based on attack patterns that will enable 
software developers to select appropriate security patterns according to possible attacks. 
 
Halkidis, S.T. et al. (2006) conducted a qualitative analysis of the features of the security 
patterns developed by the Open Group Security Forum to investigate how they conform to 
three main sets of criteria and how they guide the software to be designed. The three criteria 
included: 
 
 Guidelines by Viega and McGraw on how to build secure software. These guidelines are the 
design principles discussed below. 
 A guideline based on software hole categories that enable software to be exploited by 
attackers as described by Viega and McGraw. The security vulnerability used under this 
criterion includes buffer overflow, poor access control and race condition. 
 How well a specific security pattern can respond to different categories of attacks as 
identified by Howard and LeBlanc in the STRIDE model.  
 
Their findings showed that not all the security patterns met all the criteria from the three sets 
of criteria used for the analysis. Therefore, as no security pattern has all the desired 
characteristics, it has been suggested that developers would need a good combination of the 
security patterns when designing software in order to make it secure.  
 
However, combining security patterns to secure software design can also lead to other security 
holes. There can be inconsistencies among the security patterns, which may cause problems in 
the design when multiple security patterns are used to provide a level of security in software 
design. While each security pattern addresses a specific security problem, inconsistencies 
between patterns mean that security properties may no longer hold when they are combined 
and used to secure software designs (Dong J. et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.6 Secure Design Principles 
As many software developers often lack the much-needed security experience to develop 
secure software, secure design principles, such as the security patterns discussed above, bridge 
the gap between security experts and developers by offering guidelines that can help 
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developers build more secure software. The principles address practices that can be applied to 
architectural decisions and are recommended regardless of the language in which the software 
is to be written or the platform in which it would run (Barnum and Gegick, 2005). 
 
The design principles of software security include: 
 Securing the weakest link 
 Defence in depth 
 Failing Securely 
 Least Privilege 
 Separation of privilege 
 Economy mechanism 
 Least-Common Mechanism 
 Reluctant to trust 
 Never assume that your secrets are safe 
 Complete Mediation 
 Psychological Acceptability 
 Promoting privacy. 
 
To apply the principles, Over (2002), states that developers need: 
 A supportive environment and infrastructure 
 An operational process to put the principles into practice 
 A measurement system to manage and control the result. 
 
It should be noted that in many cases, software developers find these principles conflicting one 
another and this forces them to make trade-off decisions on their software development 
(Barnum and Gegick, 2005). As a result, software developers sometimes find these principles 
hard to follow and are not convinced of the benefits of disciplined software engineering 
methods (Over, 2002). 
 
2.2.7 Defect Prevention and Reduction 
As software riddled with defects poses a great security risk today, it has become increasingly 
important to prevent the defects from being introduced into the software or to reduce the 
number of defects to the minimum. As discussed earlier, security flaws are design errors that 
allow hackers, criminals or terrorists to obtain unauthorized access or use the software system 
(Humphrey, 2004). It is important to note here that a piece of software riddled with security 
defects may still function properly, since many of these defects do not cause functional 
problems. As a result, focusing on functional defects alone during software development would 
not be sufficient in dealing with potential security flaws in the system. Examples of software 
engineering practices which focus on reduction and prevention of overall software design and 
implementation defects include the Team Software Process (TSP) and Correction by 
Construction (CbyC). The approach taken by these practices to reduce software defects 
especially at the design phase of SDLC is discussed briefly below. 
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2.2.7.1 The Team Software Process (TSP) 
TSP was developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) as a set of defined and measured 
best practices for use by individual software developers and software development teams. TSP 
was designed as an operational process to support the establishment of good principles of 
software engineering (Over, 2002). TSP offers an integrated package which includes best 
practices for developing secure software. This includes team project management, risk 
management, process management, product quality management and software metrics.  
 
Teams using TSP are first trained in the Personal Software Process (PSP) which enables the 
software developers to acquire the necessary skills of software engineering practice and also 
appreciate its benefits in developing secure software applications. According to Noopur Davis of 
SEI software development, teams using the TSP: 
 
1. Manage defects throughout the software development lifecycle 
a) Defect prevention so specification, design, and implementation defects are not 
introduced to begin with 
b) Defect removal as soon as possible after defect injection 
1. Control the process through measurement and quality management 
2. Monitor the process 
3. Use predictive measures for remaining defects 
 
TSP does not only offer a process solution for producing near defect-free software applications, 
it also includes training for software developers in security issues, such as common causes of 
vulnerabilities, security-orientated design methods, secure coding and security testing 
especially with the TSP for Secure Software Development (TSP-Secure). This is a variant of TSP 
that augments TSP with security practices throughout SDLC for producing secure software. In 
their report on Security in Software Lifecycle Goertzel et al. (2006) states that TSP-Secure 
provides techniques and practices for: 
• Vulnerability analysis by defect type 
• Establishing predictive process metrics and checkpoints 
• Quality management for secure programming 
• Design patterns for common vulnerabilities 
• Security verification 
• Removal of vulnerabilities from legacy software. 
 
The TSP-Secure research objective is to reduce or eliminate software vulnerabilities that result 
from software design and implementation defects, and to provide the capability to predict the 
likelihood of latent security defects in delivered software (Davis, 2005). 
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To archive this, the TSP-Secure quality management strategy is to have multiple defect removal 
points in the SDLC. This increases the likelihood of finding software defects from the time the 
defects are introduced. In this way defects detected can be easily fixed and their root causes 
investigated and addressed. Davis (2005), states that “each defect removal activity can be 
thought of as a filter that removes some percentage of defects that can lead to vulnerabilities 
from the software product”. Therefore with more defect removal filters in SDLC, defects leading 
to security holes in the released software products will be drastically reduced. Also, as defects 
are measured early during SDLC, software development organizations can save money by 
taking corrective action early in the SDLC. 
 
 
Figure 2. 3: TSP-Secure Methodology for Defect Removal (Davis, 2005) 
 
TSP has been used by many organizations and it has helped to produce near defect-free 
software applications. It is reported in a study of 20 projects in 13 organizations that teams 
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using TSP-produced software have an average of 0.06 delivered design and implementation 
defects per thousand lines of new and changed code produced (Redwine and Davis, et al., 
2004). Table 2.1 below shows the quality performance of these projects compared to other 
typical software projects. 
 
   Table2. 1  Quality of Performance of TSP Projects (Redwine and Davis, et al., 2004) 
Measure TSP Projects 
Average 
Range 
Typical 
Projects 
Average 
System test defects (design and implementation defects discovered during 
system test, per thousand lines of new and changed code produced) 
0.4 
0 to 0.9 
 
2 to 15 
Delivered defects (design and implementation defects discovered after delivery, 
per thousand lines of new and changed code produced) 
0.06 
0 to 0.2 
 
1 to 7 
System test effort (% of total effort of development teams) 4% 
2% to 7% 
40% 
System test schedule (% of total duration for product development) 18% 
8% to25% 
40% 
Duration of system test (days/KLOC, or days to test 1000 lines of new and 
changed code produced) 
0.5 
0.2 to 0.8 
-- 
 
2.2.7.2 Correctness by Construction 
CbyC was developed by Praxis High Integrity System Limited in the UK and it has been used for 
over fifteen years to develop low-defect mission-critical software applications. It combines the 
best of both formal methods and agile development methodology (precise notation and 
incremental development respectively) (Amey, 2006). CbyC has evolved over the years and it is 
now applied all through SDLC from validation of the concepts of operation to preserving 
properties during long-term maintenance (Croxford and Chapman, 2005). The underlying 
principles of CbyC are: 
 Do not introduce errors in the first place. 
 Remove any errors as close as possible to the point that they are introduced. 
 Generate evidence of fitness for purpose throughout the SDLC as a natural by-product. 
 
In contrast to build and debug (the major way software products are developed today), CbyC 
aims to produce software products that are initially correct. With this in place, testing is no 
longer a point where debugging begins but a point where correct functionality of the software 
product is demonstrated. Amey (2006) describes CbyC as a natural fit to the goals of building 
security in security practices and states that CbyC “emphasizes the need to ensure that a 
system is developed integrating required properties rather than just retrospectively examined 
for those required properties.” 
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CbyC achieves its goals of not introducing any defects and making it easy for it to be detected 
and removed early by following the techniques below. These techniques form the CbyC 
process. 
• Use of Sound notation. Sound formal notations are used to write the specification. This 
removes ambiguity, thus making it difficult for errors to be introduced. 
• Use of Strong Validation. With the use of formal notation, carrying out proofs of formal 
specification and static code analysis using strong, tool supported methods is made possible. 
• Incremental Development. This involves building the software in small increments and 
making sure that each increment behaves correctly. 
• Avoidance of Repetition. A good example of how CbyC avoids repetition as described by 
Amey (2006) is the separation of software specification from high-level design. While 
software specification describes what the software will do, high-level design describes how 
the software will be structured and designed to meet requirements such as security safety 
and performance. Thus, the design does not repeat any information from the specification. 
• Striving for Simplicity. To ensure that software that is easily validated is designed and 
produced, the process of verification is simplified and the code is kept simple and directly 
traceable to the specification. 
• Managing Risk. CbyC tackles the most complex and least understood areas first when faced 
with a complex task as this is where risks and potential bugs are hidden. 
• Think hard. This involves thinking hard about the real objectives of the software product to 
be developed and using the right tool for developing it. 
 
As mentioned earlier, CbyC incorporates formal (mathematical) methods into the overall 
process of early verification and defect removal all through SDLC (Redwine and Davis et al., 
2004). At the design stage the formal methods and notations are used to specify the behaviour 
of the software and to model its characteristics (Croxford, 2005). This forms high-level design, 
which gives a top-level description of the system’s internal structure and also explains how the 
components work together. High-level design is validated by review and analysis to ensure 
correctness and consistency. For example, by using automated tools such as model checkers, a 
formal software design can be validated to ensure that it has desired properties such as 
freedom from deadlock (Hall and Chapman, 2004).  
 
CbyC also contains a detailed design stage in which the set of software modules and processes 
is explicitly modelled and analysed. The module structure describes the software architecture 
and defines how functionality described in the specification and high-level design is allocated to 
each module. For secure systems, the system state and operations are categorized according to 
their impact on security with the aim of arriving at an architecture that minimizes and isolates 
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security-critical functions that reduce the cost and effort of the (possibly more rigorous) 
verification of those units (Hall and Chapman, 2004). 
 
CbyC has proved to be very cost effective in developing software because errors are eliminated 
early during SDLC or not introduced in the first place. This subsequently reduces the amount of 
rework that would be needed later during software development. The use of formal methods 
helps CbyC to harness precision to every step of the development so that the system is more 
likely to meet the requirement and to work correctly when deployed. (Croxford, 2005) The 
Certification Authority system supporting the MULTOS multi-application smart card operating 
system was developed by Mondex International (now part of Mastercard) using CbyC. The 
system was delivered at a low operational defect rate of 0.04 defects/kloc (thousand lines of 
code) 
 
CbyC has not been widely used. Hall and Chapman (2005) state ‘that this is because individuals 
and organizations do not believe that it is possible to develop software that is low defect’ 
Secondly, practical questions such as how to acquire the necessary capability or expertise and 
how to introduce changes necessary to make the improvement, need to be answered where 
the need for the improvement is acknowledged and considered achievable. 
 
2.2.8 Formal Methods 
“Formal methods are mathematically based techniques for the specification development and 
verification of software and hardware systems” (Hinchey et al., 2008). To overcome the 
problem of complex design errors, which when left undetected can lead to implementation 
defects that are difficult to detect and remove during testing, Howe (2005), argues that the 
industry needs to invest in solutions that apply formal methods in analysing software 
specification and design in order to reduce the number of defects before implementation 
starts. Recent advances in formal methods have also made verification of memory safety of 
concurrent systems possible (Hinchey et al., 2008). As a result, formal methods are being used 
to detect design errors relating to concurrency (Howe, 2005). 
Hinchey et al. (2008) describes formal models as an engineering task that is best accomplished 
in the normal design discipline. With normal design, engineers are able to predict the behaviour 
of a system from its design before it is implemented. According to Hinchey et al. normal design 
embodies the accumulated knowledge of the models of the product in question and its 
environment that meets the desired level of dependability. This is implicitly handled in the 
configuration of a normal design and also considered in the checks and calculations mandated 
by the discipline of the normal design practice. 
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A software development process incorporating formal methods into the overall process of early 
verification and defects removal through all SDLC is CbyC (Redwine and Davis et al., 2004). CbyC 
has proved to be very cost effective in developing software because errors are eliminated early 
during SDLC or not introduced in the first place. This subsequently reduces the amount of 
rework that would be needed later during software development. Unfortunately, formal 
methods are not widely used and some software development organizations are reluctant to 
use them. Apart from this, formal methods require a mathematically meticulous way of 
judgment that many software developers are not used to (Redwine and Davis et al., 2004). 
2.2.9 Secure Tropos 
This is software development methodology that aims at integrating security into SDLC. Secure 
Tropos addresses the need to simultaneously analyse the technical and social dimensions of 
security to software systems. This methodology is based on Tropos methodology, which uses 
the i* modeling framework. This framework proposes an agent-oriented approach to 
requirement engineering during SDLC by focusing on the intentional characteristic of the agent 
(Yu et al., 2007). The following concepts are used in the framework. 
 Actor: This is an entity that has intentions and strategic goals within a system. 
 Goal: This represents the actors’ strategic interest. It is a condition or state of the world that 
the actor likes to achieve (Also referred to as ‘hard goal’).  
 Soft Goal: This is used to capture non-functional requirements of the system to-be. It lacks 
the criteria for determining whether it is satisfied or not and therefore is subject to 
interpretation. 
 Task: This is also referred to as ‘plan’ and represents a way of doing something. 
 Resource: This represents a physical or informational entity that may serve a purpose or be 
required by an actor. 
 Social Dependencies: These occur between actors in which one of the actors depends on the 
other to attain a goal, execute a task or deliver a resource. The depending actor is referred 
as the depender and the actor depended upon is referred to as the dependee. The type of 
dependence between the two actors specifies the kind of agreement (dependun) between 
them. 
 
The Secure Tropos methodology extends the Tropos methodology by integrating security into 
the concept described above and also by introducing new concepts. This includes the following. 
 Security Constraint: This represents the restriction related to the security of the system (i.e. 
such as privacy, integrity, availability) that can influence the analysis and design of the 
system to-be during SDLC by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting 
some of the requirements of the system or by refining some of the system’s objectives. 
 Secure Entity: This refers to any plan or goal relating to the security of the system. 
 Secure Goal: This represents the strategic interest of an actor in relation to security. This is 
introduced in order to achieve the security constraint imposed on an actor or the security 
constraint imposed on in the system. 
 Secure Plan: This represents a particular way of satisfying a secure goal. 
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 Secure Dependency: This introduces security constraints that both the depender and the 
dependee must agree to fulfill in order to satisfy the dependency. 
 
The Secure Tropos process involves ‘analyzing the security needs of the stakeholders and the 
system in terms of security constraints imposed on the stakeholders and the system, identifying 
secure entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints, and assigning 
capabilities to the system to help towards the satisfaction of the secure entities’ (Mouratidis et 
al., 2007). The Secure Tropos methodology has four phases, which are: 
 
1) Early Requirement Phase: During this phase the activities below are carried out. 
 A security reference diagram is constructed. 
 Security constraints are imposed on the stakeholders of the system. 
 Secure goals and entities are added to corresponding actors in order to satisfy the 
security constraints. 
 
2) Late Requirement Phase: The activities carried during this phase include the following. 
 Security constraint are imposed on the system under development in reference to the 
security reference diagram. 
 Security constraints are further analyzed. 
 Identification of security goals and entities that are necessary for the system to 
guarantee security. 
 
3) Architectural Design phase: This stage includes the activities below. 
 Analysis of security constraints and secure entities that may be introduced by new 
actors. 
 Definition of the architectural style of the system with regards to security requirements. 
  Transformation of the security requirements of the system into a design with aid of 
security patterns. 
 Identification of the agents of the system and their capabilities. 
 
4) Detailed Design: During this phase the components identified in the previous phase are 
designed with the aid of the Agent Unified Modeling Language (AUML). 
 
2.2.10 Alloy 
Alloy is a tool used for the analysis of software design. With the high-level coding notation of a 
software design, the analysis tool is used to check billions of possible executions of the system 
for unusual conditions and constraints that will cause the system to behave in an unexpected 
way. This helps in detecting the design flaws before the software is coded and therefore results 
in a more reliable and robust software design.  
 
Alloy is built upon two elements that help in making software designs more robust. One of the 
elements is the new language that helps to reveal the structure and behaviour of the software 
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design and the second element is an automated analyser that incorporates the SAT 
(satisfiability) solver to analyse the multitude of possible scenarios of the software during 
execution. Alloy works by trying to find solutions to software design puzzles that meet all the 
good constraints that could occur during the execution of the software as well as the bad 
constraints that may make the software behave unexpectedly during execution (Jackson, 2006). 
The solution (also called the ‘counterexample’) if found would reveal flaws in the design which 
would need to be fixed. 
 
To use Alloy to analyse a software design the first step taken is to create the model of the 
design that specifies the moving parts and specific behaviours (both desired and undesired) of 
the system and its components. The software engineer will have to write down the definitions 
of the various types of objects in the design and then group the objects with similar structure 
and behaviour into mathematical sets. Following this, the facts that constrain these sets and 
their relation are identified. These facts include the mechanism of the software system and 
assumptions about other components, such as how human users are expected to behave. Some 
of the facts may be simple assumptions and may reflect the design itself. From the facts, 
assertions are made specifying that the system can never get into certain undesirable states 
and that specific bad sequences of events can never occur (Jackson, 2006). 
 
Alloy uses the SAT solver to search for counterexamples, i.e. possible scenarios of the software 
system that are permitted by its design but violate the stated assertions. Alloy does this by 
constructing situations that satisfy the facts but go against a stated assertion that will make the 
system behave in an unaccepTable way. The discovery of such scenarios would reveal the flaws 
in the software design. It is important to note that the essence of the software design is 
captured by an abstraction made up of the declarations of the sets and relations, the facts and 
the stated assertions that all make explicit the limitation of the software design. This compels 
the software engineer to find which abstractions will work best for the system.  
 
So far, Alloy has been used to uncover flaws in some published software designs such as “a key 
management protocol that was supposed to enforce special-access rules based on membership 
in a group but turned out to grant access to former members who should have been rejected.” 
(Jackson, 2006) Though tools such as Alloy are yet to be widely used in the software industry, 
their use during software development will help software developers to better evaluate their 
software design thereby producing more reliable and robust software systems. 
 
2.2.11 Tools for evaluating security in Software design  
Security related activities such as threat modelling and risk analysis has historically been in the 
domain of security experts.  Over the years this has created a knowledge gap between the 
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software developers who are trained to think of functions and features of their product and its 
on-schedule delivery and the security expert who focus on observing system intrusions, dealing 
with malicious attackers and studying software vulnerabilities (Kenneth, Wyk and McGraw, 
2006). To reduce this knowledge gap some security tools has been developed in the recent 
years which enable software developers to scrutinize their software design and identify security 
flaws in a similar way as a security expert (Adebiyi, et.al, 2012). 
 
Microsoft developed two of these security tools. The first that was release for public use is the 
Threat Analysis and Modelling (TAM) tool. This was developed by the Microsoft Application 
Consulting; Engineering (ACE) team with the aim of enabling non-security expert software 
developers to use already known data and specific line of business application requirement and 
architecture to carry out threat modelling in an asset-centric approach. With this tool software 
developers can focus on protecting the assets within their application by identifying associated 
threats and counter-measures when it’s being designed. This information enables the software 
developers to understand and manage business risks in their application early in the SDLC.  
Following the release of TAM tool, Microsoft also released the SDL Threat Modelling Tool. This 
tool had been used extensively by Microsoft for threat modelling internally prior to its release. 
SDL Threat Modelling tool is a core element in the design phase of Microsoft Security 
Development Lifecycle which helps software developers to analyse their software designs prior 
to its implementation.  According to Microsoft, this tool was not developed for security experts 
but for software developers to aid the creation and analysis of threat models (Microsoft, 2011). 
In contrast to TAM tool, SDL Threat Modelling tool builds on well-known development activities 
such as the use of data flow diagram (DFD) for drawing the architecture of the software being 
designed. Thus, following a software-centric approach, threat modelling with this tool focuses 
on the software and the analysis of its design (Swigart and Campbell, 2008).   
 
While these tools have lots of useful features that enable software developers to do threat 
modelling easily, they have a few draw backs. Firstly, the quality of report generated by the 
tools is still limited by the knowledge of the software developer creating the threat model. 
Secondly, software developers require the understanding and interpretation of the extensive 
list of threats identified by the tools. This may become a daunting task especially when the 
threats are not prioritized as the case is with the use of SDL Threat Modelling Tool. Thirdly the 
process of threat modelling can increasingly become complex while using the tools due to 
factors such as number of developers involved in the threat modelling process, the nature of 
DFD created and potential stakeholders )(Mockel and Abdallah, 2011) (Berg, 2010).  
 
There is now a range of security tools from open source with similar threat modelling approach 
like that of Microsoft threat modelling tools such as SeaMonster, TRIKE and  Coras, which use 
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techniques that software developers are familiar with for the identification and mitigation of 
threats. There are other threat modelling approaches based on standards such as the Risk 
Analysis Toolkit based on ISO 1799 which generates security polices based on question and 
answers (Ricard, 2011)and other open security tools like the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) that is designed to for rating IT vulnerabilities(CVSS-SIG, 2011). 
 
2.2.12 Network Security 
Network security is the process of taking both physical and software measures to protect 
networks and their services from unauthorized modification, destruction or disclosure and the 
provision of assurance that the network would perform its critical functions correctly without 
any harmful side effects (Gregory, 2001). Some of the network security tools used for 
protecting various networks includes firewalls, anti-virus, anti-spyware, software intrusion 
detection and intrusion prevention systems, encryption, virtual private networks (VPN) and 
vulnerability scanners. 
Today, the network security environment has become a mature field with the development of 
various tools and technologies for securing the network. It had also influenced the  
development of technologies such as application firewalls and encryption devices for securing 
software product in a reactive way. However, as deployed software now come under 
continuous attack, it is being argued that so much time, money and effort would not have been 
spent on network security if we didn’t have bad software security (Viega and McGraw, 2002). 
This stems from the fact that building secure software is better than protecting a bad one. On 
this note, Gary McGraw of Citigal Inc stated that “trying to protect software from attack by 
filtering its input and constraining its behaviour in a post facto way (application security) is 
nowhere near as effective as designing software to withstand attack in the first place (software 
security)”. 
Therefore, while network security aims at protecting networks and its resources such as the 
software applications running within it, software security aims at integrating security into 
software during development in order to produce secured software applications that can 
withstand attack proactively in a hostile environment. Thus, network security could be viewed 
as providing security in depth to software applications through the use of network security 
tools to establish many layers of protection in the network environment whereby software 
security helps in providing security within software applications itself. Hence, network security 
and software security can both work together to provide an overall protection against malicious 
attackers within networks and software applications.   
2.2.13 Application Security 
With the increase of attacks targeting vulnerable software applications, the need for 
application security measures arose to augment network security measures as this could no 
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longer provide adequate security for software applications. Application security uses a 
combination of system engineering security practices, such as defence-in-depth (DiD) measures 
(e.g. protecting against malicious code, encryption, extensible markup language (XML) security 
gateways, locking down execuTables, sandboxing, application layer firewalls, policy 
enforcement) and secure configurations, with operational security practices, including patch 
management and vulnerability management to protect software application from attacks 
(Goertzel, et.al, 2007). Application Security protection measures are mostly defined at network 
and system architectural level instead of the individual software architectural level and these 
are implemented when the software application is deployed and fully operational (McGraw, 
2002). 
 
One of the benefits of application security is that it minimizes the exposure of vulnerable 
software to threats that could exploit them by using security practices such as patch 
management to reduce the number of vulnerabilities in the software application. Another 
benefit of application security is that it helps to specify trust boundaries which controls access 
to vulnerable software application and also provide safe execution environment through the 
use of boundary protection technologies (e.g. application firewall) that offer protection from 
attacks. This subsequently constrains interactions with the vulnerable software application, 
thus reducing its exposure to attackers.  
 
In analogy to band aid that offers protection against the wound but does not remove the 
disease, some authors have been referred to application security as band aid security based on 
the benefits highlighted above. These authors argue that these benefits are in favour of 
application security as many software developers do not have the skill to integrate security into 
software during development. Furthermore, as banks and many other companies through 
mergers and acquisition take over software applications often infested with various 
vulnerabilities, it has been argued that application security provides the cheapest way of 
maintaining the application because most of these companies do not have the money or time 
to rebuild the applications (Hogland, 2002). 
 
In a contrary view, application security has been described as protecting software applications 
in a reactive way by finding and fixing security problem only after they have been exploited. 
While application security deal with security problems under the band –aid security approach, 
i.e. addressing security symptoms such as stopping buffer overflows attacks by monitoring the 
application inputs or HTTP traffic on port 80, it ignores the root cause of the problem which is 
the vulnerability in the software itself. Therefore, some authors have argued that ‘in the fight 
for better software, treating the disease itself (poorly designed and implemented software) is 
better than taking an aspirin to stop the symptom’(McGraw, 2002)  This is the software security 
approach and it involves software risk management, secure coding, design for security and 
security tests during software development. In support of this argument is the IEEE P1074 
Standard for Developing Project Life Cycle Processes. According to Bar Biszick-Lockwood who 
headed the volunteer team who proposed this standard to IEEE, P1074 is the first IEEE software 
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process Standard to embed dedicated, mandatory, security-related activities in the software 
development life cycle. 
 
2.3.0 Neural Networks 
Neural Networks were inspired by the studies of the brain and nervous system in biological 
organisms. An artificial neural network consists of very large highly interconnected simple 
processing elements (called artificial neurons) which can demonstrate complex overall 
behaviour depending on the interconnected neurons and element parameters. The 
interconnected processing elements work together to solve specific problems through a 
learning process just like biological systems.  
 
A typical neuron in the human brain that neural networks model, collects signals from others 
through a fine structure of projections called the dendrites. The neuron uses an axon (a long, 
thin stand which also splits into many branches) to send out spikes of electrical activity when it 
receives an excitatory input that is suitably larger than the input. Another structure, called a 
synapse, at the end of each branch of the axon converts the activity of the axon into electrical 
effects that either excite or inhibit connecting neurons. 
 
Figure 2. 4: Structure of a Neuron (Turchin, 1977) 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) have been used in various applications to extract and identify 
trends that are too complex to observe by computer techniques or by humans because of their 
ability to obtain meaning from complicated or incomplete data. They are used to infer functions 
from various observations, which can be used to provide projections – given new situations of 
interest – and answer “what if” questions. Other advantages as stated by Stergiou and Siganos, 
1997 include:  
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1) Adaptive learning: An ability to learn how to do tasks based on the data given for training or 
initial experience.  
2) Self-Organisation: An ANN can create its own organisation or representation of the 
information it receives during learning time.  
3) Real Time Operation: ANN computations may be carried out in parallel, and special 
hardware devices are being designed and manufactured that take advantage of this 
capability.  
4) Fault Tolerance via Redundant Information Coding: Partial destruction of a network leads to 
the corresponding degradation of performance. However, some network capabilities may be 
retained even with major network damage. 
 
2.3.1 Artificial Neural Network and Conventional computers 
While conventional computers are good at calculating arithmetic very fast and doing precisely 
what they have been programmed to do, they are not good at: 
• Dealing with noisy data from the environment 
• Massive Parallelism 
• Adapting to circumstances. 
 
The reason for this is because conventional computers resolve problems using an algorithm 
approach that follows a set of instructions as specified by the programmer. Without these 
instructions, the computer will not be able to solve the problem. This factor restricts the 
problem-solving capability of conventional computers to well-understood problems and the 
methods of resolving them. 
 
Unlike conventional computers, neural networks cannot be programmed to carry out specific 
tasks. They learn by example. Information is processed similarly to the way the human brain 
processes information through its large number of highly interconnected network of processing 
elements that work in parallel to resolve specific tasks. 
 
Smith 2003, states that ANN can help especially in the following areas: 
• Where an algorithmic solution cannot be formulated 
• Where structure needs to be picked out from existing data 
• Where there are lots of examples for the behaviour that is required. 
 
Up till now neural networks have been used successfully in many disciplines for different 
applications. They have been used in the area of forecasting, predicting, data validation, 
marketing, risk management in many business organizations and also in the medical field. The 
area most relevant to this research where neural networks have been used is in the area of 
network security and application security. This is discussed below. 
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2.3.2 Neural Network Architectures 
Neural network architectures are divided into two categories: supervised and unsupervised 
architectures. In the supervised architecture the neural network is trained to give desired 
outputs when inputs are fed into the network. Examples of supervised architecture include: 
• Feed-Forward Networks: This network has only a one way connection between its input 
and output layer through which signals are allowed to travel. It is a straightforward 
network associating inputs with outputs. They are commonly used for pattern recognition, 
prediction and non-linear function fitting (Stergiou and Siganos, 1997) (MathWorks, 2011). 
Examples of feed-forward networks include perceptron networks, feed-forward back-
propagation, linear networks, feed-forward input delay back-propagation and cascade-
forward back-propagation.  
 
Figure 2. 5: Feedforward Network (Edward, 2008) 
 
• Feedback Networks. These networks allow signals to travel in both directions, thereby 
introducing loops in the network. This makes the networks dynamic as their state keeps 
changing continuously until it reaches an equilibrium point. They are usually used for 
nonlinear dynamic modelling, control system application and time-series prediction. 
 
Figure 2. 6: Feedback Network (Edward, 2008) 
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• Radial basis Network: This is a network with only one hidden layer, which provides an 
alternative method for designing non-linear feed-forward networks (MathWorks, 2011) 
(Smith, 2003). The hidden layer has a receptive field with a centre in which outputs tails off 
as the input moves away from it. 
• Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ): This network enables classification of patterns that 
are not linearly separable. Class boundaries and granularity of classification can be 
specified with LVQ. 
 
In unsupervised architecture neural networks, no external teacher is involved. The neural 
network self-organises the data presented to it and detects their emergent collective 
properties (Stergiou and Siganos, 1997). Examples of unsupervised architecture include: 
• Competitive Layers: This network recognises similar input vectors and groups them 
together. This eventually allows for the inputs to be automatically sorted into categories. 
Competitive layers are usually used for pattern and classification recognition. 
• Self-Organizing Maps: This also groups inputs according to their similarity but differs from a 
competitive layer in that it is able to preserve its topology of the input vectors such that 
nearby inputs are assigned to nearby categories (MathWorks, 2011). 
 
2.3.3 Applications of Neural Networks 
Previous researches have shown how neural networks can be used in the area of network 
security as intrusion detection systems. In this area, neural networks are being used to decide 
when an attack is taking place against a computer system and this has offered possible 
solutions to some of the problems experienced by other present approaches to intrusion 
detection, which are rule-based systems (Cannady, 1998), (Ahmad, Swati and Mohsin, 2007).  
Neural networks were proposed to recognize the distinctive characteristics of users of software 
systems and point out statistically significant variations from their recognized behaviour using 
data from the network environment even if the data is flawed or distorted. Since a network can 
come under several coordinated multiple attacks, neural networks have also helped to identify 
such attacks because of their ability to process data from a number of sources in a non-linear 
fashion (Ahmad, Swati and Mohsin, 2007). Furthermore, a neural network has the ability to 
detect novel attacks it has never been exposed to during its learning process. This is because by 
creating and refining abstractions from raw data, it learns not just what an attack is and what 
it’s not, but what makes an attack an attack (McAvinney and Turner, 2005). 
Ahmad, Swati and Mohsin (2007) proposed a neural network trained using a Resilient Back 
Propagation (RPROP) algorithm and this was tested against different types of network attack 
such as DOS and probing and the result gave an overall detection rate of 95.93% which is noted 
to be of better performance when compared to other neural network approaches to IDS. It is 
important to note here that although the neural network has been applied as a network 
security tool for detecting network attacks, it does not give a 100% detection of network 
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attacks as the result shows. However, it equally demonstrates the ability of neural networks to 
detect network attacks to a very reasonable degree. 
Also, neural networks have been proposed for detecting computer viruses using statistical 
analysis approaches. The proposed neural network was designed to study the features of 
normal system activity and recognize statistical variations from the normal activity that may 
indicate the presence of a virus (Cannady, 1998).  
In the area of software quality, neural networks have also been proposed for predicting the 
reliability of a software application by using the failure history of the software as their raw data 
to develop their own internal model of the failure process to predict the total number of faults 
to be detected at the end of a future test session of the software (Malaiya Y. K. et al., 1992). 
Similarly, Tamura, Yamada, and Kimura (2003), having noted the difficulty of assessing software 
reliability due to the increase in software complexity especially in a distributed environment 
proposed a software reliability assessment method based on a neural network model that takes 
into consideration the interactions of software components in the distributed environment. 
This method was compared to other software reliability growth models (SRGMs) using real 
software fault data to conduct a goodness of fit comparison and the result showed that this 
method gave the best fit to the data. Owing to the positive performance of neural networks in 
this area, it has been suggested as an alternative in modelling software reliability data (Ho, Xie 
and Goh, 2003). 
Neural networks have also been applied in the area of cryptography. Karras and Zorkadis (2003) 
used neural networks for strengthening the existing traditional generators of random numbers 
used in many cryptographic protocols for secure communication systems. The use of the 
Overfitting Multilayer Perceptron (MPL) type of neural networks and recurrent ANN of the 
Hopfield type for generating pseudorandom numbers were the two types of neural network-
based mechanisms proposed. Their performance was compared to the traditional generators 
and the results showed that ANN-based generators performed better in the statistical and non-
predictability tests than the traditional generators. In another approach by Lian (2008), a neural 
network is used to construct a block cipher that has the ability to encrypt data with the control 
of its key. The neural network consists of the chaotic neuron layer and the linear neuron layer 
which helps it to realize data diffusion and confusion functionalities respectively and these are 
the essential properties for the operation of a secure cipher. As a result, it offers a higher 
security against select cipher attacks when compared to other existing ciphers and it is more 
suiTable for encrypting images. 
In the area of application security, a neural network has been proposed to solve the problems 
occurring in systems using a password Table and a verification Table for user authentication 
where an attacker can add a forged user-ID and password to the verification Table or replace 
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someone’s password. This approach was proposed by Lin, Ou and Hwang (2005) using the 
characteristic memory of a back-propagation network to recall the password information 
generated and memorized during its training. This proposed method was tested using 200 pairs 
of usernames and passwords consisting of eight characters. In terms of the accuracy, the result 
of this proposed method showed that the output of the trained neural network was close to 
the expected output and, with regards to its performance, its time complexity was found to be 
0. This is because it uses simple multiplication and addition to produce its results unlike the 
methods using encryption to store password information on the verification Table requiring 
exponential computing, which is more time consuming. However, it is noted that it takes a long 
time to train the network and that the proposed method does not protect against guess attacks 
in which an attacker can try all possible passwords until a match is found.  
2.4. Summary of Chapter Two 
Creating software applications that work and at the same time will continue to function 
correctly under malicious attack remain a very great challenge to the software industry. Many 
of the approaches used to integrate security into software application during the design phase 
SDLC has been explored in this chapter. While these approaches help towards developing a 
secure software application, the need for involvement of security experts and developers lack 
of experience in security was noted as factors affecting their effectiveness. The use of formal 
methods and security tools were also explored and their draw backs such as lack of adoption 
were highlighted. Network security and application security protects software applications by 
embracing standard approaches such as penetrate and patch, input filtering (i.e. blocking 
malicious inputs), monitoring programs as they run, enforcing software use policy with 
technology and providing value in a reactive way. While network security and application 
security offers protection to software applications after development, it was established that it 
is better to integrate security during software development. The background to neural 
networks was presented in this chapter and its applications especially in the area of network 
security and application security in technologies such as IDS, cryptography, anti-virus and user 
authentication techniques. In the next chapter the proposed neural network approach is 
presented and neural network model overview will be discussed.  
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Chapter 3. Software Design Evaluation by Neural Network 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Neural network is proposed as an evaluation tool in this research for evaluating software 
designs for security flaws. The evaluation by the proposed neural network tool is based on two 
previous research works by Michael Gegick and Laurie Williams (2006) and Wiesauer and 
Sametinger (2009) (See chapter 2 for further discussion). In the first research work, Gegick and 
Williams (2006) created regular expression based attack patterns which show sequence of 
events that could occur during an attack.  These attack patterns are based on software 
components involved in attacks and are tailored towards identifying security flaws in system 
design. The authors argued that software engineers can conduct a Security Analysis for Existing 
Threats (SAFE-T) by matching the attack patterns to their system design. Their motivation for 
this approach is to enable software developers identify vulnerabilities in their system design 
before coding start as this is seen as a cheaper way of integrating security into software 
compared to when it is been retrofitted after development. In the second research work, 
Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) proposed a new a new taxonomy for security design patterns 
based on attack patterns. The authors argue that there is a need for a selection criterion 
because software developers who are not experienced in security are unable to select and 
apply security pattern in a correct and effective manner. Therefore by using their proposed 
taxonomy the authors state that software developers can match identified attack patterns in 
their software designs to corresponding security design patterns that would provide the 
appropriate mitigation.   
One of the limitations with some of the current approaches for integrating security into 
software design is the difficulty of getting software developers to think like attackers during the 
threat modelling process as this mind-set is not native to them(Swigart and Campbell, 2008). It 
has been suggested that software developers can instead look at the attack surface of their 
software design and think of how to build defences into their application (Swigart and 
Campbell, 2008). The proposed neural network tool achieves this by associating components in 
the design with attacks that can be performed on them when possible attack patterns are 
matched to the software design. This subsequently assists the software developers in 
addressing security defences needed to be put in place. 
 
In this chapter, the model overview of this research work is presented. The components of the 
research model show the way through which the proposed neural network tool would be 
evaluating software design for security flaws based on the previous research works highlighted 
above. As a result, each of the components of the research model would also be discussed. 
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3.2. Model Overview 
The figure below shows the model overview. This includes the input module, the neural 
network module and the output module. The input module consists of the system design, 
which is in form of scenarios that has been abstracted from a software design. The scenarios 
consist of the participating software components and actors in the design during each scenario. 
The neural network module consists of two neural networks. The first neural network is trained 
to recognise possible attacks from the set of scenarios presented to it by matching it to 
corresponding attack patterns proposed by Gegick and Williams (2006). The second neural 
network accepts the output of the first neural network (i.e. identified attack pattern) as input 
and suggests possible security design pattern that could mitigate the threat in the attack 
pattern identified in the first neural network. The output module simply shows the attack 
identified by the first neural network and the security pattern suggested by the second neural 
network that has been mapped to deal with the attack. 
 
System Design 
Scenarios
Identified Attack 
Pattern & 
Suggested 
Solution
Neural 
Network 1
Neural 
Network 2
Model Overview
Input 
Module
Output 
Module
Neural Network Module
 
Figure 3. 1: Model Overview 
 
3.3 The Input Module 
The proposed Neural Network tool uses the abstract and match technique for identifying 
security flaws in software designs by matching possible attack pattern to the design. For the 
purpose of this research work, data was abstracted from the attack scenarios in the reported 
attacks in online vulnerability databases. As all the attacks considered were mainly caused by 
security flaws in the design of the reported software application, the abstracted attack 
scenarios were used as the software design in the input module of the research model because 
this provided information on the software design of the reported vulnerable software 
application. In a similar way, using well known approaches such as data flow diagrams (DFD) 
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and sequence diagrams, software developers are able to abstract information from scenarios in 
their software designs needed by the Neural Network tool for matching possible attack 
patterns to their design. In the following sections, the source of the attack scenarios and the 
attributes used to abstract the information needed to train the neural network are discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Source of attack scenario 
To generate the attack scenarios linking the software components and actors identified in the 
attack pattern, online vulnerability databases were used to identify attack scenarios 
corresponding to the attack pattern. Data of attack scenarios from the following online 
vulnerability databases were used in this research. 
1. CVE Details 
2. Security Tracker 
3. Secunia 
4. Security Focus 
5. The Open Source Vulnerability database (OSVD) 
6. IBM Internet Security Systems 
 
For each of the attack scenarios, the online vulnerability databases gave various types of 
information. The variety of information given on the same attack scenarios provided 
comprehensive information about the attacks. Most of the online vulnerability databases gave 
a brief description of the attack as seen in the figure below. NoTable among other information 
provided is information about source of the attack (i.e. whether the attack is a remote attack 
or a local attack), the impact of the attack on confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
reported software application, the vulnerability exploited in the attack, the CVSS score of the 
attack which indicated the severity rating of the attack, details of exploits code and level of 
access gained by the attacker. The figure below shows the information provided on the attack 
on webmail server from CVE details, security focus and security tracker online databases. 
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Figure 3. 2: Information on CVE Details database showing attack on webmail 
 
 
Figure 3. 3: Information on Security Focus database showing attack on webmail 
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Figure 3. 4: Information on Security Tracker database showing attack on webmail. 
 
 
3.3.2 Attack Attributes  
For the purpose of training the neural network the following attributes were used to abstract 
the information needed from the attack scenarios. 
 The Attacker: The information captured with this attribute is the capability of the attacker. 
This examines what level of access possessed when carrying out the attack. The following 
levels of the access were examined for each of the attack scenario. 
1. No access: This shows the attacker has no access when carrying out the attack. The 
attacker could escalate his privilege during the course of the attack. In some attack 
scenarios, no access is required by the attacker for carrying out the attack.    
2. Read access: This indicate where the attacker has a form of user account with access 
limited to reading or viewing information in an application   
3. Write/Change access:  This also shows where the attack having a form of user account 
but with more privileges. In this case, the attacker is able to read and write. He is able 
to make changes or modify the data that he is able to access. 
4. Admin access: For this level of access, the attacker is able to read, write, make changes 
to data, create and delete user accounts. With this access, the attacker has full 
administrative right.  
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 Source of attack: This attack attributes captures the location of the attack during the 
attack. In particular, the attack scenarios are examined under this attribute to find out 
whether the attack was carried locally (i.e. internally) or remotely (i.e. externally) 
 
 Target of the attack:  This captures the system component that is targeted by the attacker. 
This could be a system resource such as memory, buffer or data that is stored in a 
database.  
 
 Attack vector: This attributes captures the mechanism (i.e. software component) adopted 
by the attacker to carry out the attack. For instance, the webmail attack scenario in the 
figure above, the attacker uses a long Get Request to cause buffer overflow and also 
execute arbitrary code.  
 
 Attack type: The security property of the application being attacked is captured under this 
attribute. The security property under attack could be: 
1. Confidentiality: This is when privacy in the application is compromised. For example, 
when information is disclosed to users who are not authorized to have access to it.  
2. Availability: This is when the attack is aimed at making services provided by the 
software system unavailable to valid users. For instance, in denial of service attack 
3. Integrity: Attack against this security property includes attacks where the data stored 
or processed by the targeted software application is maliciously modified. 
 
 Input Validation: This attributes examines whether any validation is done on the input 
passed to the targeted software application before it is being processed.  Attack scenarios 
are categorized into the following groups using this attributes 
1. No Validation: where no input validation was carried out on inputs 
2. Partial Validation: Where insufficient input validation was done on the inputs 
3. All inputs validated: Where all input was properly validated or where the attack was 
not associated to this security flaw. 
 
 Dependencies: The interaction of the targeted software application with the users and 
other systems is analysed under this attributes. The intention here is find out whether any 
measure is implemented in the software application to make sure its dependency on users 
or other software system is secured. With this attributes, attack scenarios are examined 
under the following categories 
1. None:  This is where no security measure is implemented before accepting any form of 
interaction from users or other software system. For example, attack scenarios where 
visitors to a website are allowed to post messages without any form of authentication 
2. Authentication: This examines whether authentication was carried out before 
interacting with users and other software system 
3. Access Control: In this category, the targeted software application in the attack 
scenario is examined for failure in restricting access to resources to unauthorized users  
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4. Trust Boundary Defined: This examines whether the targeted software application 
define a trust boundary between itself and other users or software system it is 
interacting with 
5. Encryption: For this category, the failure of the targeted software application to secure 
the communication between itself and other users or software systems when 
exchanging sensitive information is examined 
 
 Output encoding to external applications/services: Attack scenarios are examined under 
this attributes to check whether the attack is associated with flaws due to failure of the 
targeted software application in properly verifying and encoding its outputs to other 
software systems.  For instance, in SQL injection attacks, the targeted web application is 
checked for failure in sanitizing user supplied query before passing this to the database.  
Therefore, under this attributes, attack scenarios are examined to see if the flaws exploited 
in the attack  is due to failure of the targeted software application to verify untrusted data 
using techniques such as escaping all inputs, use of parameterized interface or prepared 
statements. 
 
 Authentication:  This attribute checks for failure of the targeted software application to 
properly handle account credentials safely or when the authentication is not enforced in 
the attack scenarios. Attack scenarios are examined under this attributes to see of the flaw 
is associated to any of the issues below include: 
1. Use of plaintext password 
2. Use of salted or harsh password  
3. Lack of account lock outs and time outs 
4. Session Management 
5. Credential management 
6. Lack of re-authentication for assessing sensitive data 
7. Lack of decision logs showing whether failure or success of authentication 
 Access Control: Failure in enforcing access control by the targeted software application is 
examined in the attack scenarios with this attribute. The attacked scenarios are analysed 
with flaws associated to the following: 
1. Data access authorization 
2. URL access authorization 
3. Service access authorization 
4. Function access authorization 
5. File access authorization 
6. Server side enforcement of access control 
7. Failure in checking all access path 
 
 HTTP Security: Attack Scenarios are examined for security flaws related to HTTP requests, 
headers, responses, cookies, logging and sessions with this attribute. The following issues 
are examined in the attack scenarios with this attribute: 
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1. Lack of validation when redirecting data 
2. Lack of defined HTTP request methods 
3. Failure to validate HTTP request and response 
4. Use of weak random token when processing or accessing sensitive data 
5. Lack of secure flag set up on cookies that contain sensitive data 
 
 Error handling and logging:  Attack scenarios are examined under this attributes for failure 
of the targeted application in safely handling error and security flaws in log management. 
Security flaws examined with this attributes include 
1. Display of sensitive data in error messages 
2. Lack of server side controlled logging 
3. Access not denied by default by the error handing logic 
4. Failure to log success or failure of security relevant log 
5. Failure to control access to log 
6. Lack of validation of untrusted data used in event logged 
  
3.4. The Neural Network Module 
The neural network module contains two neural networks. The first neural network is trained 
using the information from the input module to match possible attack pattern. The second 
neural network uses the information about the identified attack pattern to match possible 
security design patterns that can mitigate the threat in the attack. During the implementation 
of the two networks in this research, the neural networks were designed to work 
independently as two separate networks and not and not as a single system. The neural 
network module as shown in Figure 3.1 illustrates how the two networks relate to each other. 
 
3.4.1 Neural Network I 
The abstract and match technique has been used as a security identification technique for 
abstracting vulnerabilities that can be matched to different set of software systems. Attack 
trees and other related techniques use these techniques (see chapter 2 for further discussion) 
to abstract known vulnerabilities to a high level representation in a generalized form so that 
software developer can match the abstracted vulnerabilities in the same or different software 
systems they have been found originally (William and Gegick, 2006).  Building on this approach, 
William and Gegick (2006), proposed the regularly expressed attack patterns for representing 
vulnerabilities in software design in a generic way (i.e. independent of any software application 
and programming language) so that this could be easily adopted by software developers for  
matching the attack patterns to their software design. Table 3.2 in section 5 shows the 53 
regularly expressed attack patterns proposed by the authors. 
 
Following a similar approach, the first neural network in the neural network module uses the 
information abstracted from software design scenarios in the input model to match the security 
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flaws in the scenarios to the regularly expressed attack patterns proposed by William and 
Gegick (2006). Figure 3.5 shows the steps taken to achieve this. The output of the first neural 
network (i.e. the identified attack pattern) is used as an input for the second neural network in 
the mitigation step 
 
Figure 3. 5: Neural Network 1 Evaluation process steps 
 
3.4.2 Neural Network II 
In the second neural network in the neural network module of the model overview, this 
research aims to use neural network to suggest possible solutions to the attack patterns 
identified by the first neural network. This approach builds on the proposed selection criterion 
by Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) which matches attack patterns to security design patterns. 
To achieve this, data was abstracted from the 51 regularly expressed attack patterns by William 
and Gegick (2006). Also, using Microsoft threat classification scheme (STRIDE) the attack 
patterns were grouped into six groups in order to align the attack patterns to their 
corresponding threat category. The data abstracted from the attack patterns formed the 
attributes of the attack patterns that were used in training the neural network. The attributes 
consists of: 
The Attack ID: This is the unique ID that identifies the attack 
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Resource Attacked: This is the resource that is attacked in the attack pattern.  
Attack Vector: This is method through which the attacker uses to attack the resource 
Attack Type: This state whether the attack is an attack against confidentiality, integrity or 
availability 
The second neural network is used to match attack patterns to security design patterns defined 
by Kienzle and Elder (2002), Blakley, et.al (2004) and Steel, et.al, (2005). The security design 
patterns defined by these authors are stated in the Table 3.1 below 
Table 3. 1: List of Security patterns 
Security patter by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by Blakley, 
et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
Authentication Enforcer Checkpointed  System Account Lockout 
Authorization Enforcer Standby Authenticated Session 
Intercepting Validator Comparator- Check Fault – 
Tolerant System 
Client Data Storage 
Secure Base Action Replicated System Client Input filters 
Secure Pipe Error/ Detection/Correction Directed Session (M) 
Secure Service Proxy  Hidden Implementation (M) 
Secure Session Manager Protected System Encrypted Storage 
Intercepting Web Agent Policy Minefield 
Secure logger Authenticator Network Address Blacklist 
 Subject Descriptor Partitioned Application 
Audit Interceptor Secure Communication Password Authentication 
Container Managed Security Security Context Password Propagation 
Dynamic Service 
Management 
Security Association Secure Assertion 
Obfuscated Transfer Object Secure Proxy Server Sandbox 
Policy Delegate  Trusted Proxy 
Secure Service Façade  Validated Transaction 
Secure Session Object   
  Build Server From Ground up 
Message  Inspector Gateway  Choose the right stuff 
Secure Message Router  Document Security goals 
Message Inspector  Document Server 
Configuration 
  Enrol by Validating out of band 
Assertion Builder  Enrol Using Third party 
Validation 
Credential Tokenizer  Enrol with pre-existing Shared 
Secret 
Single Sign On (SSO) 
Delegator 
 Enrol without validating 
Password Synchronizer  Log for Audit 
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  Patch Proactively 
  Red Team the Design 
  Share responsibility for 
security 
  Test on a staging server 
 
3.5. The Output Module 
In the output module of the model overview, the result of the evaluation of the two neural 
networks in the neural network module is presented (i.e. the identified attack pattern and the 
matched security design pattern). Table 3.2 shows the regularly expressed attack pattern 
proposed by Gegick and Williams (2006) and the security design patterns defined by Steel, et.al, 
(2005). 
 
Table 3. 2: Security Patterns matched with Attack Patterns 
Regular 
Expression 
ID 
Regular Expression Description Security 
Pattern 
Regex1 (User+)(Server+)(Log+) 
(HardDrive
+
) 
A user can exceedingly access a 
server that logs accesses to the 
hard drive.  If permitted, the log file 
may become large enough to fill the 
hard drive causing the system to 
crash -- a denial- of-service attack 
(DoS).  This may also occur on 
servers that log errors. 
Authorization 
Enforcer 
Regex2 (User)(Message)(Server) 
(Header
+
) 
(MessageHeaderHandler) 
(Memory + CPU) 
A user may send a message with 
thousands of headers (e.g. MIME 
headers) to a server, causing a 
server memory/CPU DoS. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
 
Regex3 (User)(HTTPServer) 
(GetMethod) 
(GetMethodBufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long HTTP GET request to a web 
server may cause a buffer overflow. 
Either the requestURI or HTTP 
version may be too long for the 
buffer. The attacker may be able to 
escalate their privileges. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Message Inspector 
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Regex4 (User)(Variable + Filename + 
Header)(HTTPServer) 
(PostMethod)(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long POST request via a variable, 
Filename or Header, may cause a 
buffer overflow on the server. The 
POST request may be in the form of 
a hidden variable, filename or 
header).  The attacker may be able 
to escalate their privileges. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Message Inspector 
Regex5 (User)(Server)(Message) 
(HeaderFieldBufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user may submit an excessively 
long header field value causing a 
buffer overflow on the server (e.g. 
HTTP, email headers). The attacker 
may be able to escalate their 
privileges. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Message Inspector 
Regex6 (User)(HTTPServer) 
(HTTPMessageHandler)(Log) 
(SysAdmin)(LogEntryRead) 
(BufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long message to the server can later 
induce a buffer overflow when 
viewed by a system administrator. It 
is possible for the attacker to 
escalate their privileges. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Secure Logger 
Regex7 (User)(HTTPServer) 
(PostMethod)(HTTPContent 
LengthHeaderValue) 
(HTTPMessagePayloadLength) 
(ServerConnectionState) 
A user may submit a value via the 
POST method that specifies the 
Content-Length of the HTTP header 
be less than the content-length of 
the message, thus causing the 
socket to stay open (DoS). (see 
regex37) 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Message Inspector 
Regex8 (User)(UserNameEntry) 
(PasswordEntry) (Server) 
(AuthenticationRoutine) 
(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long string of characters for either 
the username or password may 
cause a buffer overflow in the 
authentication routine. The attacker 
may be able to escalate their 
privileges. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Regex9 (User)(SQLInput)(Server) 
(WebApplication) 
(Database)(Data) 
Failure to sanitize user input (e.g. 
Query string) can allow a user to 
submit an arbitrary SQL query, thus 
allowing for unauthorized access to 
data. This regex is too abstract to 
cover the many possibilities of 
invalid SQL input. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
Message Inspector 
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Regex10 (User)(SQLInputField) 
(Server) 
(WebApplication)(Database) 
(CPU) 
An attacker may submit a malicious 
SQL query (such as a Cartesian join 
of all Tables) consuming the CPU. 
 
Intercepting  
Validator 
Message Inspector 
Regex11 (User) 
(CommandLineArgumentEntry) 
(ApplicationServer?) 
(Application) 
(CommandLineArgumentBufferW 
rite)(Buffer) 
A user may submit an excessively 
long command line parameter 
causing a buffer overflow. The 
attacker may be able to escalate 
their privileges. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Message Inspector 
Regex12 (User+)(HTMLPage+)(Server+) 
(HardDrive
+
) 
A user may submit an excessive 
amount of data in an HTML page, 
thus filling up the hard drive on 
which the server resides. 
Message Interceptor  
 
 
Regex13 (User)(InjectionOfMalicious 
HTMLTags/scriptInURL/Form) 
(Cookie*)(FormData*) 
(ServerVariables*) 
(Information) 
A user may inject malicious 
scripts/tags (SCRIPT, OBJECT, 
APPLET, EMBED, FORM) or 
variables (e.g. JSP, ASP, search 
string) in a web page, msg. board, 
email, message (e.g. IM), Script in 
URL, URL parameter or HTML/CSS 
TAG, or HTML injection in HTML tag 
to obtain access to information such 
as cookies.  This is called Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS). 
I 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
 
Regex14 (User)(Machine) 
(SyslogFunction)(Log) 
(Memory) 
It is possible to corrupt memory by 
passing format strings through the 
Syslog(), a logging function. This 
may potentially be exploited to 
overwrite arbitrary locations in 
memory with attacker- specified 
values. The Syslog function is often 
improperly used and is thus a target 
of attacks. Machine is any computer 
that uses the syslog function. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
63 
 
Regex15 (User)(ReadUserInput) 
(EnvironmentVariableWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user may submit an excessively 
long environment variable causing a 
buffer overflow in the application. 
The attacker may be able to 
escalate their privileges. 
 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex16 (User)(GUI/Browser) 
(BookMarkSave) 
(BookmarkBufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user may save an excessively 
long bookmark and cause a buffer 
overflow. The bookmark may be 
written by the attacker or come from 
a long web page title.  The attacker 
may be able to escalate their 
privileges. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex17 (User)(Application)(File) 
(FileRead) 
An application that reads a file may 
throw an exception or halt if the file 
is corrupt or has been tampered with 
by an attacker. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
 Regex18 (SocketRead) 
(SocketBufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user may submit an excessively 
long stream to a socket and cause a 
buffer overflow. This is true for 
handling any connection on the 
internet (e.g. GET request). The 
attacker may be able to escalate 
their privileges. 
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Rgex19 (Class)(Subclass) 
(OverriddenSecuredMethods) 
(Application) 
Overriding methods that have been 
secured in a super class may create 
a software vulnerability. In Netscape 
4.0 the ClassLoader overrode the 
definition of built-in "system" types 
like java.lang.Class - applications 
usually subclass ClassLoader - a 
better example is from  
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/
guid e/security/jce/JCER 
efGuide.html - suggests to not 
override methods/constructor s in 
CipherInputStream because the 
class takes into account many 
security considerations. 
Regex20 (User)(Hyperlink)(Server) 
(HyperlinkBufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user may make an excessively 
long hyperlink on a webpage and 
cause a buffer overflow on a server. 
If the hyperlink is used to connect to 
a session, then the malicious user 
may take over the application. 
Message Inspector 
Regex21 (User)(Server) 
(MessageHeaderHandler) 
(Server) 
A user may send a negative, NULL, 
or invalid value (e.g. not include ":' 
between header name/value) in a 
header field resulting in a DoS on 
the server. 
Message Inspector  
Regex22 (UserInput) 
(PointerDereference) 
(Application) 
A user may fail to submit a 
username causing a DoS. This 
could be the result of a  pointer that 
is dereferenced to obtain the 
username, but NULL is returned 
instead. 
Message Inspector 
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Regex23 (User+)(Server+)(CPU+) 
(HardDrive*) 
A script that make an excessive 
number of connections to the 
listening daemon process of a 
server may cause a DoS. This script 
need only make connections -- 
further I/O may not be necessary 
with the connections. 
Message Interceptor 
Gateway 
Regex24 (UserInput) 
(IntegerEvaluationRoutine) 
(BufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user that supplies an integer 
larger than the integer variable type 
expected may cause an 
exception/buffer overflow or DoS. 
 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex25 (User)(HTTPServer) 
(GetRequestRoutine) 
(Application + Information) 
A malformed URL (e.g. excessive 
forward slashes, directory 
traversals, special chars such as '*', 
Unicode chars, format string 
specifier, NULL) may cause a DoS 
or in case of directory traversal the 
user may obtain private information. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
Authorization 
Enforcer 
Regex26 (User)(Server) 
(SearchString) 
(Information) 
A user may insert a directory 
traversal such as "../../" in a search 
string (e.g. CGI) and obtain private 
information. 
I  
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex27 (User)(SearchString) 
(Server) 
(Data)(User)(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that requests data from an 
untrusted server may receive large 
data and result in a buffer overflow. 
Often happens in gaming 
environments. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 Regex28 (Read)(FileHeader) 
(BufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user may label a file with an 
excessively long filename and cause 
a buffer overflow in the process 
reading the file.  This occurred in an 
operating system context. 
Message Inspector 
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Regex29 (User)(EmailHeader) 
(Firewall)(Buffer) 
A user can overflow a buffer in their 
firewall with a large email header to 
escalate their privileges (the user 
can attack their own company's 
LAN). 
Message Inspector  
Regex30 (User)(MalformedDTD) 
(SOAPServer) 
(XMLParser)(CPU + Memory) 
A user that submits a malformed 
DTD may cause the XML parser of a 
SOAP server to consume the 
CPU/Memory. 
Message Inspector 
Regex31 (User)(HTTPRequest) 
(ProxyServer)(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long HTTP GET request to a proxy 
server may cause a buffer overflow.  
The attacker may be able to 
escalate their privileges. 
Message Inspector 
Gateway 
Regex32 (User)(RequestMessage) 
(Router) 
A user that submits malformed 
headers (e.g. failing to supply 
expected headers) may cause a 
DoS.  Also, NULL as a header value 
may cause a DoS. 
Message Inspector 
Regex33 (User)(HTTPgetRequest) 
(Router)(EmbeddedServer) 
(Bufer*) 
A user that sends an excessively 
long GET request to a router may 
cause a DoS via a buffer overflow or 
CPU consumption. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex34 (User+)(HTTPServer+) 
(GetRequestRoutine+) 
(Buffer + CPU) 
A user may submit consecutive 
multiple long GET request URIs to 
either consume the CPU or overflow 
a buffer. 
Message Inspector 
Gateway 
Regex35 (User)(HTTPgetRequest) 
(Router) 
A user may submit a malformed 
GET request (e.g. a blank (NULL)) 
request and cause a router to DoS. Intercepting  
Validator 
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Regex36 (User) 
((FTPCommand+MailCommand)+ 
OSCommand)(FTPServer + 
MailServer))(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user that submits an overly long 
OS command or FTP/Mail command 
may cause a buffer overflow in the 
FTP/Mail server. The attacker may 
be able to escalate their privileges. 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex37 (User)(Socket)(Server) 
(ExceptionThrown*) (Server) 
A user may cause an exception to 
be thrown in the server and cause it 
to hang. (No data needs to be 
transferred) (similar to regex 7) 
Secure Pipe 
 
Secure Base Action 
 
 
Regex38 (User)(UserNameEntry) 
(PasswordEntry) 
(AuthenticationServer?) 
(AuthenticationRoutine) 
A user that submits a malformed 
username or password for 
authentication may cause a DoS 
(e.g. format string specifier) or NULL 
as part of the name may bypass the 
authentication routine. 
Authentication 
Enforcer 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 Regex39 (User)(FTPRequest) 
(FTPServer)(BufferWrite) 
(Buffer) 
A user may submit a long directory 
request (e.g. in the URL of a 
browser) by using long directory 
names or "/" can cause a buffer 
overflow or DoS in the FTP server.  
The attacker may be able to 
escalate their privileges. 
 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex40 (User)(FTPRequest) 
(FTPServer) 
(GetRoutine)(Server) 
A user that requests a file that does 
not exist on the server may cause a 
DoS (e.g. Get <unavailable file>) Message Inspector 
Gateway 
Regex41 (Metafile)(SizeField) 
(FileHeader)(FileRead) 
(BufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user that specifies the "Size" field 
of a metafile to be less than the 
actual file may cause a buffer 
overflow. 
Message Inspector 
Regex42 (Application) 
(DownloadMalicousFile) 
(PredicTableFileLocation) 
(AttackerReference) 
(Information) 
A user that saves files to 
predicTable locations especially 
where applications let you reference 
them may allow for information 
disclosure. 
Obfuscated Transfer 
Object 
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Regex43 (Application)(FileCreation) 
(System) 
If an application creates a 
file/directory that allows malicious 
users to write to them (makes them 
symbolic links or simply changes 
them), then attackers can escalate 
their privileges. 
Obfuscated Transfer 
Object 
Regex44 (ApplicationRun) 
(Privileges) (System) 
An application that runs with 
SYSTEM privileges and lets a user 
execute another program such as 
CMD.EXE may grant themselves 
SYSTEM privileges. 
Container Manager 
Security 
Regex45 (User)(MessageHeader+ 
QueryParam)) 
(Server)(System) 
A user may insert shell commands 
into a message handler on a server 
(e.g. email server), which may allow 
the attacker run those commands on 
that system. 
Message Inspector 
Regex46 (User)(Message)(Server) 
(System) 
A user that submits a message 
(command) to the server before 
authentication may cause a DoS 
(done in C code). 
Authentication 
Enforcer 
 
Message Inspector 
Gateway 
 
Regex47 (SourceFile)(IncludeFile) 
(EnvironmentVariable+ 
ProgramVariable+ 
URLparam)(System) 
An attacker can change/influence an 
environment, program, or URL
variable to point to a remote 
machine. If the variable points to an 
"include" directory, then the 
attacker's include file can be 
executed on the target system 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex48 (User)(MalformedFTPCommand) 
(FTPServer) 
(BufferWrite)(Buffer) 
A user that submits an excessively 
long FTP command may cause a 
DoS or buffer overflow. Intercepting  
Validator 
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Regex49 (User)(InvalidRequest) 
(ErrorMessage) 
(System) 
A user that submits an invalid 
request may be returned with an 
error message that shows the 
installation path of the server. 
Obfuscated Transfer 
Object 
 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
Regex50 (User)(Application) 
(Subprocess)(System) 
An application that spawns a sub 
process to handle a user command
must ensure that the sub process 
does not have elevated permissions. 
Container Manager 
Security 
Regex51 (WebBrowser)(CLSID) 
(Filename)(System) 
A user that embeds a CLSID in the 
filename of a malicious file can trick 
a web browser into opening the file 
with a different application than 
intended. 
Authentication 
Enforcer 
 
Message Inspector 
Gateway 
Regex52 (Server)(QueryString) 
(Command)(System) 
A user may insert a command for 
the value of a URL parameter and 
execute that command on the server 
(remote execution attack) 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 Regex53 (User)(URL)(Server)(Device) 
(System) 
A user that submits a URL with a
device as part of the request may 
cause a DoS (e.g. 
http://[victim]/COM1) 
Intercepting  
Validator 
 
 
3.6. Summary of Chapter three. 
When potential attack patterns are matched against software design, the software developers 
are able to take the necessary steps in mitigating the security flaw identified in the design. To 
achieve this, the proposed neural network tool in research work matches the security flaws in 
the design to possible attack patterns. The data source and attributes used in abstracting the 
information from the attack scenarios has been highlighted in this chapter. To suggest possible 
solutions to the flaws identified with the attack pattern, the second neural network matches 
the attack patterns to security design pattern that can provide mitigation. The attributes for 
abstracting the information used in training the second neural network and the security design 
patterns which are matched to attack patterns were highlighted. Finally, the result of the 
output module of the model overview was discussed. In the next chapter the implementation 
of the first neural network will be demonstrated. 
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Chapter 4. Implementation of Neural Network I 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates the implementation of the first neural network in the neural 
network module discussed in chapter three. This include demonstration on how data is 
abstracted from attack scenarios reported in authoritative data sources using the attack 
attributes for training the neural network; demonstration on how the training data is encoded, 
the implementation of the neural network architecture and the training of the neural network. 
The analysis of performance of the network is also presented in this chapter. 
 
4.2. Data Collection 
A total of 715 attacks from the online vulnerability databases (see chapter 3) relating to 52 of 
Gegick and Williams’ regular expressed attack patterns were analysed. Table 4.1 is sample of 
data collected on the attacks from the vulnerability databases.  At the time of collecting data 
from the online vulnerability databases, there was not enough data to fully analyse regularly 
expressed attack pattern 19. However, from the 715 attacks that were analysed, 260 of the 
attacks were unique in terms of their impact, mode of attack, software component and actors 
involved in the attack. The remaining 455 attack are a repetition of the same type of exploit in 
different applications that has been reported in the vulnerability databases (See Figure 4.1). As 
this research is focused on evaluating software design for security flaws, only attacks that 
exploited software design flaws were considered in the online vulnerability database. Table 4.1 
shows a sample of data collected from the vulnerability databases. A complete list of data 
collected can be seen in Appendix VII.  Once the attack has been analysed the attack attributes 
discussed in chapter three are used to abstract the data capturing the attack scenario in the 
exploit for training the neural network. 
 
Table 4.1 Sample of data collected from vulnerability databases 
Date published Title of  Vulnerability from Vulnerability Databases  ID 
2006-07-12 Shopping Cart Multiple HTML Injection Vulnerabilities CVE-2006-3542 
2007-02-26 Shop Kit Plus StyleCSS.PHP Local File Include Vulnerability CVE-2007-1127  
2009-01- 27 Shop-inet 'show_cat2.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability CVE-2009-0292 
2000-02-01 Multiple Vendor Web Shopping Cart Hidden Form Field 
Vulnerability 
BID -1237 
2010-09-02 Shop a la Cart Products Multiple Input Validation 
Vulnerabilities 
BID-42953 
2008-01-07 Shop-Script 'index.php' Local Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
BID- 27165 
2006-10-23 Shop-Script Multiple HTTP Response Splitting 
Vulnerabilities 
BID-20685 
2005-05-16 Shop-Script CategoryID SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-13633 
2005-05-16 Shop-Script ProductID SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-13635 
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2008-06-08 Shop-Script Pro 'current_currency' Parameter SQL Injection 
Vulnerability 
BID-35429 
2011-10-20 Wizmall Multiple Remote File Disclosure Vulnerabilities BID-50300 
2011-10-20 Wizmall Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities BID-50302 
2004-02-16 ShopCartCGI Remote File Disclosure Vulnerability CVE-2004-0293 
2005-12-23 ShopCentrik ShopEngine EXPS Parameter Cross-Site 
Scripting Vulnerability 
BID-16054 
2010-05-22 ECShop 'search.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-40338 
2010-05-07 ECShop 'category.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-40001 
2009-05-29 ShopEx ECShop 'integrate.php' Multiple Remote Command 
Execution Vulnerabilities 
BID-44497 
2009-04-27 ECShop 'user.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-34733 
2010-02-06 ShopEx Single 'errinfo' Parameter Cross Site Scripting 
Vulnerability 
BID-39941 
2009-08-21 Shopmaker Local File Include and SQL Injection 
Vulnerabilities 
BID-35937 
2008-10-22 ShopMaker 'product.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-31854 
2008-02-01 CandyPress Multiple Input Validation Vulnerabilities CVE-2008-0546 
2007-10-23 CandyPress Store Logon.ASP Cross-Site Scripting 
Vulnerability 
CVE-2007-5629  
2007-01-09 Shopstorenow E-commerce Shopping Cart Orange.ASP SQL 
Injection Vulnerability 
CVE-2007-0142  
2010-04-06 ShopSystem 'view_image.php' SQL Injection Vulnerability BID-39260 
2006-11-15 ShopSystems Index.PHP SQL Injection Vulnerability CVE-2006-5935 
2006-04-11 ShopWeezle Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities CVE-2006-1706 
2005-08-01 Opera Web Browser Download Dialog Manipulation File 
Execution Vulnerability 
CVE-2005-2407 
2012-02-07 WordPress AllWebMenus Plugin 'actions.php' Arbitrary File 
Upload Vulnerability 
CVE-2012-1010 
2010-07-02 Qt Remote Denial of Service Vulnerability CVE-2010-2621 
2010-06-16 SolarWinds TFTP Server Write Request Denial Of Service 
Vulnerability 
CVE-2010-2310 
2010-06-15 Dlink Di-604 IP Textfield Size Cross-Site Scripting and Denial 
of Service Vulnerabilities 
CVE-2010-2293 
2010-06-15 uniper Networks IVE OS 'homepage.cgi' URI Redirection 
Vulnerability 
CVE-2010-2289 
2001-09-08 Hassan Consulting Shopping Cart Arbitrary Command 
Execution Vulnerability 
CVE-2001-0985 
2004-12-31 Virtual Programming VP-ASP Shopping Cart CatalogID SQL 
Injection Vulnerability 
CVE-2004-2412 
2004-11-23 RobotFTP Server Username Buffer Overflow Vulnerability CVE 2004-0286 
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Figure 4. 1: Pie chart of data collected 
4.3. Data Encoding 
In order to encode the data needed for training the neural network, data collected on the 
reported attacks from the vulnerability database was analysed. All the attack scenarios 
analysed from the vulnerability databases exploited software design flaws in the applications 
they were found. In most cases, the attacks are carried out in ways the software designer did 
not intend the software application to be used at the time of design. For instance a system that 
is designed to accept user input can be exploited by a malicious user who enters a long string of 
characters to cause a buffer overflow. Therefore, all the attack scenarios analysed were actual 
software design scenarios containing flaws that were exploited by attackers. Information 
provided on each reported attack was used in modelling the attack scenarios in the attacks. 
Figure 3.2 in chapter 3 is an example of attack on webmail in the CVE detail online vulnerability 
database. This attack corresponds to regularly expressed attack pattern 3 (See Table 3.2 in 
Chapter 3, Section 5). This attack pattern is: 
  
(User)(HTTPServer) (GetMethod) (GetMethodBufferWrite) (Buffer) 
 
In order to get a clearer picture of the attack, the attack modelling concept of the secure 
troopos was used to analyse the attacks (See chapter for 2 for further discussion). Using this 
approach, the attack components such as the attacker, the actors and resources under attack 
and their interaction were clearly identified in the design. Figure 4.1 below shows how the 
attack on webmail was analysed using this approach.  
 
36% 
64% 
Data collected on Reported Attacks 
Unique Attacks
Repeated Attacks
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Figure 4. 2: Analysis of Attack on Webmail using secure troopos approach 
 
From the figure above, it could be seen that the goal of the attacker is to attack the webmail 
system. To achieve this, he can perform any of the following tasks: 
 
 Make system unavailable: The attacker can accomplish this task by sending long Get 
Request to manipulate the URL when playing the role of the user.  The Mail Manager 
(depender) depends on the User (dependee) for Get Mail Request and Send Mail Request (i.e. 
the dependun) which are resources the attacker can manipulate when performing this task. 
    
 Make system unreliable: The attacker can also execute arbitrary code as a sub task to be 
performed in order to make the system unreliable. This task can be performed in a multi-
stage attack where the attacker has initially escalated his privileges by performing the task 
above followed by running arbitrary codes through the Search Mail or Get Mail Request 
resource 
 
 Steal Information: The attacker can perform this task by attacking Read Mail and Send Mail 
resources. The attacker can also escalate his privilege using the sub-task (i.e. send Long Get 
Request) on Get Mail Request and Send Mail Request resources to cause a buffer overflow.  
An attacker gaining the privileges of the administrator will be able to access the information 
on any user account on the webmail server. 
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Once the data collected on the attacks from the vulnerability databases has been analysed, the 
attack scenario in the attack is established. Using the attack attributes in Table 4.1, the data 
needed for training the neural network is abstracted from the attack scenario. 
 
Apart from using the secure troopos approach to analyse the data collected on the attacks in 
the vulnerability database, the sequence diagram was also used. Figure 4.2 gives two possible 
design scenarios when analysing the webmail attack in figure 3.2 in chapter 3.  This involves the 
client who could be the attacker requesting for access from the webserver by presenting his 
login information.  In response, the webserver retrieves the client details from the database, 
validates the client and gives a notification that the login is successful. The client then proceeds 
to request for mail access.  The webserver redirects the request to the mail server who in turn 
retrieves the mail from the database for the webserver. The webserver then sends the mail to 
the client. It should be noted that webserver, login information, mail server and database in the 
sequence diagram are resources which the attacker may be choosing as targets for his attacks 
 
Figure 4. 3: Sequence diagram on Webmail 
From the sequence diagram, two design scenarios i.e. the login scenario and the request for 
mail scenario were established.  Using the Long Get Request, during the two design scenarios, 
the attacker can stage a buffer overflow attack. Through this way, attack scenarios were also 
established for the purpose generating data for training the neural network. 
The training data sample consists of 12 input units for the neural network. This corresponds to 
the number of the attributes used in abstracting data from the attack scenarios. Table 4.1 
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shows gives an overview of the attack attributes and the code for each data abstracted using 
the attribute.   
Table 4. 1: List of Attack Attributes 
S\N Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attacker No access 0 
Read access 1 
Change Access 2 
Delete All 3 
2 Source of Attack External 1 
Internal 2 
3 Target of Attack Data resource 1 
System resource 2 
4 Attack Vector 
 
Software component used for attack Component ID 
5  Attack Type 
 
Availability 1 
Integrity 2 
Privacy 3 
6 Input Validation No Validation 3 
Partial validation of inputs 2 
All inputs validated 1 
7 
 
 
 
Dependencies 
 
 
None 0 
Authentication  3 
Access Control  
3 
Input validation 3 
Trust Boundary undefined 3 
Encryption 3 
8 Output encoding to 
external 
applications/Services 
 
 
None 0 
Parameterized Interface 3 
Stored procedure 3 
Escaping all user supplied input 3 
9 
 
Authentication 
 
 
None 0 
Plain text password 5 
Harsh password 
25 
Salted password 2 
One time password 3 
Lock outs 3 
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Session management 3 
Time outs 3 
Decisions logged 3 
Credential management 3 
Re-authentication for accessing sensitive data 
3 
10 Access Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 0 
Data access authorization 1 
URL access authorization 2 
Service access authorization 3 
Function access authorization 4 
File access authorization 5 
All access path checked 6 
Server side enforcement 10 
11 HTTP Security 
 
None 0 
Redirect data validation 3 
Defined HTTP request methods 3 
Input Validation for HTTP request and response 
3 
Secure flag set up for cookies with sensitive data 3 
Strong random token 3 
12 Error handling and 
Logging 
Sensitive application data in error message 3 
Server side controlled logging 3 
Server side error handled on server 3 
Access not denied by default 3 
Success and failure security relevant event logged 3 
No Access control to log 
3 
No Validation of un-trusted data used in event logged 3 
 
To generate the corresponding values for attack attributes four and five in Table 4.1 above, 106 
attack components were abstracted from the regularly expressed attack pattern in Table 3.2 in 
chapter 3 (See Table 4.2 and the appendix  for the description on the attack components).   
Also, to make it easier for the attack components to be identified using the attack attributes 
above, each attack component was allocated a unique ID and were also classified into the 
following groups: 
 Users: This group normally depicts users of the software application system. However, in the 
context of this research work, the group mostly refer to the attackers or the victims of the 
attacks 
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 Inputs: This signifies the input the user is supplying to the software application to be 
processed. An example of this is a search string submitted to a search engine on a web site 
 Data: Attack components in the regularly expressed attack pattern such as file, information 
or cookie referring to any for data which is involved in the attack was classified under this 
group. 
 Parameter: This group is used classify the attack components used as parameters in 
software applications. For example, parameter used in establishing the size of a field, 
memory reference point or the payload length of an HTTP message.  
 Hardware:  This group refer to any hardware such as CPU, hard drive or memory that is 
involved in an attack. 
 Software: This group also refer to software applications involved in attacks such as when an 
attacker takes over a software application that has system privileges to run malicious code. 
Attack components such as application,  browser, firewall or sub process of an application 
are classified under this group 
 Server: Attack components representing any server processes in the regularly expressed 
attack pattern is classified under this group.  Example of this include application server, 
proxy server or FTP server  
 Event: All the attack components representing system events such as when reading or 
writing to a file or buffers is classified under this group.  Example of this attack component 
includes buffer write,  file read, HTTP Request and Get Method 
 Others: Three attack components that could not be categorized under the groups above 
were included in this group. The attack component includes: class, subclass and privilege. 
To further analyse the attack components in the regularly expressed attack pattern a concept 
map in figure 4.3 was used to illustrate how they interact with one another using the groups in 
which the attack components has been categorized into. Using this concept the following 
interactions were observed between the attack components. 
1. The user or client group interacts with other groups by: 
 Using Inputs to trigger Events and receiving responses from Events 
 Having privileges. It should be noted here that in many attack scenarios the attacker 
may not need to have any privilege to stage an attack 
 
2. The Event group interacts with other groups by: 
Responding to actions triggered by the Users or other Software systems. E.g. A software 
application responding to user requests to open a file. 
Accessing Data. E.g. User triggering the Get Request event to access web pages 
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3. The Software and Server group comes under the Application/System group in the concept 
map. They interact with other groups by: 
Using Inputs to trigger Events and receiving responses from Events 
 Having privileges. 
 Uses Hardware / Resources 
 
4. The  Hardware/ Resource group interact with other groups by  
 Saving, retrieving or processing data when it is used by software systems 
 Has privileges 
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Figure 4. 4: Concept map showing interaction between the groups in which the attack 
components has been categorized 
Table 4. 2: List of Attack Components 
Component 
ID 
Software Component Group 
1 Application Software 
2 Application Run Events 
3 Application Server Parameter 
4 Attacker Reference Parameter 
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5 Authentication Routine Event 
6 Bookmark Buffer Write Event 
7 Bookmark Save Event 
8 Browser/GUI Software 
9 Buffer Hardware 
10 Buffer Write Event 
11 Class Other 
12 Client User 
13 CLSID Parameter  
14 Command Inputs 
15 Command Line Argument Buffer Write Event 
16 Command Line Argument Entry Inputs 
17 Computer Hardware 
18 Cookie Data 
19 CPU Hardware 
20 Data Data 
21 Database Data 
22 Daemon Process Software 
23 Device Hardware 
24 Download Malicious File Data 
25 Email Header Data 
26 Embedded Server Server 
27 Environment Variable Parameter 
28 Environment Variable Write Event 
29 Error Message Data 
30 Exception Thrown Event 
31 File Creation Event 
32 File Header Data 
33 Filename Data 
34 File Read Event 
35 Firewall Software 
36 Form Data Data 
37 FTP Request Event 
38 FTP Server Server 
39 Get method Event 
40 Get Request Routine Event 
41 Get Routine Event 
42 Hard Drive Hardware 
43 Header Data 
44 Header field Buffer Write Event 
45 HTML Page Data 
46 HTTP Content Data 
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47 HTTP Get Request Event 
48 HTTP Message Handler Event 
49 HTTP Message Payload length Parameter 
50 HTTP Request Event 
51 HTTP Server Server 
52 Hyperlink Parameter 
53 Include File Data 
54 Information Data 
55 Integer Evaluation Routine Event 
56 Invalid Request Inputs 
57 Length Header Value Parameter 
58 Log Data 
59 Log Entry Read Event 
60 Malformed DTD Data 
61 Malformed FTP Command Inputs 
62 Malicious client User 
63 Malicious Include File Data 
64 Memory Hardware 
65 Message Header Data 
66 Message header Handler Event 
67 Metafile Data 
68 Overridden Secured Methods Event 
69 Password Entry Input 
70 Pointer Dereference Event 
71 Post Method Event 
72 PredicTable File Location Parameter 
73 Privileges Other 
74 Program Variable Parameter 
75 Proxy Server Server 
76 Query Parameter Parameter 
77 Query String Input 
78 Read User Input Event 
79 Request Message Event 
80 Search String Input 
81 Server Server 
82 Server Connection State Event 
83 Server Variables Parameter 
84 Size Field Parameter 
85 SOAP Server Server 
86 Socket Software 
87 Socket Buffer Write Event 
88 Socket Read Event 
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89 Source File Data 
90 SQL Input Input 
91 SQL Input Field Input 
92 Subclass other 
93 Sub process Software 
94 Sys admin User 
95 Syslog Function Event 
96 System Software 
97 URL Input 
98 URL param Parameter 
99 User User 
100 User Input Input 
101 Username Entry Input 
102 Variable Parameter 
103 Victim Client User 
104 Web App Software 
105 XML Parser Software  
106 FTP Handler Event 
 
To demonstrate how the data for training is encoded using the code for each of the attributes 
in the Table above, information was abstracted on the attack scenario on webmail by looking at 
the online vulnerability databases to get the details of the attributes we are interested in (See 
chapter 3). In this example, the data abstracted from the attack scenario using the attack 
attribute list is as follows. 
Table 4. 3:Sample of Pre-processed Training Data from Attack Scenario 
Attacker Source  Target  Attack  
Vector 
Attack 
Type 
Input 
Validation 
Dependencies Output 
Encoding 
Authentication Access 
Control 
HTTP 
Security 
Error 
No 
Access 
External Buffer Long Get 
Request 
Availability Partial 
Validation 
Authentication 
& Input 
Validation 
None None URL 
Access 
Input 
Validation 
None 
 
Using the corresponding values for the attributes, the data is then encoded as shown in Table 
4.4 below. 
Table 4. 4: Sample of Training data after encoding 
Attacker Source  Target  Attack  
Vector 
Attack 
Type 
Input 
Validation 
Dependencies Output 
Encoding 
Authentication Access 
Control 
HTTP 
Security 
Error 
0 1 9 39 5 2 6 0 2 2 3 0 
 
The second stage of the data processing involves converting the encoded data into ASCII 
comma delimited format which can be used to train the neural network as shown below  
 
0, 1, 9, 39, 5, 2, 6, 0, 0, 2, 2, 3, 0 
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 Finally, the data is loaded in the neural network for training as shown in the following Table. 
  
 
 
Table 4. 5:Sample of data input in Neural Network 
Input 1 Input 2  Input 3  Input 4 Input 5 Input 6 Input 7 Input 8 Input 9 Input 10 Input 11 Input 12 
0 1 9 39 5 2 6 0 0 2 3 0 
 
The data for the expected output of the neural network are derived from the attack pattern 
that is to be identified in each of the attack scenarios. Therefore, each of the attack patterns is 
given a unique ID to derive the expected output for each of the input data samples. The unique 
ID corresponds to the number of the regularly expressed attack pattern as shown in Table 3.2 in 
chapter 3. The output data sample consists of output units corresponding to the attack pattern 
IDs. For example the neural networks implemented in this chapter classify attacks into different 
attack patterns. The above sample data on webmail attack corresponds to regularly expressed 
attack pattern 3. Therefore, the neural network is trained to identify the expected attack 
pattern as 3 using the following output data  
0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
 
4.4. The Neural Network Architecture  
The feed-forward back-propagation neural network is used to evaluate scenarios from software 
designs and identify possible attacks in the design. The back-propagation neural network is a 
well-known type of neural network commonly used in pattern recognition problems (Srinivasa 
and Settipalli, 2009). It has been used in this research because of its simplicity and reasonable 
speed. The three layer back-propagation architecture (see Figure 4.4) was adopted in this 
research work for training the neural network. The choice of this architecture is mainly due to 
the fact that it is the most standard and general architecture commonly used for training neural 
networks (Ryan, Lin and Mikkulainen, 1998). Therefore, by adopting this architecture, the 
feasibility of the proposed neural network tool in this research can be demonstrated and its 
results can be replicated easily.   
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Figure 4. 5: The Neural Network Architecture 
To find out the optimal performance of the neural network, three different training 
optimization algorithms were applied to the back propagation network. The tree training 
algorithms has been selected because they are commonly used in training neural networks for 
resolving pattern recognition problems. The training algorithms consisted of the following: 
 Levenberg-Marquardt (LM): This training optimization algorithm has been described as the 
fastest training algorithm. It is also the recommended first choice for supervised neural 
network. The advantage of the LM optimization algorithm is noticeable mostly on function 
approximation problems with relatively small size neural network where very accurate 
training is required (Gavin, 2011, Beale, Hagan and Demuth et.al, 2010, Lourakis, 2005). 
Compared to other training optimization algorithms, LM training algorithm also obtains a 
lower mean square error (MSE). However LM training algorithm is less efficient when used 
with large neural network because it requires more memory and computational time.  Also, 
in pattern recognition problems, the performance of LM training optimization algorithm is 
less efficient (Beale, Hagan and Demuth et.al, 2010).  Based on the advantages of LM training 
algorithms  highlighted above, it has been considered for training the neural network in this 
research work 
 
 Resilient Back-propagation (RP): RP optimization training algorithm has been described as 
the fastest algorithm for training neural networks on pattern recognition problems (Beale, 
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Hagan and Demuth et.al). It requires relatively small memory but when its error goal is 
reduced, its performance degrades.  
 
 Scaled Conjugate Gradient (SCG):  The SCG training optimization algorithm give a good 
performance on various types of problems especially where the size of the neural network is 
large.  It is commonly used in pattern recognition problems because it converges quickly. It is 
almost as fast RP training algorithm and requires a relative small memory.  In comparison 
with RP training algorithm, when the error is reduced, its performance does not degrade 
quickly.  
Beale, Hagan and Demuth et.al (2010) states that any neural network whose weight, net input, 
and transfer functions have derivative functions can be trained using the optimization 
algorithm discussed above. Once any of the conditions below is met, the training of the neural 
network stops.  Beale, Hagan and Demuth et.al (2010) states that these conditions include: 
 Reaching the maximum number of epochs (repetitions) is reached. 
 Exceeding the maximum amount of time. 
 When performance is minimized to the goal.  
 The performance gradient falls below the set minimum gradient 
 Validation performance has increased more than maximum fail times since the last time it 
decreased (when using validation). 
For each of the above training optimization algorithms applied to the neural network in this 
research work, different number of hidden neurons was also used to further optimize its 
performance. Each layer of the hidden nodes in the neural network architecture apply a tan-
sigmoid transfer function to the various connection weights and in the output nodes, the linear 
transfer function is applied to its weight. As back-propagation neural network is a supervised 
learning architecture, the training set of data discussed in section 2 was used for its training. 
From this, the neural network derives its weights and parameters. The weights and parameters 
are computed by calculating the error between the actual and expected output data of the 
neural network when the training data is presented to it. The error is then used to modify the 
weights and parameters to enable the neural network to have better chance of giving a correct 
output when it is next presented with same input. 
4.5. The Neural Network training 
To train the neural network the training data set is divided into two sets. The first set of data is 
the training data sets (260 Samples) that were presented to the neural network during training. 
The second set (52 Samples) is the data that were used to test the performance of the neural 
network after it had been trained. At the initial stage of the training, it was discovered that the 
neural network had too many categories to classify the input data into (i.e. 52 categories) 
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because the neural network was not able to converge. To overcome the problem, the training 
data was further divided into two sets. The first set contained 143 samples and the second set 
contained 117 samples. These were then used for training two neural networks. For each of the 
neural networks, the training optimization algorithms discussed above were applied and its 
performance was observed when 80, 90, 100, 110 and 120 hidden neurons were used.  Mat lab 
Neural Network tool box is used to perform the training. The training performance is measured 
by Mean Squared Error (MSE) and the training stops when the generalization stops improving 
or when the 1000th iteration is reached. The training parameters also include the learning rate 
which is set to 0.01 with a goal of 0; maximum fail set to 6, a minimum gradient of 0.000001. 
The results and analysis of the performance of this neural network is presented in section six.  
Table 4. 6:Training and Test data sets 
Number of samples Training Data Test Data 
Data Set 1 143 26 
Data set 2 117 26 
Total 260 52 
 
4.6. Analysis and Discussion 
As highlighted above, different numbers of neurons were applied to the neural network I to 
further optimize its performance. In order to find out when neural network I had the best 
performance, the training was executed in five simulations to obtain the average results of its 
performance. The average results on the training time, MSE and number of epoch were used in 
analysis of the performance of the neural network because the neural network is initiated with 
random weights during its training and this gives different results. The results of the 
performance of the neural network when RP and SCG training optimization algorithms were 
applied are presented in this section. Also, statistical analysis was carried out to establish the 
significance of the training optimization algorithms applied to the neural network using 
statistical tools. The result of the performance of the neural network when LM training 
optimization algorithm is applied is not presented because the performance of the neural 
network was poor when the training algorithm is applied. It took an average of 15 minutes to 
complete its training and the result of its MSE was an average of 4.5 which is very far from the 
set goal.  
4.6.1. Mean Square Error (MSE) 
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the result of the performance of first neural network based on 
MSE using different number of hidden neurons. The performance of neural network when SCG 
training optimization algorithm was applied was considered to be very good as the neural 
network was able to reach its set goal for training with the different number of hidden neurons 
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used. The MSE results obtained were below 0.005 for which the neural network could generate 
an outcome very close to the expected attack pattern. Figure 4.7 shows the plot of the average 
MSE result for the different number of neurons applied to the network. From this plot it could 
be noticed that the MSE dropped sharply to the lowest MSE (0.002148) when 90 neurons were 
implemented. To test the performance of the neural network, the second data sets in Table 4.6 
were used to test the two neural networks implemented under neural network l and the result 
produced an output as close as possible to the expected output (See Chapter 6 for more 
discussion) 
 
 
Figure 4. 6: Plot of MSE for Neural Network I during training 
 
Table 4. 7:MSE of Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
s\n
o 
Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 0.00279 0.00119 0.00398 0.00199 0.00239 
2 0.00199 0.00199 0.000796 0.00239 0.00159 
3 0.00447 0.00358 0.002790 0.00279 0.00318 
4 0.00389 0.00159 0.001990 0.00279 0.00451 
5 0.00309 0.00239 0.00279 0.00199 0.00239 
Ave 0.003246 0.002148 0.002469 0.00239 0.002812 
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Figure 4. 7: MSE of Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
 
The performance of the first neural network when the RP training optimization algorithm was 
applied was also considered to be very good. The differences in the average MSE results 
obtained is small and were also below 0.005. Compared to the MSE result obtained when SCG 
training optimization algorithm was applied the MSE result obtained for RP was slightly higher. 
However, when the network was tested with the second data set in Table 4.6 the generated 
output was also identical to the expected output. Figure 4.8 shows the plot of the average MSE 
results obtained. The plot showed that the lowest MSE (0.00284) was obtained when 90 
neurons were implemented in the neural network.  
 
Table 4. 8: MSE of Neural Network I with RP Applied 
s\n
o 
Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 0.00358 0.0019 0.00279 0.00239 0.00239 
2 0.00318 0.00402 0.00477 0.00358 0.00279 
3 0.00318 0.00159 0.00239 0.0034 0.0042 
4 0.00438 0.00404 0.00279 0.00336 0.00407 
5 0.00279 0.00265 0.00474 0.00491 0.00239 
Ave 0.003422 0.00284 0.003496 0.003528 0.003168 
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Figure 4. 8: MSE of Neural Network I with RP Applied 
 
4.6.2. Number of Epochs 
Table of 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the performance of the first neural network based on number 
of epochs used in training the network. The highest number of average epoch used when SCG 
was applied as the training optimization algorithm was 462.8 with 100 neurons implemented. 
This dropped to the lowest (355) when 120 neurons were implemented in the network. Figure 
4.9 shows the plot of the average number of epoch used in training with different number of 
neurons. From the plot, it would noticed that the number epoch increases as the number 
neuron increased from 80 to 100 and reduces after 110 and 120 neurons were implemented in 
the network. 
 
Table 4. 9:Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
s\n
o 
Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 359 402 585 370 300 
2 551 385 379 341 325 
3 513 536 514 358 395 
4 429 530 424 306 333 
5 392 399 412 411 422 
Ave 448.8 450.4 462.8 357.2 355 
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Figure 4. 9: Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
 
The highest number of epoch used in training the network when RP training optimization 
algorithm was applied is 559.8 when 80 neurons were implemented and the lowest was 454.4 
when 100 neurons were implemented. The plot of the average number of epoch used when RP 
training optimization algorithm was applied in Figure 4.10 shows that the number of epochs 
used decreases as the number of neurons implemented increases from 80 to 100. However, the 
number of epoch used increased as number neurons implemented increased from 110 to 120. 
In comparison to number of epoch used in training the network when SCG training optimization 
algorithm was applied, the number of epoch used when RP training optimization algorithm was 
applied was more. 
 
Table 4. 10:  Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with RP Applied 
s\n
o 
Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 433 560 551 472 518 
2 425 426 425 456 599 
3 810 602 483 411 533 
4 615 253 395 504 438 
5 516 483 418 441 515 
Ave 559.8 464.8 454.4 456.8 520.6 
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4.6. Summary of Chapter 4 
The implementation of the first neural network has been demonstrated in this chapter. Data 
from online vulnerability databases were used as the data source for the information needed 
on the attack scenarios used in training the neural network. To model the attack scenario from 
the data, secure troopos approach and sequence diagrams were used. This provided all the 
needed information on the attack components in the attack.  Using the 12 attack attribute, data 
was abstracted from the attack scenarios and then encoded. Further analysis was done on the 
attack attribute four and five in order to encode the data. This involved generating all the attack 
components from the regularly expressed attack patterns, giving each attack component a 
unique ID and classifying them into different groups to illustrate how they interact with one 
another. A discussion on the concept map showing their interaction was presented. The data 
abstracted was used subsequently as the input data for the neural network. For the expected 
output data, unique IDs were allocated to the regularly expressed attack patterns which the 
neural network is trained to identify based on the information on the attack scenario presented 
to it. The standard three layer neural network architecture was adopted for this research and to 
obtain an optimal performance for the neural network, three training optimization algorithms 
were used along with different number of hidden neurons. The training optimization algorithm 
includes Levenberg-Marquardt (LM), Resilient Back-propagation (RP) and Scaled Conjugate 
Gradient (SCG). The strength and weakness of all the training optimization algorithms were 
highlighted. The performance of neural network during training was measured by Mean Square 
Error (MSE).  
The performance of the neural network were analyzed based on MSE, number of epoch used in 
training and time of training. The analysis of the overall result of the performance of the 
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Figure 4. 10: Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with RP 
applied 
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network showed that neural network I gave a better performance when SCG training 
optimization algorithm was applied. The best MSE performance of network was observed when 
90 neurons were implemented and the training was completed in 51 seconds. Based on this 
result, 90 hidden neurons were chosen for the implementation of neural network I and SCG 
training optimization algorithm was chosen for its training. In the next chapter, the 
implementation of neural network II is demonstrated.  
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Chapter 5.  Implementation of Neural Network II 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates the implementation of neural network II the neural network model.  
The process through which the neural network matches the security patterns to identified 
attack pattern by neural network I model is demonstrated.  This includes the implementation of 
the neural network, demonstration on data collection and encoding and training of the neural 
network. The result and analysis of performance of the network is also presented in this 
chapter. 
5.2. Data Collection 
The identified 52 regularly expressed attack patterns by William and Gegick was used as the 
data source for training the second neural network. To align the regularly expressed attack 
patterns to the threats that can exploit security flaws they represent, Microsoft threat 
classification scheme (STRIDE) was used to classify them into six groups according to their 
corresponding threat category. Table 5.1 shows that out of the 52 regularly expressed attack 
patterns, 1 of them was classified under spoofing identity attack category, 2 was classified 
under tamper with data attacks, none was classified under repudiation attacks, 6 was classified 
under the information disclosure attacks, 21 was classified under the denial of service attacks 
and 27 was classified under the elevation of privilege attacks. No attack was classified under 
repudiation attacks because none of the regularly expressed attack patterns demonstrated this 
type of attack. However, it was assumed that this attack was covered under the elevation of 
privilege attack because the attacker must have escalated his privileges before been able to 
cover his tracks in a multi-stage attack scenario. 
Table 5. 1: Classification of Attack Pattern 
 Attack Category Attack IDS Frequency 
1 Spoofing 51 0.02% 
2 Tampering 9, 47 0.04% 
3 Repudiation  0.00% 
4 Information Disclosure 13, 24, 25, 26,42, 49 0.12% 
5 Denial of Service 1, 2, 7, 10, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 48, 53 
0.41% 
6 Elevation of Privilege 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 28, 
29, 30, 31, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 
50, 51, 52 
0.53% 
 
Data was also collected from the security design patterns defined by Steel, et.al (2005), Blakley, 
et.al (2004) and Kienzle and Elder (2003). The security patterns defined by these authors can be 
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seen on Table 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below. A total of 23 security design patterns were defined by 
Steel, et.al (2005).  These were classified into four logical tiers consisting of the web tier, the 
business tier, web services and identity tier. Table 5.2 show the security design patterns defined 
under each logical tier: 
Table 5. 2: Security Design Pattern by Steel, et.al (2005) 
S\no Web Tier Business Tier Web Services Identity Tier 
1 
Authentication 
Enforcer Audit Interceptor 
Message  Inspector 
Gateway 
Assertion 
Builder 
2 
Authorization 
Enforcer 
Container Managed 
Security 
Secure Message 
Router 
Credential 
Tokenizer 
3 Intercepting Validator 
Dynamic Service 
Management Message Inspector 
Single Sign On 
(SSO) Delegator 
4 Secure Base Action 
Obfuscated Transfer 
Object  
Password 
Synchronizer 
5 Secure Pipe Policy Delegate   
6 Secure Service Proxy Secure Service Façade   
7 
Secure Session 
Manager Secure Session Object   
8 
Intercepting Web 
Agent    
9 Secure logger    
 
A total of 13 security design patterns were defined by Blakley, et.al (2004) and these were 
classified into two groups. This consisted of the available security design patterns and the 
protected security design patterns. Table 5.3 shows the security design patterns classified 
under each category. 
Table 5. 3: Security Design Patterns by Blakley, et.al (2004) 
s\no Available Protected 
1 Check pointed  System Protected System 
2 Standby Policy 
3 Comparator- Check Fault – Tolerant 
System 
Authenticator 
4 Replicated System Subject Descriptor 
5 Error/ Detection/Correction Secure Communication 
6  Security Context 
7  Security Association 
8  Secure Proxy 
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The security design patterns defined by Kienzle and Elder (2003) were also classified into two 
categories. These include the structural patterns and procedural patterns. The structural 
patterns consist of 13 main security design patterns and 3 mini-patterns. The mini-patterns are 
less formal and shorter discussion that were included as a supplement to the main security 
design patterns. The procedural patterns consist of 13 security design patterns. Table 5.4 shows 
the security design patterns that were classified under each category. 
Table 5. 4:  Security Design Patterns by Kienzle and Elder (2003) 
s\no Structural Patterns Procedural Pattern 
1 Account Lockout Build Server From Ground up 
2 Authenticated Session Choose the right stuff 
3 Client Data Storage Document Security goals 
4 Client Input filters Document Server Configuration 
5 Directed Session (M) Enrol by Validating out of band 
6 Hidden Implementation (M) Enrol Using Third party Validation 
7 Encrypted Storage Enrol with pre-existing Shared Secret 
8 Minefield Enrol without validating 
9 Network Address Blacklist Log for Audit 
10 Partitioned Application Patch Proactively 
11 Password Authentication Red Team the Design 
12 Password Propagation Share responsibility for security 
13 Secure Assertion Test on a staging server 
14 Server Sandbox  
15 Trusted Proxy  
16 Validated Transaction  
 
There are other security design patterns that have been defined by other authors different 
from the ones highlighted above (See chapter 2 for further discussion). For this reason, a 
decision had to be made on which security design patterns to be analysed for abstracting the 
data needed for training the neural network. The decision to use the security design patterns 
defined by Steel, et.al (2005),  Blakley, et.al (2004) and Kienzle and Elder (2003) base on the 
following reasons: 
1. Security design pattern by Blakley, et.al (2004) was initiated by the Open Group Security 
Forum in a coordinated effort to resolve the problem of lack of clear definition of security 
design patterns. The security design patterns were defined based on a comprehensive list of 
existing security design pattern to be used as a guide by software developers.  
 
2. There is an existing research work by Halkidis, S.T. et al. (2006) in which the security design 
by Blakley, et.al (2004) was analysed qualitatively which provided insight into this research 
work (See section 3 further discussion) 
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3. Since security design patterns have been defined for different purposes, the security design 
patterns by Steel, et.al (2005) and Kienzle and Elder (2003) were chosen because they both 
address web related security issues. 
 
5.3. Data Encoding 
In order to encode the data needed for training the second neural network, the collected data 
were initially analysed. Since the data to be used as input for the second neural network is 
based on the regularly expressed attack pattern identified by the first neural network, no 
further analysis was required because the data was already analysed (See chapter 4 for more 
discussion) and classified according to the type of threat they represent as shown in Table 5.1. 
The information from the analysis on the attack components in the regularly expressed attack 
patterns was used to encode the input data. Table 5.5 shows the attributes of the regularly 
expressed attack patterns used in encoding the input data to the second neural network (See 
Chapter 3 section 4.2 for further discussion).   
Table 5. 5: Attributes of Regularly Expressed Attack Patterns 
s\no Attribute Observable Value 
1 Attack ID Attack Pattern Attack ID 
2 Resource Attacked Attack Component Attack Component ID 
3 Attack Vector Attack Component Attack Component ID 
4 Attack Type Availability 1 
Integrity 2 
Confidentiality 3 
 
The taxonomy of security design patterns by Wiesauer and Sametinger (2009) was based on the 
description of the attack patterns in Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC) catalogue and the intent and purpose of the security design patterns.  The authors 
stated that since the classification of the attack patterns in CAPEC catalogue is based on STRIDE, 
their proposed taxonomy on security design patterns could be considered as classification 
based on STRIDE as well. Building on this approach, the security design patterns defined by 
Steel, et.al (2005), Blakley, et.al (2004) and Kienzle and Elder (2003) in section 2 were analysed. 
From previous research by Halkidis, S.T. et al. (2006), it was observed that security design 
pattern by Blakley, et.al (2004) was analysed qualitatively using Microsoft threat classification 
(STRIDE) to find out the security design pattern that provides protection on each of the threat 
category. The result of the analysis is shown on Table 5.6 and was used as part of the data 
needed for training the second neural network.  
Table 5. 6: Classification of Security Design Pattern by Blakley, et.al (2004) 
s\no Security Pattern S T R I D E 
1 Check pointed  System     X  
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2 Standby     X  
3 Comparator- Check Fault – Tolerant 
System 
    X  
4 Replicated System     X  
5 Error/ Detection/Correction     X  
6 Protected System X X  X  X 
7 Policy X X  X  X 
8 Authenticator X X  X  X 
9 Subject Descriptor       
10 Secure Communication X X  X X X 
11 Security Context  X  X  X 
12 Security Association X X  X  X 
13 Secure Proxy X X  X  X 
 
In a similar manner, security design patterns defined by Steel, et.al (2005), and Kienzle and 
Elder (2003) were analysed. During the analysis of security design patterns by Kienzle and Elder 
(2003), the procedural patterns were not analysed because they consisted security patterns 
which were not implemented in the software application. Procedural patterns were defined for 
the purpose of improving the development process of mission critical software applications. 
They can impact the management of a software development project when adopted by 
software developers.  Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 show the threat category that the security design 
patterns were classified after the analysis.  It would be noticed that the secure assertion and 
dynamic service management on Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 respectively were not classified under 
any category. These security design patterns are related to each other and could not be 
classified under any threat category because they only provide monitoring and reporting of the 
system events but do not offer protection against STRIDE attacks  
 
Table 5. 7: Classification of Security Design Pattern by Kienzle and Elder (2003) 
s\no Structural Patterns S T R I D E 
1 Account Lockout X X  X  X 
2 Authenticated Session X X  X  X 
3 Client Data Storage    X  X 
4 Client Input filters  X  X X X 
5 Directed Session (M)  X     
6 Hidden Implementation (M)    X   
7 Encrypted Storage    X  X 
8 Minefield X  X    
9 Network Address Blacklist X    X  
10 Partitioned Application      X 
11 Password Authentication X  X  X  X 
12 Password Propagation X X  X  X 
13 Secure Assertion       
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14 Server Sandbox  X  X  X 
15 Trusted Proxy X X  X  X 
16 Validated Transaction  X     
 
Table 5. 8:  Classification of Security Design Pattern by Steel, et.al (2005) 
s\no Security Pattern S T R I D E 
1 Authentication Enforcer X X  X  X 
2 Authorization Enforcer X X  X  X 
3 Intercepting Validator  X  X  X 
4 Secure Base Action X X  X X X 
5 Secure Pipe X X  X X X 
6 Secure Service Proxy X X  X  X 
7 Secure Session Manager X X  X  X 
8 Intercepting Web Agent X X  X  X 
9 Secure logger  X  X X   
10 Audit Interceptor  X X X   
11 Container Managed Security X X  X  X 
12 Dynamic Service Management       
13 Obfuscated Transfer Object    X   
14 Policy Delegate    X X  
15 Secure Service Façade X X  X  X 
16 Secure Session Object X   X  X 
17 Message  Inspector Gateway X X X X  X 
18 Secure Message Router X   X   
19 Message Inspector X X X X   
20 Assertion Builder X      
21 Credential Tokenizer X  X    
22 Single Sign On (SSO) Delegator X   X   
23 Password Synchronizer X   X   
 
Following the analysis of the data collected on the regularly expressed attack patterns and the 
security design patterns, the data needed for training the second neural network was encoded. 
A total of 226 training data samples were abstracted from the regularly expressed attack 
patterns using the attributes in Table 5.5.  To encode the data, the corresponding value for the 
information abstracted by each attribute in the Table was used in encoding the data. For 
instance, regularly expressed attack pattern 1 is represented as: 
(User
+
)(Server
+
)(Log
+
)(HardDrive
+
) 
 
Based on the analysis of the data collected on this attack pattern, the information on Table 5.9 
was abstracted from attack pattern 1 using the regularly expressed attack pattern attributes. 
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Table 5. 9: Sample of Pre-processed training data from attack pattern 
Attack ID Resource 
Attacked 
Attack Vector Attack Type 
1 Hard Drive Log Availability 
 
In order to encode the information abstracted in the Table, the attack component ID for Hard 
Drive and Log was used for their encoding (See Table 4.2 in chapter 4 Section 3) The 
corresponding values for Availability and Denial of Service in Table 5.5 was also 
used for their encoding. Table 5.10 below shows the training data for the example above after 
it has been encoded. 
 
Table 5. 10: Sample of training data after encoding 
Attack ID Resource 
Attacked 
Attack Vector Attack Type 
1 42 58 1 
 
The next stage involves converting the encoded data into ASCII comma delimited format which 
can be used to train the neural network as shown below  
 
1, 42, 58, 1 
 
The data is then loaded into the neural network for training as shown in the following Table. 
 
Table 5. 11: Sample of input data into neural network 
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 
1 42 58 1 
 
For the expected output, security design patterns by Steel, et.al (2005), and Kienzle and Elder 
(2003) were grouped into six groups with respect to STRIDE. Each group provides possible 
solutions to the threats identified under each threat category of STRIDE. A unique ID is assigned 
each group so that the neural network can match them to the corresponding attack patterns. 
Based on this encoding, the neural network is expected to identify the possible solution for the 
attack pattern in the Table 5.11 above by giving the following output: 
  
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
 
Table 5.12 -5.17 shows the six groups the security design patterns were classified into using 
STRIDE 
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Table 5. 12: Security Design Patterns Group 1 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Authentication Enforcer Protected System Account Lockout 
2 Authorization Enforcer Policy Authenticated Session 
3 Secure Base Action Authenticator Minefield 
4 Secure Pipe Secure Communication Network Address Blacklist 
5 Secure Service Proxy Security Association Password Authentication 
6 Secure Session Manager Secure Proxy Password Propagation 
7 Intercepting Web Agent  Trusted Proxy 
8 Container Managed 
Security 
  
9 Secure Service Façade   
10 Secure Session Object   
11 Message  Inspector 
Gateway 
  
12 Secure Message Router   
13 Message Inspector   
14 Assertion Builder   
15 Credential Tokenizer   
16 Single Sign On (SSO) 
Delegator 
  
16 Password Synchronizer   
 
 
  Figure 5. 1: Security Design Patterns Group 1 
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Table 5. 13:Security Design Patterns Group 2 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Authentication Enforcer Protected System Account Lockout 
2 Authorization Enforcer Policy Authenticated Session 
3 Intercepting Validator Authenticator Client Input filters 
4 Secure Base Action Secure Communication Directed Session (M) 
5 Secure Pipe Security Context Password Authentication 
6 Secure Service Proxy Security Association Password Propagation 
7 Secure Session Manager Secure Proxy Server Sandbox 
8 Intercepting Web Agent  Trusted Proxy 
9 Secure logger  Validated Transaction 
10 Audit Interceptor   
11 Container Managed 
Security 
  
12 Secure Service Façade   
13 Message  Inspector 
Gateway 
  
14 Message Inspector   
 
 
 Figure 5. 2: Security Design Patterns Group 2 
 
Table 5. 14: Security Design Patterns Group 3 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Secure logger  Minefield 
2 Audit Interceptor   
3 Message  Inspector   
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Gateway 
4 Message Inspector   
5 Credential Tokenizer   
 
 
 Figure 5. 3: Security Design Patterns Group 3 
 
Table 5. 15:Security Design Patterns Group 4 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Authentication Enforcer Protected System Account Lockout 
2 Authorization Enforcer Policy Authenticated Session 
3 Intercepting Validator Authenticator Client Data Storage 
4 Secure Base Action Secure Communication Client Input filters 
5 Secure Pipe Security Context Hidden Implementation (M) 
6 Secure Service Proxy Security Association Password Propagation 
7 Secure Session Manager Secure Proxy Password Authentication 
8 Intercepting Web Agent  Password Propagation 
9 Secure logger  Server Sandbox 
10 Audit Interceptor  Trusted Proxy 
11 Container Managed 
Security    
 
12 Obfuscated Transfer Object   
13 Policy Delegate   
14 Secure Service Façade   
15 Secure Session Object   
16 Message  Inspector 
Gateway  
 
17 Secure Message Router   
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18 Message Inspector    
19 Single Sign On (SSO) 
Delegator  
 
20 Password Synchronizer   
 
 
 Figure 5. 4: Security Design Patterns Group 4 
 
Table 5. 16: Security Design Patterns Group 5 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Secure Base Action Check pointed  System Client Input filters 
2 Secure Pipe Standby Network Address Blacklist 
3 
Policy Delegate 
Comparator- Check Fault – 
Tolerant System 
 
4  Replicated System  
5  Error/ Detection/Correction  
6  Secure Communication  
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 Figure 5. 5: Security Design Patterns Group 5 
 
Table 5. 17: Security Design Patterns Group 6 
s\no Security patterns by Steel, 
et.al, (2005) 
Security Patterns by 
Blakley, et.al (2004) 
Security patterns by Kienzle 
and Elder (2003) 
1 Authentication Enforcer Protected System Account Lockout 
2 Authorization Enforcer Policy Authenticated Session 
3 Intercepting Validator Authenticator Client Data Storage 
4 Secure Base Action Secure Communication Client Input filters 
5 Secure Pipe Security Context Encrypted Storage 
6 Secure Service Proxy Security Association Partitioned Application 
7 Secure Session Manager Secure Proxy Password Authentication 
8 Intercepting Web Agent  Password Propagation 
9 Container Managed 
Security 
 Server Sandbox 
10 Secure Service Façade  Trusted Proxy 
11 Secure Session Object   
12 Message  Inspector 
Gateway 
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 Figure 5. 6: Security Design Patterns Group 6 
 
 
5.4. Neural Network Architecture 
A feed-forward back-propagation neural network is used to analyse the attack patterns and 
generate possible solutions from the security design patterns that can be help in mitigating the 
threat identified in the attack patterns. The architecture of the second neural network is the 
same as that of the first neural network. This is the standard three layer neural network 
architecture consisting of the input layer, the hidden layer and the outer layer. To optimize the 
performance of the neural network, LM, RP and SCG training optimization algorithms were also 
applied in the same way as the first neural network (See chapter four for further discussion) 
With respect to the transfer functions, a tan-sigmoid transfer function was applied to the 
various connection weights in the hidden nodes and in the output nodes, the linear transfer 
function is applied to its weight. Since a supervised learning architecture (i.e. back-propagation) 
was adopted for the second neural network, the data discussed in section 3 was used for its 
training.  
5.5. Neural Network Training 
To train the second neural network the training data set is divided into two sets. The first set of 
data is the training data sets (201 Samples) that were presented to the neural network during 
training. The second set (26 Samples) is the data that were used to test the performance of the 
neural network after it had been trained. In a similar way as the first neural network, the 
performance of the second neural network was observed when 80, 90, 100, 110 and 120 
hidden neurons were used for each training optimization algorithm that was applied. The 
training performance is measured by Mean Squared Error (MSE) and the training stops when 
the generalization stops improving or when the 1500th iteration is reached. Mat lab Neural 
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Network tool box was used to perform the training. The training parameters also include the 
learning rate which is set to 0.01 with a goal of 0; maximum fail set to 6 and a minimum 
gradient of 0.000001 
5.6. Performance Analysis and Discussion 
In a similar way to neural network l, different numbers of neurons were applied to the neural 
network to further optimize its performance.  The training was executed in five simulations to 
obtain the average results of its performance because the neural network is initiated with 
random weights during its training and this gives different results.  Therefore, following the 
same process used in the analysis of the performance results from neural network l, the 
average results on the training time, MSE and number of epoch were also used in analysis of 
the performance of the neural network II. The result of the performance of the neural network 
II when LM training optimization algorithm is applied is also not presented in this section 
because the performance neural network was poor when the training algorithm was applied. It 
took an average of 2 minutes to complete its training which was faster than the time observed 
when it was used in training neural network I. The lowest MSE obtained during its training was 
0.659 which is very far from the set goal in training the network. A statistical analysis was also 
carried out to establish the significance of the training optimization algorithms applied to 
neural network II using statistical tools. 
 
5.6.1. Mean Square Error (MSE) 
Table 5.18 and 5.19 show the performance of the neural network II when SCG and RP training 
optimization algorithms were applied to the network based on their MSE results. The lowest 
MSE result (0.001838) obtained when SCG training optimization algorithms was applied to the 
network with 100 neurons. The highest MSE result was observed when 90 neurons were 
implemented in the network. It was also observed that the MSE results were below 0.0044 for 
the network could closely match the attack patterns to the expected security design patterns. 
The performance of the network was tested with the 25 test data sample. The output 
generated from the network was identical to the expected output. Therefore the performance 
of neural network II when SCG training optimization algorithm was applied was considered to 
be very good. Figure 5.7 shows the plot of the MSE result for neural network II during training. 
Figure 5.8 shows the plot of the average MSE result for the different number of neurons applied 
to the network. 
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 Figure 5. 7: Plot of MSE for Neural Network II 
 
Table 5. 18:MSE of Neural Network II with SCG Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 0.0029 0.00332 0.00124 0.00347 0.00319 
2 0.000829 0.00126 0.00166 0.00159 0.00264 
3 0.00455 0.00376 0.00265 0.00124 0.00191 
4 0.00333 0.0029 0.000829 0.00385 0.00124 
5 0.00249 0.00438 0.00281 0.00373 0.00145 
Ave 0.00282 0.003124 0.001838 0.002776 0.002086 
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Figure 5. 8:  Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
 
The performance of neural network II was better when RP training optimization algorithm was 
applied to the network. It was observed that the MSE results obtained were lower than the 
MSE results obtained with SCG training algorithm was applied to the network. The highest MSE 
(0.002286) was obtained when 110 neurons were implemented in the network and the lowest 
(0.001055) was obtained when 90 neurons were implemented. The performance of the 
network was also tested with the test data sample and this generated an output which was 
identical to the expected output (see chapter 6 for more discussion). Figure 5.9 shows the plot 
of the average MSE results obtained 
Table 5. 19: MSE of Neural Network I with RP Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 0.000323 0.0019 0.000522 0.00115 0.00394 
2 0.00385 0.00138 0.0038 0.00488 0.000757 
3 0.000376 0.000776 0.000324 0.000969 0.000537 
4 0.001 0.00114 0.000316 0.00147 0.000107 
5 0.000367 0.0000789 0.00351 0.00296 0.000509 
Ave 0.001183 0.001055 0.001694 0.002286 0.00117 
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Figure 5. 9:MSE of Neural Network II with RP Applied 
  
5.6.2. Number of Epochs 
Table 5.20 and 5.21 shows show the performance of the first neural network based on number 
of epochs used in training the network. The highest number of average epoch used when SCG 
was applied as the training optimization algorithm was 532.4 with 100 neurons implemented. 
This dropped to the lowest (364.2) when 110 neurons were implemented in the network. 
Figure 5.10 shows the plot of the average number of epoch used in training with different 
number of neurons.  
 
Table 5. 20:Number of Epoch used in Neural Network II with SCG Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 582 512 636 281 345 
2 535 408 686 302 312 
3 257 410 352 370 385 
4 315 518 626 302 659 
5 722 408 362 566 574 
Ave 482.2 451.2 532.4 364.2 455 
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Figure 5. 10:Number of Epoch used in Neural Network I with SCG Applied 
 
It was observed that when RP training optimization algorithm was applied to the network, the 
number of epoch used was greater than when SCG training optimization algorithm was applied. 
The highest number of epoch used with RP training optimization algorithm is 1324.8 when 80 
neurons were implemented and the lowest was 906.8 when 110 neurons were implemented. 
The plot of the average number of epoch used when RP training optimization algorithm was 
applied in Figure 5.11 shows that the number of epochs used decreases as the number of 
neurons implemented increases from 80 to 110 and increased slightly when the number of 
neurons was increased to 120. 
Table 5. 21: Number of Epoch used in Neural Network II with RP Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 1500 1448 1005 1101 610 
2 1038 845 998 635 987 
3 1500 1245 989 827 980 
4 1086 1188 1133 983 1009 
5 1500 1500 1056 988 993 
Ave 1324.8 1245.2 1036.2 906.8 915.8 
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Figure 5. 11: Number of Epoch used in Neural Network II with RP Applied 
 
5.6.3. Training Time 
Table 5.22 and 5.23 show the time spent in training neural networks II with SCG and RP training 
optimization algorithms respectively.  The plot of the average time spent in training the 
network when SCG RP training optimization algorithm was applied (Figure 5.12) shows a sharp 
increase in the training time from 20 seconds to 45 seconds when the number of neurons 
implemented increased from 110 to 120.  
Table 5. 22:Training Time for Neural Network II with SCG Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 00:25 00:23 00:30 00:17 00:34 
2 00:22 00:29 00:34 00:16 00:30 
3 00:11 00:18 00:17 00:20 00:38 
4 00:13 00:23 00:32 00:17 01:05 
5 00:30 00:19 00:17 00:31 00:57 
Ave 00:20 00:22 00:26 00:20 00:45 
 
 
Figure 5. 12: Training Time for Neural Network II with SCG Applied 
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Compared to the time spent when SCG training optimization algorithm was applied to the 
network, the time spent in training the network when RP training optimization algorithm was 
applied to the network was longer. The plot of the average time spent in training the network 
as shown in figure 5.13 reveal that the shortest time spent in training (47 seconds) was when 90 
neurons was implemented in the network and the longest time spent in training the network (1 
minutes and 1 second) was when 80 neurons was implemented. It would be noticed that the 
time spent in training the network when RP training optimization algorithm was applied 
decreased as the number of neurons implemented increased from 80 to 110 and increased 
slightly when 120 neurons were implemented.  
 
Table 5. 23:Training Time for Neural Network II with RP Applied 
s\no Number of Hidden Neurons 
80 90 100 110 120 
1 01:32 01:05 00:48 00:54 00:31 
2 00:44 00:38 00:46 00:34 00:52 
3 01:01 00:54 00:46 00:43 00:50 
4 00:44 00:51 00:52 00:52 00:59 
5 01:02 01:05 00:49 00:51 01:01 
Ave 01:01 00:55 00:48 00:47 00:51 
 
 
Figure 5. 13: Training Time for Neural Network II with RP Applied 
 
 
6. Summary of Chapter 5 
The Implementation of the second neural network has been demonstrated in this chapter. 
Using the data from the analysis of the regularly expressed attack pattern and security design 
pattern data needed for the training of the neural network was abstracted. The list of attributes 
used in abstracting the data was presented and the encoding of the data was demonstrated.  
Similar neural network architecture to the first neural network was adopted for the second 
neural network architecture. LM, RP and SCG training optimization algorithms was also applied 
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to neural network and its performance was measured by Mean Square Error (MSE) 
The overall result of the network shows that neural network II perform better when it was 
trained with RP training optimization algorithm. The best MSE performance was observed when 
90 neurons were implemented in the network and the training time lasted for 55 seconds. 
Based on this result, 90 hidden neurons were chosen for the implementation of neural network 
II and RP training optimization algorithm was chosen for its training. Similarly neural network II 
was tested using test data sample and output generated was identical to the expected security 
design pattern.  In the next chapter, the validation study is presented to analyse how close the 
output of the proposed neural network tool produce matches the expected out. A case study is 
also presented to demonstrate how the neural network tool can be used to integrate security 
into software design.  
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Chapter 6. Result and Discussion 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Having analyzed the performance of neural network I and II in the previous chapter, in this 
chapter a statistical analysis is conducted to compare the performance of the networks when 
SCG and RP training optimization algorithms were applied. This is followed by a validation study 
in which the test data from chapter 4, section 5 and chapter 5, section 5 is used to test the 
performance of neural network I and II respectively. The results of the actual output of the 
networks are compared to their expected output. Their difference are identified and analyzed. 
The performance of neural network I was also compared to the performance of students 
conducting SAFE-T in Gegick and Williams’ feasibility study. To demonstrate how the proposed 
neural tool can be used in integrating security into software design, a case study on a real life 
system is presented.  
6.2. Statistical Analysis on the Performance of Neural Network I 
To compare the performance of the neural network I when SCG and RP training optimization 
algorithms were applied to the network a statistical analysis was conducted. The one way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare the average MSE results obtained when the 
two training algorithms were applied to the network.  Table 6.1 shows the hypotheses that 
were proposed in the analysis. 
Table 6. 1:Hypothesis proposed for comparing performance of neural network l 
Hypothesis Test Explanation 
Ho µ1 =  µ2 The mean of MSE results obtained from the network when the two 
training algorithms are applied are the same 
HA µ1 ≠ µ2 The mean of MSE results are different 
 
To carry out the analysis, the average results of the MSE obtained was processed by multiplying 
each value by 1000 to make it easier for the calculation to be computed. Table 6.2 shows the 
initial and final data after it was processed. The decision rule for accepting or rejecting the 
proposed hypothesis given the two training algorithms each with five different numbers of 
neurons is based on the critical F- distribution value (Fcrt) of 5.32 with 1 degree of freedom 
(DF)(i.e. between the groups) and 8 DF (i.e. within the groups) and at 0.05 confidence level 
interval. If the observed F statistic value (Fobs) is lesser than Fcrt value (i.e. Fobs < Fcrt )  the null 
hypothesis Ho, is accepted otherwise it is rejected in favour of HA. Table 6.3 is the ANOVA Table 
used in calculating the Fobs.  
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Table 6. 2:Average of MSE Results of neural network implemented with SCG and RP 
Number of 
Neurons 
SCG RP 
Initial Final Initial Final 
80 0.003246 3.246 0.003422 3.422 
90 0.002148 2.148 0.00284 2.84 
100 0.002469 2.469 0.003496 3.496 
110 0.00239 2.39 0.003528 3.528 
120 0.002812 2.812 0.003168 3.168 
 
Table 6. 3:ANOVA Table for Average MSE Result for Neural Network l 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Treatment 
Error 
1 
8 
1.1486 
1.0608 
1.1486 
0.1326 
8.6621 0.05 
Total 9 2.2094    
 
Result from the ANOVA Table show that the Fobs = 8.6621 and since this is greater than Fcrt 
(5.32), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the average MSE results obtained from 
neural network l when the two training algorithms are applied to the network are significantly 
different. Furthermore based on the analysis of the MSE in chapter 4, section 6.1, neural 
network I had a better performance when SCG training algorithm was applied to the network. 
 
6.3 Statistical Analysis on the Performance of Neural Network II 
Also using statistical analysis, the performance of neural network II when SCG and RP training 
optimization algorithms were applied to the network was analyzed. The one way analysis of 
variance was used to compare the average MSE results obtained from the network. Table 6.4 
shows the proposed hypotheses for the analysis. 
 
Table 6. 4:Hypothesis proposed for comparing performance of neural network II 
Hypothesis Test Explanation 
Ho µ1 =  µ2 The mean of MSE results obtained from neural network II when the two 
training algorithms are applied are the same 
HA µ1 ≠ µ2 The mean of MSE results are different 
 
The average results of the MSE obtained from neural network II was also processed in a similar 
way to section 2.4 by multiplying each value by 1000 to make it easier for the statistical 
calculation to be computed. Table 6.5 shows the initial and final data after it was processed. Fcrt 
value of 5.32 with 1 and 8 DF at 0.05 confidence level interval was used as the decision rule for 
either accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore if Fobs < Fcrt, then the null hypothesis 
Ho, is accepted.  Otherwise it is rejected in favour of HA. Table 6.6 is the ANOVA Table used in 
calculating the Fobs.  
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Table 6. 5:Average of MSE Results of Neural Network II implemented with SCG and RP 
Number of 
Neurons 
SCG RP 
Initial Final Initial final 
80 0.00282 2.82 0.001183 1.183 
90 0.003124 3.124 0.001055 1.055 
100 0.001838 1.838 0.001694 1.694 
110 0.002776 2.776 0.002286 2.286 
120 0.002086 2.086 0.00117 1.17 
 
Table 6. 6:ANOVA Table for Average MSE Result for Neural Network II 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Treatment 
Error 
1 
8 
2.7626 
2.2337 
2.7626 
0.2792 
8.1385 0.05 
Total 9 4.9963    
 
Since Fobs > Fcrt , the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of HA and conclude that the average 
MSE results obtained from neural network II when the two training algorithms are applied to 
the network are significantly different. By comparing the average MSE results obtained from 
the network, it can be established that neural network II had a better performance when RP 
training algorithm was applied to the network. 
 
6.4. Validation Study  
In the validation study, the test data from the data collected was used to test the performance 
of the neural networks after they had been trained. The expected and actual output of the 
network and then compared and analyzed. 
 
6.4.1 Neural Network I 
For neural network I, a total of 52 data samples were used to test the network.  Since neural 
network I involve two networks, the test data was divided into two data sets each consisting of 
26 data samples corresponding to each neural network (See Table 4.6, chapter 4 section 5).  
Table 6.1 shows the result of the actual output of the neural network I and its expected output. 
  
Table 6. 7: Actual and expected output of Neural Network I 
s\n Attack Pattern Investigated Actual Output Expected Output 
Results from Network 1 
1 Attack Pattern 1 0.9970 1 
2 Attack Pattern 2 1.5821 2 
3 Attack Pattern 3 3.0000 3 
4 Attack Pattern 4 3.9991 4 
5 Attack Pattern 5 4.9913 5 
6 Attack Pattern 6 6.0000 6 
7 Attack Pattern 7 6.9998 7 
8 Attack Pattern 8 7.9995 8 
9 Attack Pattern 9 8.9972 9 
10 Attack Pattern 10 9.9189 10 
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11 Attack Pattern 11 10.9999 11 
12 Attack Pattern 12 11.9989 12 
13 Attack Pattern 13 12.9206 13 
14 Attack Pattern 14 13.9877 14 
15 Attack Pattern 15 14.9986 15 
16 Attack Pattern 16 16.0000 16 
17 Attack Pattern 17 16.6118 17 
18 Attack Pattern 19 18.9989 19 
19 Attack Pattern 20 19.9997 20 
20 Attack Pattern 21 21.0000 21 
21 Attack Pattern 22 22.0000 22 
22 Attack Pattern 23 22.5392 23 
23 Attack Pattern 24 23.9999 24 
24 Attack Pattern 25 25.0000 25 
25 Attack Pattern 26 25.9996 26 
26 Attack Pattern 27 26.9935 27 
Results from Network 2 
27 Attack Pattern 28 27.9970 28 
28 Attack Pattern 29 28.9943 29 
29 Attack Pattern 30 30.0000 30 
30 Attack Pattern 31 31.0000 31 
31 Attack Pattern 32 31.9999 32 
32 Attack Pattern 33 32.6139 33 
33 Attack Pattern 34 34.0000 34 
34 Attack Pattern 35 34.9684 35 
35 Attack Pattern 36 36.0000 36 
36 Attack Pattern 37 37.0000 37 
37 Attack Pattern 38 38.0000 38 
38 Attack Pattern 39 39.0000 39 
39 Attack Pattern 40 39.9916 40 
40 Attack Pattern 41 41.5488 41 
41 Attack Pattern 42 42.0000 42 
42 Attack Pattern 43 43.0000 43 
43 Attack Pattern 44 43.9998 44 
44 Attack Pattern 45 44.9992 45 
45 Attack Pattern 46 46.0000 46 
46 Attack Pattern 47 47.0000 47 
47 Attack Pattern 48 47.9992 48 
48 Attack Pattern 49 49.0000 49 
49 Attack Pattern 50 49.9751 50 
50 Attack Pattern 51 50.8999 51 
51 Attack Pattern 52 51.5942 52 
52 Attack Pattern 53 52.6986 53 
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Figure 6. 1: Actual vs. Expected output of Network 1 of NN I 
 
 
Figure 6. 2: Actual vs. Expected output of Network 2 of NN I 
 
In comparing the actual output of neural network I to its expected output it would be seen that 
the neural networks have been able to match the correct attack patterns as close as possible in 
the expected output.  Results from the actual output show that while the network was able to 
match some the attack pattern investigated exactly (i.e. identification of the exact attack 
pattern ID), the result also showed many attack patterns were identified by approximating their 
IDs. Of the 52 data sample that was used to test neural network I, 16 of the actual output result 
were exact match of expected output while the remaining 36 result were approximation of the 
attack pattern IDs.  The approximated results are accepted in the validation study as this 
showed that the network was able to identify the possible attack pattern from the test data 
presented to it.  
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Analysis of the result of the actual output showed that the attack pattern that were exactly 
matched from the test data were attacks in which the attackers had manipulated the user input 
in order to stage  buffer overflow attacks or denial of service attacks. This is no surprise as most 
of the attacks patterns involve the attacker manipulating the user input. However, for the 
outputs in which the network gave a result which matched the expected output after 
approximation (i.e. -0.5 <X> 0.5: where X is attack pattern ID), were mostly attacks causing DoS. 
 
Michael Geigick and Laurie Williams conducted a feasibility study by using undergraduate 
students playing the role of software developers who are not experienced in security to match 
20 of their attack patterns to the system design of a hypothetical banking system (see Appendix 
IV) using their SAFE-T approach. The result of the feasibility study showed that 91% of attack 
patterns were correctly identified by the students. Using design scenarios from the same 
system design, neural network I was also tested in a similar way to identify attack patterns that 
can be matched to the design scenarios. Table 6.8 shows the expected regularly expressed 
attack patterns for the system design and the actual output of the network for the attack 
patterns matched to each design scenario. The result showed that neural network I was able to 
match the possible attack pattern to each design scenario with an output which was close as 
much as the expected output.  Comparing this result with the result of the neural network, it 
could be seen that the neural network gave a better performance by identifying all the attack 
patterns relating to the design correctly. Therefore, given the accuracy of the neural networks, 
it shows that neural networks can be used to evaluate software from its design 
 
Table 6. 8:Actual and expected output of Neural Network I with input from design scenario 
s\n  Design Scenarios Actual Output Expected Output 
1 Scenario 1 0.9423 1 
2 Scenario 2 1.9956 2 
3 Scenario 3 2.9986 3 
4 Scenario 4 3.9959 4 
5 Scenario 5 4.9592 5 
6 Scenario 6 5.7081 6 
7 Scenario 7 6.9989 7 
8 Scenario 8 7.9999 8 
9 Scenario 9 8.8304 9 
10 Scenario 10 9.9949 10 
11 Scenario 11 10.9985 11 
12 Scenario 12 11.9961 12 
13 Scenario 13 12.9963 13 
14 Scenario 14 13.9968 14 
15 Scenario 15 14.9992 15 
16 Scenario 16 16.9996 17 
17 Scenario 17 19.9969 20 
18 Scenario 18 20.9988 21 
19 Scenario 19 22.5392 23 
119 
 
20 Scenario 20 23.9941 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3: Actual vs. Expected output result of design Scenarios evaluated by NNI 
 
6.4.2 Neural Network II 
The performance of neural network II was also tested using the test data in chapter 5 section 5.  
Table 6.9 shows the actual and expected output of neural network II. By comparing the 
expected and actual output, it would be seen that the network was able to match most the 
attack patterns to correct the group that will provide mitigation to vulnerabilities in the attack 
pattern. In a similar way to neural network I, the output of neural network II matched the 
expected output after approximation (i.e. -0.5 <X> 0.5: where X is group ID) There were two 
instances in which the network failed to match the attack patterns to the correct group. This 
was when the network was used to evaluate test data sample 10 and 17.  For test data sample 
10, the network produce an output of 2.6441 when the expected output is 6 and for test data 
17, the network produced an output of 6 when the expected output is 2. By looking at the data 
used in training the network for matching the attack patterns to their corresponding security 
pattern, it was seen that for these attack patterns, the attacker had multiple ways in which the 
attack could be carried out. This explains why the network failed to match the attack patterns. 
With a larger data sample for training the neural network, a better performance can be 
achieved. Figure 6.4 is a graph showing the difference between the actual and expected output 
 
Table 6. 9: Actual and expected output of Neural Network II 
s\n Test Data Sample Actual Output Expected Output 
1 Sample 1 6.0000 6 
2 Sample 2 5.9999 6 
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3 Sample 3 5.0000 5 
4 Sample 4 4.9998 5 
5 Sample 5 5.0000 5 
6 Sample 6 5.0000 5 
7 Sample 7 5.9999 6 
8 Sample 8 6.0000 6 
9 Sample 9 5.0000 5 
10 Sample 10 2.6441 6 
11 Sample 11 5.0000 5 
12 Sample 12 5.0000 5 
13 Sample 13 6.0000 6 
14 Sample 14 4.9183 5 
15 Sample 15 6.0000 6 
16 Sample 16 5.0000 5 
17 Sample 17 6.0000 2 
18 Sample 18 1.7707 2 
19 Sample 19 5.6890 6 
20 Sample 20 4.0000 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 4: Actual vs. Expected output of NN II 
 
6.5. Case Study 
The design for the online shopping portal by Mohan et.al (2009) is adopted in this research to 
illustrate how the proposed neural network tool can be used to evaluate software design for 
security flaws. In the design scenario, a customer visits the portal to either view or buy 
products.  The customer searches for the product by selecting the appropriate category and 
brand. To purchase the product, the customer adds the product to the shopping cart which he 
can also edit by deleting already added product and adding new product. Once the customer 
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has completed his shopping, he checks out and he is prompted to sign in if he is an existing 
customer or to register if he is not. After signing in, customer is directed to the secure payment 
section where he confirms the delivery address, and also provides his payment details. At the 
last stage of the order, a confirmation page is displayed to confirm shipment ID and delivery of 
product with 15 days.  From the design, three scenarios were evaluated. The identified attack 
patterns for each scenario by neural network I and the group of security patterns that can 
provide mitigation identified by neural network II is presented below. Figure 6.5 is the class 
diagram for the design of the online shopping portal. 
+Add_Category() : void
+Update_Brands() : string
+Update_Total_Brands() : void
-#Categoryid : int
-Nos_of_Brands : int
-Category_Name : string
Category
+Add_Segment() : void
+Update_Category() : string
+Update_Total_Segment() : void
-#Segementid : int
-SegementName : string
-Nos_of_Category : int
Segment
+Add_Brand() : void
+Update_Product() : string
+Update_Total_Product() : void
-#Brandid : int
-BrandName : string
-Nos_of_Products : int
Brand
+Add_Product() : void
-#Productid : int
-Product_Name : string
Product
+Calculate_Cost() : float
+Verify_Productid() : bool
+Verify_Cartid() : bool
-#CartItemid : int
-Productid : int
-Quantity : int
-TotalCost : float
CartItems
+Calculate_Cost() : float
+Verify_Custid() : bool
-#Cartid : int
-Custid : int
-Total_Cost : float
-CartItemid : int
Cart
+Verify_Cardid() : bool
+Verify_Custid() : byte
+Verify_Cartid() : bool
-#Paymentid : int
-Cartid : int
-Cardid : int
-Payment_Amount : float
-Custid : int
Payment
+Add_Customer() : void
+Update_Details() : bool
-Custid : int
-Cust_Details : string
-Userid : string
-Password : string
Customer
+Verify_Cardid() : bool
+Verify_Custid() : bool
+Verify_Paymentid() : bool
-#Cardid : int
-CardNo : int
-Card_Details : string
CardDetails
-has
1..* 1..*
-has
0..*
*
-has0..*
1..*
-Made of
1
1..*
-Consist of
0..1
1..*
1
..
*
*
-Supports
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Figure 6. 5: Class diagram of online shopping portal 
 
6.5.1 Scenario 1: Product Selection 
In this design scenario, the customer visiting the portal searches the portal by selecting the 
product category and then the brand to view different products. Product selected by the 
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customer is described as the cart item when it is added to the cart in the class diagram in Figure 
6.5. The system returns a cart id for each cart item added to the cart. Figure 6.6 is the sequence 
diagram for this scenario. Looking at the scenario, information stored by the cart could be 
chosen by the attacker as the target of attack. By manipulating this information, it is possible 
for the attacker to reduce the price to be paid for the products that have been added to the 
cart. Figure 6.7 shows that the data is stored in a backend database. Based on the attack 
attributes in Table 4.1 in chapter 4 section 3, the data capturing the design scenario on Table 
6.10 is generated.  
  
Table 6. 10: Attack attributes for scenario 1 
S\n Attributes Observable value 
1 Attacker No access 0 
2 Source of Attack External 1 
3 Target of Attack Information 54 
4 Attack Vector Query String 77 
5 Attack Type Confidentiality 9 
6 Input validation No Validation 3 
7 Dependencies Input validation and access control 6 
8 Output encoding Escaping supplied user input (lacking) 3 
9 Authentication None 0 
10 Access Control Function access 4 
11 HTTP Security Input validation 3 
12 Error handling and Logging None 0 
Customer CartItem Cart
Selects a product
Add to Cart
Cartid
Cartid
 
Figure 6. 6: Sequence diagram for product selection 
 
By using the corresponding values of the attributes in Table 6.4 as the input for neural network 
I, the network produced an output of 25.9976 which corresponds to regularly expressed 
attack pattern 26. In this attack, an attacker can use directory traversal or shell characters as 
input in a crafted URL in order to view sensitive information (See Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 section 
5 for more discussion). An example of this attack is recorded by security focus under BID 3308 
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and in CVE details database under CVE 2001-0985. In order to match the identified attack 
pattern to the corresponding group of security patterns that can provide mitigation, the 
attributes of the attack patterns listed in Table 5.5 in chapter 5 section 3 is used to generate the 
input for neural network II (See Table 6.11). With this input, neural network II produced an 
output of 3.9615. This corresponds to group 4 of the security patterns in Table 5.15 in chapter 
5 section 3. This group of security pattern provides mitigation for information disclosure 
attacks.  
Table 6. 11:Attributes of identified attack pattern in scenario 1 
S\n Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attack ID Attack ID 26 
2 Resource Attacked Information 54 
3 Attack Vector Query String 77 
4 Attack type Confidentiality 3 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Scenario 2: Cart Submission 
In this scenario, the customer checks out after adding products he decides to buy to the 
shopping cart.  The cart checks out each cart item by requesting the cart item class to calculate 
the cost. Following this, data on the cart is stored on the database which generates a cart id for 
the cart. In this design scenario, the attacker can choose the data stored in database as his 
target of attack by manipulating the data on the database. Figure 6.7 shows the sequence 
diagram of this scenario. The data capturing the design scenario using the attack attributes is 
shown in Table 6.12 
 
Table 6. 12:Attributes for scenario 2 
S\n Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attacker No Access 0 
2 Source of Attack External 1 
3 Target of Attack Data 20 
4 Attack Vector SQL Input 90 
5 Attack Type Privacy 9 
6 Input validation No validation 3 
7 Dependencies Validation and access Control 6 
8 Output encoding None 0 
9 Authentication None 0 
10 Access Control Service access  3 
11 HTTP Security Input Validation 3 
12 Error handling and Logging None 0 
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Customer Cart CartItem
Submit a Cart
CartitemCost
Cartid
Checkout Cart
for each cartitem
Calculate cost per cartitem
Database
Save Cart
Cartid
Cart Submitted
 
Figure 6. 7: Sequence diagram for shopping cart submission 
 
Neural network I produced an output of 8.9988 when the value of the attributes on Table 6.12 
was used as its input.  This corresponds to the regularly attack pattern 9 in which the attacker 
injects SQL into the URL in order to query backend databases. An example of this attack is 
recorded by security focus under BID 9967 and in CVE details database under CVE 2004-2412. 
Table 6.13 shows the attributes for the identified attack pattern and their corresponding values 
which are used as input for neural network II. The network produced an output of 1.9999 
which indicates that the security design patterns in group 2 as shown on Table 5.13 in chapter 5 
section 3 can provide mitigation for data tampering attacks.  
Table 6. 13:Attributes of identified attack pattern in scenario 2 
S\n Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attack ID Attack ID 9 
2 Resource Attacked Data 20 
3 Attack Vector SQL Input 91 
4 Attack type Integrity 2 
 
6.5.3 Scenario 3: Log in 
In the log in design scenario, the customer is prompted to log into his account by supplying his log in 
credentials. The log credentials are then validated by checking the details of the user on the database. If 
the credentials supplied by the user are valid, the user is granted access to his account. Figure 6.8 shows 
the sequence diagram for this scenario. A point of interest for an attacker in this particular design 
scenario is gaining access into various accounts in the shopping portal. The data capturing the design 
scenario using the attack attributes is shown in Table 6.14 
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User Login Screen ValidateUser Database
Clicks on Login
Validate User (userid, password)
CheckUserDetails
UserDetails
ValidateUser
Result
ShowMessage
 
Figure 6. 8: Sequence diagram for customer login 
 
Table 6. 14:Attributes for scenario 3 
S\n Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attacker No access 0 
2 Source of Attack External 1 
3 Target of Attack Authentication Routine 5 
4 Attack Vector Username Entry 101 
5 Attack Type Confidentiality 9 
6 Input validation No Validation 3 
7 Dependencies Validation 3 
8 Output encoding None 0 
9 Authentication None 0 
10 Access Control Service access 3 
11 HTTP Security Input Validation 3 
12 Error handling and Logging None 0 
 
Using the values on Table 6.14 as input for neural network I, the network produced an output 
of 7.9786 which corresponds to regularly expressed attack pattern 8. In this attack, the 
attacker submits a long string of character for the username. This causes a buffer overflow that 
enables the attacker to escalate his privileges. An example of this attack is recorded by security 
focus under BID 9672 and in CVE details database under CVE 2004-0286. Table 6.15 shows the 
attributes for the identified attack pattern and their corresponding values which are used as 
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input for neural network II. The network produced an output of 6.0000 which indicates that 
the security design patterns in group 6 as shown on Table 5.17 in chapter 5 section 3 can 
provide mitigation for privilege escalation attacks. 
 
Table 6. 15: Attributes of identified attack pattern in scenario 3 
S\n Attributes Observable Value 
1 Attack ID Attack ID 8 
2 Resource Attacked Authentication Routine 5 
3 Attack Vector Username Entry 101 
4 Attack type Confidentiality 3 
 
6.6 Comparison of the neural network approach with current approaches 
In comparing the proposed neural network tool with the current approaches used in integrating 
security into software design during SDLC, the following can be observed: 
In a similar way to architectural risk analysis and threat modelling, it is necessary to decompose 
the software architecture so as to identify the features of the software design (such as assets 
and source of attack) that needs to be analysed when using the proposed neural network tool. 
For example, in the case study in above, each of the design scenarios represent a functional 
part of the software design which is analysed using the attack attributes to abstract the data 
needed by the neural network for analysing the software design.  
Furthermore, the proposed neural network tool is based on the abstract and match technique 
through which software flaws in a software design can be identified when an attack pattern is 
matched to the design. Hence, using well known approaches such as DFD and sequence 
diagrams familiar to software developers, they are able to abstract information about their 
software designs needed by the Neural Network tool for matching possible attack patterns 
(Adebiyi et.al, 2012). 
However, to conduct architectural risk analysis and threat modelling may be daunting task for 
software developers who are not necessarily experts in security. Therefore, the need to involve 
security experts to analyse the software design for security flaws is inevitable. The proposed 
neural overcome this challenge by helping software developers to think of the defences to be 
put in place when possible attack patterns are matched to their software design.  
Also, as discussed in chapter 2 section 11, current security tools used during software design 
such as SDL Threat Modelling Tool is limited by the knowledge of the software developer 
creating the threat Model. As the proposed neural network tool aids software developers who 
are non-security experts, this problem is addressed as the developer only needs to abstract the 
information needed from their designs to be analysed. This eliminates the need for software 
developers to think like the attacker when conducting threat modelling or when drawing attack 
127 
 
trees. All the developers need to focus on is the software design and abstracting the correct 
information from the design scenarios. Moreover, the interpretation of results generated from 
current security tools depends largely on the understanding of the developer on security risks. 
In contrast, the attack pattern matched to a software design and the security design patterns 
identified as solution to flaws in the software design using the proposed neural network tool 
can be are easily understood by software developers. 
While the use of formal methods helps to eliminate software flaws in software during SDLC, as 
discussed in chapter 2 section 8, it is not widely used by software developers. Apart from this its 
adoption by software developers may require a significant deviation from their software 
development methodology. However, the proposed neural network tool can be used during the 
design phase of current software development methodologies without a significant deviation 
from software development process. 
 
6.7. Summary of Chapter 6 
The statistical analysis conducted on the performance of the networks in this chapter showed 
that there were significant differences in their performance when SCG and RP training 
optimization algorithms were applied to the networks. From the results on the performance of 
the neural networks in the validation study, it was observed that that neural network I was able 
to match the test data sample to the excepted attack patterns as close as possible. Neural 
network II was also able match most of the test data sample to the expected group of security 
design patterns. In the two instances the network failed in identifying the correct group, it was 
observed that attack patterns had multiple ways in which the attack could be carried out. This 
explains why the network has not been to match the test data sample for these attack patterns 
to the correct group.  In the case study, three design scenarios from the online shopping portal 
were evaluated. Using the attack attributes, data needed from the scenarios were abstracted 
and were used as input for the neural network. The result of the evaluation show that the 
neural network I was able to match possible attack patterns to the design of the shopping 
portal and neural network II was able to match the identified attack patterns to the group of 
security design patterns that can provide mitigation for the attacks. Based on this information, 
a software developer can make informed decision on what to do in order to integrity security 
into his software design. A comparison between the proposed neural network approach and 
current approaches was also discussed in this chapter. In chapter 7, the conclusion to this 
research is presented and the future direction is discussed. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
Securing software products no doubt will continue to be an on-going challenge because of the 
nature of software produced today. As consumers continue to demand the addition of new 
features to various software applications and the software developers aim at meeting the time 
to market the software applications, malicious hackers will continue to explore new forms of 
vulnerability which they can exploit. As a result, there is no time when new forms of attacks and 
vulnerabilities will not be discovered. It must be noted that network security cannot guarantee 
the security of software applications within a network because software base attacks are 
designed to follow the normal path of a software functionality which already provides an 
acceptable means of access through a network and its security control.  
It cannot be overstated that the cost of fixing security flaws in software applications is very 
costly after they are deployed. The cost could be 30 times more than the cost of finding and 
fixing the problem early in the SDLC. Therefore, integrating security into a software design will 
help tremendously in saving time and money during software development and when the 
software is deployed. For instance, it is less expensive and less disruptive to discover design-
level vulnerabilities during the design, than during implementation or testing, forcing a costly 
redesign of pieces of the application.  
Therefore, software developers must begin to work towards building more secured software 
products by making security a top priority during SDLC. In this regard, software development 
team should be aware of the security issues affecting the software under development and 
must be properly trained to ensure that these issues are properly addressed during SDLC. The 
use of tools capable of helping developers to do a better job and software development 
process that integrates security throughout SDLC also plays a very important role in producing 
secure software.  Base on this fact, this research work proposed the use of neural network as a 
tool to enable software developers to evaluate their software design for security flaws and also 
suggest possible solutions  
Chapter 1 gives the background to this research work and in chapter 2 a literature review on 
the current approaches used in securing software applications was conducted. Based on the 
information gathered on two of the current approaches, the neural network tool in this 
research was proposed. Chapter 3 discussed the proposed neural network tool while chapter 4 
and 5 demonstrated the implementation of the first and second neural network respectively. 
Chapter 6 presented the results and discussion on the performance of the neural network. In 
this chapter, the discussion on the contribution on this research work to knowledge, the 
limitation of the proposed neural network model and a comparison of the proposed neural 
network approach with some of the current approaches used in integrating security into 
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software design are presented. This chapter concludes with the future direction of this research 
work.    
7.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The major contributions of this research work to knowledge are as follows: 
1. Matching attack patterns to software design. By using of neural network as a tool for 
matching attack patterns to software design during design phase of SDLC, the security 
flaws in the software design can be identified. The identification of the security flaw in 
the software design by the neural network tool will enable software developers to take 
the necessary steps in mitigating the threat identified in the security flaw before coding 
begins.  
 
2. Matching attack patterns to security design patterns. The use of security design pattern 
to resolve security problems is currently a challenge to software developers. Building on 
the existing approach in literature to match security design patterns to attack patterns, 
the proposed neural network tool matches identified attack patterns in a software 
design to the corresponding security patterns that can provide mitigation.  
 
3. Aids towards bridging the gap between software developers and security professionals. 
When attack patterns are matched against software design by the neural network tool, 
software developers become more aware on the security aspect of their software 
design and security expertise solutions to threat in the attack.  In this way, the software 
developers can benefit from security expertise of the security professionals. 
Therefore, based on the above, the success of this research in using neural networks to 
evaluate software design for security flaws will consolidate the efforts of software designers 
evaluating their software as they identify areas of security weakness in their software design. 
This will enhance the development of secured software applications in the software industry 
especially as software designers often lack the required security expertise. Thus, neural 
networks given the right information for its training will also contribute in equipping software 
developers to develop software more securely especially in the area of software design. 
7.2 Limitation  
One of the significant limitations to this research is the difficulty of obtaining information from 
software developers in the industry on software designs that can be used in this research work. 
As this information is private to the software developers, limited information was obtained. 
Another difficulty encountered during the course of this research work is the representation of 
the software design to neural network.  As there is no previous work related to using neural 
network as a tool during software design stage of SDLC, no information could be obtained from 
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previous research papers. However, after looking through the resources on neural network 
repository online and speaking to some to software developers in various conferences 
attended, this problem was resolved.  One of the valuable lesson learnt during this research 
work, is to constantly seek professional training relevant to my area of research as this 
contributes significantly to the research work. For instance, it was after going some series of 
training on Mat lab that the skill needed for training the neural network in this research work 
was acquired.  
The regularly expressed attack pattern used in training the neural network is a generic 
classification of attack patterns. Therefore, any unknown attack introduced to the neural 
network will be classified to the closet regularly expressed attack pattern. However, the success 
of the neural network in evaluating software design for security flaws largely depends on the 
input data capturing the attributes of the software design introduced to it.  
 
7.3 Future Work 
Various security tools have been developed to aid software developers in integrating security 
into software applications during SDLC. However, most of these tools are used in the late phase 
of SDLC. As the focus of this research work is integrating security during the early phase of SDLC 
especially during the design phase, it is our intention to carry out a comparative study in which 
the neural network tool would be compared to security tools currently used in integrating 
security during the design phase of SDLC. Result of this comparative analysis should include 
how effective it is in identifying security flaws and its performance based on security 
background of the user using the tools. 
Furthermore, information from attack patterns which capture security flaws in software designs 
from other authors and from CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration Classification) 
would be used in training the neural network. This would subsequently improve the 
performance of the network and increase its scope in matching design scenarios to attack 
patterns not covered in the regularly expressed attack patterns. Also, the neural network tool 
needs to be trained to match attack patterns to other security design patterns proposed by 
other authors. It is also our intention to look further into improving the output result of the 
neural network tool by using other suggested classification of security patterns when defining 
the expected output of the neural network II. 
Further testing of the neural network tool is also required before it can gain acceptance as a 
tool for matching attack patterns to software designs and matching attack patterns to security 
patterns. This test would include finding out whether the attack described in an attack pattern 
matched to a design by the neural network tool is feasible. And if this is feasible, another test 
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should be conducted to explore how effective is the solution that has been suggested in 
preventing the attack 
For the neural network tool to be used by developers, it could be deployed as a plugin in an 
existing software design suite E.g. IBM Rational Rose. The neural network tool will work within 
the same design suite and provide feedback to developers. Also, it would be of great benefit if 
the tool could connect to online vulnerability database and CAPEC to help developers get 
detailed information on threat that has been identified. Alternatively, it could be deployed as 
an independent security tool.  However, for the neural network tool used successfully, it must 
be able to read files created from software design suite and must be able to synchronize it 
feedback to such tools. This is because most software design suite encourage collaboration 
among all the stakeholders in a software project and feedback from the neural network tool 
needs to accessible to the relevant stakeholders 
Lastly, it is desirable to also find out the impact of the neural network tool on the training and 
security awareness of software developers and on other security techniques used in integrating 
in software during software development lifecycle. This could be investigated by measuring 
how the feedbacks from the neural network tool add to the knowledge of software developers 
on the security of their software application and how it complements other security 
techniques. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I 
 
Security Pattern by Blakely et.al (2004) 
Available System Security Pattern 
Pattern Name Description 
Checkpoint System 
pattern 
 
 Used to recover and restore a system to a known valid state in case a 
component fails 
 Offers protection from loss or corruption of state information 
Standby Pattern 
 
 Used to resume service provided by one component from another component 
 Offers backup when a component fails and cannot be recovered. An  similar or 
identical component is used to provide continues services 
Comparator-Check 
Fault Tolerant 
System pattern 
 Used to design a system so that can detect an independent failure of one 
component quickly and not cause a system-wide failure. 
Replication System  
pattern 
 
 Used to create multiple points of presence and recovery in the case of the 
failure of one or more components or links. 
 Provide a means for load balancing and redirection to decrease the chance of 
non-availability 
Error 
Detection\Correction 
pattern 
 
 Used to add redundancy to data to facilitate later detection and recovery of 
error 
 Offers protection against data corruption by deducing errors and possibly 
correcting them in order to ensure correct information exchange or stored. 
 
Protected System Security Pattern 
Pattern Name Description 
Protected System 
pattern 
 
 Used to provide structure through which all access by clients is mediated by a 
guard which must be by-passed.  
 Enforces security policy by controlling access to resources according to 
predefined policy 
Policy Pattern  Used to isolate policy enforcement to a discrete component. 
 Ensures that policy enforcement are performed in the proper sequence 
 “An authenticated user owns a security context (e.g. a role) that is passed to 
the guard of resource. The guard checks inside the policy whether the context 
of this user and the rules match and provides or denies access to the resource” 
Authenticator 
pattern 
 Used to perform authentication of a requesting process before deciding access 
to distributed object 
Subject Descriptor 
patter 
 Used to provide access to security attributes of an entity on whose behalf 
operations are to be performed. 
 Used to control the conditions under which authorization is to be performed. 
 Used to represent authorization subjects as sets of predicates or assertions on 
attributes and property values 
Secure 
Communication 
pattern 
 Used to secure the communication of two parties in the presence of threats. 
 It us used to ensure that the mutual security objectives are met 
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Security Context 
pattern 
 Provides container for security attributes and data relating to execution 
context, process, operation or action. 
Security Association 
pattern 
 Defines a structure which provides each participant in a secure communication 
with the information it will use to protect messages to be transmitted to the 
other party. 
 Also provide participant with information needed to understand and verify the 
protection applied from the other party. 
Secure Proxy pattern  Defines the relationship between the guards of two instances of protected 
system in the case when one instance is entirely contained within the other. 
 Can be used to provide defence in depth 
 
Appendix II 
 
Security pattern by Steel et.al (2005) 
Web Tier Security Patterns 
Pattern Name Description 
Authentication 
Enforcer 
This pattern shows how a browser client should authenticate with the server. It 
creates a base Action class to handle authentication of HTTP requests. 
Authorization 
Enforcer 
This pattern creates a base Action class to handle authorization of HTTP 
requests. 
Intercepting 
Validator 
This pattern refers to secure mechanisms for validating parameters before 
invoking a transaction. Unchecked parameters may lead to buffer overrun, 
arbitrary command execution, and SQL injection attacks. The validation of 
application-specific parameters includes validating business data and 
characteristics such as data type (string, integer), format, length, range, null-
value handling, and verifying for character-set, locale, patterns, context, and 
legal values. 
Secure Base 
Action 
The secure base action is a pattern for centralizing and coordinating security-
related tasks within the Presentation Tier. It serves as the primary entry point 
into the Presentation Tier and should be extended, or used by a Front 
Controller. It coordinates use of the Authentication Enforcer, Authorization 
Enforcer, Secure Session Manager, Intercepting Validator, and Secure Logger 
to ensure cohesive security architecture throughout the Web Tier. 
Secure Logger This pattern defines how to capture the application-specific events and 
exceptions in a secure and reliable manner to support security auditing. It 
accommodates the different behavioral nature of HTTP servlets, EJBs, SOAP 
messages, and other middleware events. 
Secure Pipe This pattern shows how to secure the connection between the client and the 
server, or between servers when connecting between trading partners. In a 
complex distributed application environment, there will be a mixture of 
security requirements and constraints between clients, servers, and any 
intermediaries. Standardizing the connection between external parties using 
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Pattern Name Description 
the same platform and security protection mechanism may not be viable. 
It adds value by requiring mutual authentication and establishing 
confidentiality or non-repudiation between trading partners. This is 
particularly critical for B2B integration using Web services. 
Secure Service 
Proxy 
This pattern is intended to secure and control access to J2EE components 
exposed as Web services endpoints. It acts as a security proxy by providing a 
common interface to the underlying service provider components (for 
example, session EJBs, servlets, and so forth) and restricting direct access to 
the actual Web services provider components. The Secure Service Proxy 
pattern can be implemented as a Servlet or RPC handler for basic 
authentication of Web services components that do not use message-level 
security. 
Secure Session 
Manager 
This pattern defines how to create a secure session by capturing session 
information. Use this in conjunction with Secure Pipe. This pattern describes 
the actions required to build a secure session between the client and the server, 
or between the servers. It includes the creation of session information in the 
HTTP or stateful EJB sessions and how to protect the sensitive business 
transaction information during the session. 
The Session pattern is different from the Secure Session Manager pattern in 
that the former is generic for creating HTTP session information. The latter is 
much broader in scope and covers EJB sessions as well as server-to-server 
session information. 
Intercepting 
Web Agent 
This pattern helps protect Web applications through a Web Agent that 
intercepts requests at the Web Server and provides authentication, 
authorization, encryption, and auditing capabilities. 
 
Business Tier Security Patterns 
Pattern Name Description 
Audit 
Interceptor 
The Secure Logger pattern provides instrumentation of the logging aspects in 
the front, and the Audit Interceptor pattern enables the administration and 
manages the logging and audit in the back-end. 
Container 
Managed 
Security 
This pattern describes how to declare security-related information for EJBs in 
a deployment descriptor. 
Dynamic 
Service 
Management 
This pattern provides dynamically adjustable instrumentation of security 
components for monitoring and active management of business objects. 
Obfuscated This pattern describes ways of protecting business data represented in transfer 
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Pattern Name Description 
Transfer Object objects and passed within and between logical tiers. 
Policy Delegate This pattern creates, manages, and administers security management policies 
governing how EJB tier objects are accessed and routed. 
Secure Service 
Façade 
This pattern provides a session façade that can contain and centralize complex 
interactions between business components under a secure session. It provides 
dynamic and declarative security to back-end business objects in the service 
façade. It shields off foreign entities from performing illegal or unauthorized 
service invocation directly under a secure session. 
Session information can be also captured and tracked in conjunction with the 
Secure Logger pattern. 
Secure Session 
Object 
This pattern defines ways to secure session information in EJBs facilitating 
distributed access and seamless propagation of security context. 
 
Web Services Tier Security Patterns 
Pattern 
Name 
Description 
Message 
Inspector 
This pattern checks for and verifies the quality of XML message-level security 
mechanisms, such as XML Signature and XML Encryption in conjunction with 
a security token. The Message Inspector pattern also helps in verifying and 
validating applied security mechanisms in a SOAP message when processed by 
multiple intermediaries (actors). It supports a variety of signature formats and 
encryption technologies used by these intermediaries. 
Message 
Interceptor 
Gateway 
This pattern provides a single entry point and allows centralization of security 
enforcement for incoming and outgoing messages. The security tasks include 
creating, modifying, and administering security policies for sending and 
receiving SOAP messages. It helps to apply transport-level and message-level 
security mechanisms required for securely communicating with a Web services 
endpoint. 
Secure 
Message 
Router 
This pattern facilitates secure XML communication with multiple partner 
endpoints that adopt message-level security and identity-federation mechanisms. 
It acts as a security intermediary component that applies message-level security 
mechanisms to deliver messages to multiple recipients where the intended 
recipient would be able to access only the required portion of the message and 
remaining message fragments are made confidential. 
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Security Patterns for Identity Management and Service Provisioning 
Pattern Name Description 
Assertion Builder This pattern defines how an identity assertion (for example, 
authentication assertion or authorization assertion) can be built. 
Credential Tokenizer This pattern describes how a principal's security token can be 
encapsulated, embedded in a SOAP message, routed, and processed. 
Single Sign-on (SSO) 
Delegator 
This pattern describes how to construct a delegator agent for handling a 
legacy system for single sign-on (SSO). 
Password 
Synchronizer 
This pattern describes how to securely synchronize principals across 
multiple applications using service provisioning. 
 
Appendix III 
Security Design Patterns by Kinezle and Elder (2003) 
Structural Patterns 
Pattern Name Description 
Account Lockout Passwords are the only approach to remote user authentication that has 
gained widespread user acceptance. However, password guessing 
attacks have proven to be very successful at discovering poorly chosen, 
weak passwords. Worse, the Web environment lends itself to high- 
speed, anonymous guessing attacks. Account lockout protects customer 
accounts from automated password security guessing attacks, by 
implementing a limit on incorrect password attempts before further 
attempts are disallowed. 
Authenticated Session An authenticated session allows a Web user to access multiple access-
restricted pages on a Web site without having to re-authenticate on every 
page request. Most Web application development environments provide 
basic session mechanisms. This pattern incorporates user authentication 
into the basic session model. 
Client Data Storage It is often desirable or even necessary for a Web application to rely on 
data stored on the client, using mechanisms such as cookies, hidden 
fields, or URL parameters. In all cases, the client cannot be trusted not to 
tamper with this data. The Client Data Storage pattern uses encryption 
to allow sensitive or otherwise security-critical data to be securely stored 
on the client. 
Client Input Filters Client input filters protect the application from data tampering 
performed on untrusted clients. Developers tend to assume that the 
components executing on the client system will behave as they were 
originally programmed. This pattern protects against subverted clients 
that might cause the application to behave in an unexpected and insecure 
fashion. 
Directed Session The Directed Session pattern ensures that users will not be able to skip 
around within a series of Web pages. The system will not expose 
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multiple URLs but instead will maintain the current page on the server. 
By guaranteeing the order in which pages are visited, the developer can 
have confidence that users will not undermine or circumvent security 
checkpoints. 
Hidden Implementation The Hidden Implementation pattern limits an attacker’s ability to discern 
the internal workings of an application—information that might later be 
used to compromise the application. It does not replace other defenses, 
but it supplements them by making an attacker's job more difficult.  
Encrypted Storage The Encrypted Storage pattern provides a second line of defense against 
the theft of data on system servers. Although server data is typically 
protected by a firewall and other server defenses, there are numerous 
publicized examples of hackers stealing databases containing sensitive 
user information. The Encrypted Storage pattern ensures that even if it is 
stolen, the most sensitive data will remain safe from prying eyes.  
Minefield The Minefield pattern will trick, detect, and block attackers during a 
break-in attempt. Attackers often know more than the developers about 
the security aspects of standard components. This pattern aggressively 
introduces variations that will counter this advantage and aid in 
detection of an attacker. 
Network  Address 
blacklist 
A network address blacklist is used to keep track of network addresses 
(IP addresses) that are the sources of hacking attempts and other 
mischief. Any requests originating from an address on the blacklist are 
simply ignored. Ideally, breaking attempts should be investigated and 
prosecuted, but there are simply too many such events to address them 
all. The Network Address Blacklist pattern represents a pragmatic 
alternative. 
Partitioned Application The Partitioned Application pattern splits a large, complex application 
into two or more simpler components. Any dangerous privilege is 
restricted to a single, small component. Each component has tractable 
security concerns that are more easily verified than in a monolithic 
application. 
Password 
Authentication 
Passwords are the only approach to remote user authentication that has 
gained widespread user acceptance. Any site that needs to reliably 
identify its users will almost certainly use passwords. The Password 
Authentication pattern protects against weak passwords, automated 
password-guessing attacks, and mishandling of passwords. 
Password Propagation Many Web applications rely on a single database account to store and 
manage all user data. If such an application is compromised, the attacker 
might have complete access to every user’s data. The Password 
Propagation pattern provides an alternative by requiring that an 
individual user’s authentication credentials be verified by the database 
before access is provided to that user’s data.  
Secure Assertion The Secure Assertion pattern sprinkles application-specific sanity checks 
throughout the system. These take the form of assertions – a popular 
technique for checking programmer assumptions about the environment 
and proper program behavior. A secure assert maps conventional 
146 
 
assertions to a system-wide intrusion detection system (IDS). This 
allows the IDS to detect and correlate application-level problems that 
often reveal attempts to misuse the system. 
Server Sandbox Many site defacements and major security breaches occur when a new 
vulnerability is discovered in the Web server software. Yet most Web 
servers run with far greater privileges than are necessary. The Server 
Sandbox pattern builds a wall around the Web server in order to contain 
the damage that could result from an undiscovered bug in the server 
software. 
Trusted Proxy A trusted proxy acts on behalf of the user to perform specific actions 
requiring more privileges than the user possesses. It provides a safe 
interface by constraining access to the protected resources, limiting the 
operations that can be performed, or limiting the user’s view to a subset 
of the data. 
Validated Transaction The Validated Transaction pattern puts all of the security-relevant 
validation for a specific transaction into one page request. A developer 
can create any number of supporting pages without having to worry 
about attackers using them to circumvent security. And users can 
navigate freely among the pages, filling in different sections in whatever 
order they choose. The transaction itself will ensure the integrity of all 
information submitted. 
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Appendix IV 
System Design of a hypothetical banking syste
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Appendix V 
Screenshots of Neural Network I (first Network) 
 
 
 
 
Screenshots of Neural Network I (Second Network) 
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Screen Shot of Neural Network II 
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Appendix VI 
Neural Network 1 (First Network:  Weight to layer 3) 
[-0.16874 0.46912 -0.17275 0.93263 0.22674 0.33647 0.82078 -1.2175 -0.30718 0.1619 0.60244 -
0.84596 0.35917 -0.58197 -0.1355 0.78296 -0.14891 -0.63678 0.58449 0.60938 0.74851 -0.75645 -
0.50426 -0.86166 -0.27702 0.10394 0.49177 -0.1605 1.0453 -0.012048 0.19877 0.67603 -0.11851 -
0.043609 -0.89364; 
 -0.37075 0.60491 0.36731 2.1922 -0.6221 0.12072 1.0724 0.35546 -2.0527 -0.53752 -1.4685 -0.022488 
0.64421 0.83976 -0.50733 0.27778 0.17341 -1.0992 0.81255 0.39671 0.70053 -0.081449 -0.59588 -
0.28674 -0.24363 0.46533 0.21334 -0.21313 1.7439 0.49439 -0.040434 -0.42118 -0.82257 0.98078 -
0.45328; 
 -0.1083 0.40013 0.75861 0.43049 -1.2952 -0.56643 -0.061328 -0.54782 1.2521 0.12715 -2.1861 
0.47863 -0.053031 -0.78504 -0.43256 0.43859 1.068 -0.46446 -2.2287 0.88026 0.65504 0.95359 -
0.84473 -1.0891 -0.68932 0.65899 0.2167 -1.5766 -0.18785 0.34162 -0.91247 -0.042785 -0.35586 -
0.58015 -0.47937; 
 -0.45063 0.50104 -0.28596 0.40768 -0.91112 1.7644 0.10891 -0.26777 -1.981 1.2315 0.13444 0.1784 
0.69268 -1.3179 -0.48735 1.0694 2.0058 -0.55395 -0.55371 0.91008 1.0734 0.10779 -0.58433 -0.78402 
0.23368 -0.41306 0.8539 -0.53076 1.2675 -2.2481 -0.63883 0.33174 0.46121 0.5084 0.9367; 
 0.91631 0.07302 -1.2417 -0.41323 1.3863 -0.023949 -1.3495 0.89421 0.95998 -0.11751 -0.99684 
1.3973 0.59484 1.5423 -0.28783 0.86094 -0.089169 -0.85489 2.4052 0.56013 0.52985 1.7752 -0.4175 -
0.35226 1.2106 0.23597 0.37343 0.98609 -0.23339 0.43199 -0.39431 0.19539 -1.2496 1.6346 -0.50527; 
152 
 
 0.60016 0.29291 -0.44971 0.78497 -0.48747 -0.29152 -0.30941 0.48076 -0.10347 -0.0019005 0.14059 
0.53035 0.58725 -0.074515 -0.52416 0.045644 -0.01699 -0.4462 1.1127 0.024181 -0.06964 -0.51163 
0.10999 0.012175 0.37395 1.3187 0.0046624 -0.67747 -0.94985 -0.44251 -1.0815 -0.057936 0.21611 -
0.037913 -0.673; 
 -0.93018 0.3447 -0.30622 0.8012 -0.84328 -0.63199 0.29164 -0.63001 -0.3383 0.31774 0.012506 -1.536 
0.89533 -0.12367 -1.0244 0.54619 0.57499 -0.2583 -0.99891 0.28656 0.65137 1.0307 -0.69852 -0.27886 
1.0703 -0.431 0.19843 -0.68107 -0.78461 -1.2297 -0.28078 -0.021021 0.30103 0.035136 -3.2589; 
 2.3712 -0.020569 1.0805 0.061385 0.47081 2.9245 0.12073 0.116 -1.2281 0.11631 -0.015111 0.18819 
0.075333 1.3236 -0.42198 0.1665 0.13483 -0.80836 -0.40835 0.62561 0.56523 -1.016 0.088189 -
0.098191 1.3194 1.0351 0.040431 -0.20273 0.55845 -0.84564 0.036098 0.54485 -0.17828 0.39558 
0.011753; 
 -0.83361 0.037664 -1.7883 0.97998 1.6225 -1.9614 -0.60463 -0.79921 -0.44931 -1.5775 -0.064096 -
1.2352 0.37646 -0.89299 -0.5847 1.0306 -0.43719 -1.1248 -0.33434 0.7354 0.88145 0.80174 0.41088 -
0.96219 0.43431 0.47466 0.45816 -0.40462 1.2164 -1.7696 -0.98476 0.95398 0.19492 0.66361 0.18371; 
 1.9634 -0.3596 -0.48624 0.52468 -1.5157 -1.5481 -0.75522 -0.60929 0.21619 -0.84161 -0.44918 -1.3449 
0.58941 1.9428 -0.57106 0.9087 -0.59144 -0.25726 -0.11953 0.27224 0.35514 1.3963 -0.19481 -0.75189 
-0.66517 -0.65553 0.45938 -0.81879 -0.57675 -1.1529 -0.71389 0.39541 0.6605 0.38264 -0.20745; 
 1.3363 -0.095471 -0.44977 0.68648 1.1049 -0.18412 -0.50327 0.35878 -0.51511 -0.66366 -1.3242 
0.56085 0.33476 -0.83207 -0.41446 0.7586 -0.28156 -0.25522 -0.8105 0.41925 0.2915 0.25792 -0.279 -
0.38436 0.40188 0.61716 -0.075181 -0.71581 0.22185 0.71126 -0.46072 0.46842 1.5155 0.31407 -
0.25532; 
 0.005081 -0.020256 -0.12506 -0.137 -0.60889 -0.066088 0.781 -0.20534 0.77267 -0.47274 0.37117 -
0.20639 -0.12378 -0.29893 0.013001 0.3097 0.010454 -0.16373 -1.0239 0.51806 0.35029 -0.093545 
0.15633 -0.62207 1.0679 0.53538 1.2272 -0.43737 -0.40301 -0.15853 0.081084 1.5515 0.85398 
0.067091 -0.30354; 
 -0.27075 0.5451 -2.0196 -1.3172 -1.1419 -1.517 -0.93752 -1.2761 -1.8635 0.95251 1.5891 0.0037349 
0.39957 1.1789 -0.54893 1.0023 0.48079 -0.32365 -0.90432 0.98014 0.99491 -0.19345 -0.82439 -0.1963 
0.09139 0.17318 0.423 -0.63343 0.53891 2.6909 -0.3045 0.15552 -0.49413 0.12658 0.0019409; 
 0.57914 2.1806 -0.11365 0.19539 0.27843 -0.55773 -0.0019489 -0.5663 -0.10024 -0.42955 -0.077741 -
0.36 0.14317 -0.28479 -0.51904 0.32154 0.084153 0.082452 -0.63545 -0.050958 0.19833 -0.72762 -
1.5764 -0.52302 0.46164 0.39028 -0.06375 -0.61024 -0.38948 -0.36031 0.15571 -0.16362 -0.21822 -
0.052815 -0.067036; 
 0.26184 0.64629 0.20241 -1.8688 0.55728 0.33182 -0.5613 -1.499 0.53433 0.329 -1.0948 0.099771 
0.94483 -1.2848 -0.57714 0.6661 -0.10247 -0.20858 0.58051 0.40007 0.41128 0.10002 -0.44536 -0.8396 
-0.15608 -0.043278 1.2195 0.048752 -0.33135 0.067516 -0.1272 -0.3257 0.87144 -0.17051 -0.14156; 
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 1.0996 0.37021 0.45179 0.39903 -0.51302 0.13948 1.4701 -0.9589 0.43698 0.62273 -0.99534 0.13125 
0.52355 1.0193 -0.36298 0.86183 -0.98225 -0.52502 0.20888 0.25955 0.3902 -0.53294 -0.26033 -
0.90482 1.8221 0.1055 0.01444 -0.62337 0.021385 -0.27247 0.21679 -0.44207 0.88962 0.70243 -
0.036662; 
 -0.29616 0.67145 0.18642 0.22566 1.129 -0.020646 0.69462 -0.024119 -0.29747 0.73282 0.11451 -
0.55373 0.68005 0.077157 -0.16139 0.28083 -0.83718 -0.27889 -0.64558 0.72196 0.059226 0.41305 -
0.42 -0.4984 1.271 0.28179 0.47993 -2.0659 0.22861 0.72645 -0.28891 -0.024572 -0.57331 0.10878 -
0.14352; 
 -1.0713 0.47274 -0.16907 -2.6718 0.79298 1.8399 -0.25943 0.082362 0.0053939 -1.0884 -0.24043 
0.7413 0.30837 -0.63532 -0.92624 0.30116 -0.37611 -0.84821 -1.078 0.71424 0.12971 0.085605 -
0.26007 -0.9068 0.43572 -0.22903 0.33892 -0.73762 0.24666 -1.6835 -0.67711 -0.35032 -0.47052 -
0.35499 -0.41858; 
 -0.39696 0.39997 0.26203 0.50923 1.21 -0.28958 0.39347 0.014213 2.6689 -1.8635 1.2526 0.71566 
0.48233 1.8037 -0.34577 0.66118 1.4289 -0.7266 -2.0338 0.91744 1.0442 -0.080937 -0.79409 -0.97551 
0.094203 0.91673 0.20046 -0.21624 -0.4189 1.3897 -0.40207 0.19589 -0.68227 0.12572 -0.72807; 
 -0.41681 -0.41505 -1.5604 -1.2439 0.93151 -0.2496 1.4941 0.16361 0.28889 0.12021 0.1022 -0.86283 
0.30597 1.2326 -0.16369 0.091447 -0.48314 -0.40747 0.86488 0.41102 0.27273 -1.0703 -0.92711 -
0.80791 0.31456 0.61888 0.18815 -0.47133 -1.3027 -1.0286 0.21561 -0.25669 -0.23219 -0.14272 -
0.18964; 
 -0.34271 0.32036 -2.1063 1.0928 1.0386 3.1617 0.080611 -0.23116 1.8746 0.82869 0.29223 1.5338 
0.42698 -0.64105 -0.2654 0.69486 -0.94791 -0.55473 -0.49423 0.10671 0.79908 0.28972 -0.46165 -
0.30679 0.13562 -0.091318 0.21584 -0.13459 -0.35401 1.2973 -0.41617 0.75114 0.063945 0.33344 -
0.77448; 
 -0.16133 0.3878 0.062173 -1.1818 0.41922 0.075442 0.93286 -0.19557 -0.67739 0.071846 -0.57973 
0.49595 0.40671 0.23613 -0.90741 0.33997 -0.32956 -0.82821 0.40086 -0.044961 0.11563 -0.0084878 -
0.3041 -0.16512 -0.11949 0.40711 -0.45734 -0.82926 0.32667 0.11749 -1.6161 1.2322 1.0187 0.61073 -
0.92963; 
 -0.089573 0.20997 0.49355 -0.83159 1.1258 1.5587 -0.0066089 -0.026393 1.3047 0.31986 2.01 -2.148 
0.22348 -0.14294 -0.71449 0.74849 1.6712 -0.61445 2.545 0.39031 0.6314 -0.083588 -0.61346 -0.14176 
0.37991 -0.18981 0.10641 -0.83907 0.30997 1.0725 -0.16124 0.31785 0.058244 -0.28293 -0.5086; 
 1.0678 0.2165 0.47577 -1.6904 -0.13782 0.15952 1.9122 0.13399 0.47221 -0.91265 -1.0237 -0.67731 
0.67053 0.026892 -0.21008 0.80735 0.41187 -0.12929 0.35055 0.3811 0.79882 1.283 -0.59784 -0.64256 
0.30512 -0.27308 0.46733 -0.69773 -2.236 1.1542 -0.46544 0.023994 -0.33677 1.3884 0.057178; 
 -0.80474 0.49505 0.40314 -1.4483 -0.77715 0.11736 -1.2416 -0.28978 0.24278 0.4233 0.05443 -0.5929 
0.48019 0.32133 -0.95371 0.37852 -0.19461 -0.75764 -1.1751 0.59947 0.040578 0.7144 -0.2238 -
154 
 
0.67192 -0.12821 1.8456 0.025829 -0.87076 -1.2135 -0.81434 -0.51651 0.74512 0.48069 1.1549 -
0.097741; 
 -0.87395 0.02663 -1.9877 1.168 1.1627 1.9248 -0.49736 -2.0415 -1.379 -1.5317 0.60118 -0.96778 
0.21748 1.8683 -0.65136 0.40536 2.6187 -0.30935 1.6731 0.28783 0.56594 -1.2267 -0.16659 -0.71195 -
0.36162 0.26234 0.2141 0.24062 -0.10049 0.4772 -0.20505 0.4144 2.646 0.4699 -0.61364] 
 
Neural Network I (Second Network: weight to layer 3) 
[0.00027829 -0.61828 0.73982 -0.40325 -0.28699 0.089942 -0.26725 -0.048234 -0.29411 -0.57788 
0.37841 -0.57048 0.59433 0.0094232 1.4085 0.82056 0.80302 -0.1766 -0.54572 0.65269 0.91527 -
0.44104 0.44588 -0.033723 0.27357 0.63858 -0.093854 -0.070888 -0.55713 -0.328 0.25231 0.55114 -
0.95603 -0.62083 -0.29803; 
 0.069377 -0.54301 -1.0676 -0.33555 -0.37548 0.020985 0.12136 0.24337 0.080117 -0.24181 0.31416 -
0.85271 0.88078 -0.92719 -1.2092 -0.15579 0.20331 -1.1349 0.5568 0.00089946 0.26062 -0.10447 
0.66929 -0.86826 0.13782 0.089057 -0.55251 0.031708 0.22604 -0.36976 0.16308 0.40124 -1.2889 -
0.46932 -0.67402; 
 -0.772 -0.74579 -0.55708 -0.11964 -0.41502 -1.2333 -0.10064 -0.59397 -0.30849 -0.09555 0.42258 -
0.76372 0.48766 0.32933 0.11672 0.29361 -1.3662 0.82167 0.50149 0.51635 0.14896 0.42495 0.85338 -
0.54342 0.30342 0.20106 -1.1115 -0.29523 -0.37487 1.1887 -0.42638 0.3735 0.13716 -0.28454 -
0.90382; 
 -0.042158 -0.70406 -0.27203 0.12494 -0.59092 1.0419 -0.49495 -0.085801 -0.36588 -0.056737 0.6553 -
0.2243 0.96982 -0.51594 -1.6151 0.15789 -0.21724 0.9266 0.13196 0.29904 0.16845 0.39745 -0.049178 
-0.45508 -0.00062244 -1.6337 0.12764 0.26033 0.5166 -0.10963 -0.44981 0.20918 -1.0314 -0.31119 -
0.42226; 
 -0.29248 -0.79441 0.20935 -0.22569 -0.62937 0.41342 -0.042484 -0.26192 -1.2337 -0.19639 0.13909 
0.03175 -0.68431 -0.79355 0.41636 0.32003 0.01192 0.7439 0.45249 0.11059 0.15618 0.17267 -0.74136 
0.020536 0.22543 -0.45403 0.21755 -0.076817 -0.61225 -0.29869 -0.057344 0.18794 0.6706 0.060744 -
0.12071; 
 0.23764 -0.58026 1.946 0.14825 -0.49704 -0.22677 -0.58459 -0.60264 -0.5686 0.057248 0.037745 -
0.37985 0.45205 0.28124 -1.1667 0.93059 0.98203 -0.076015 -0.4089 0.80834 0.52765 -0.083223 -
0.10655 -0.086983 0.45008 0.15332 0.3953 -0.15956 -0.53378 0.40659 -1.2172 0.20758 0.27337 -
0.77231 -0.16307; 
 -0.04335 -0.33719 -0.2474 0.07895 -0.57564 0.60017 -0.29364 -0.48244 -0.20828 -0.17485 0.15358 
0.84556 0.53709 1.0001 -0.57952 0.39579 -0.52672 -0.33391 0.11712 0.65041 -0.53551 -0.37578 -
0.89508 -0.54239 0.3291 0.58018 0.18767 0.015882 -0.55264 1.1173 0.091167 0.56552 -0.46362 -
0.20206 -0.34357; 
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 -0.077813 -0.58706 -0.72498 -0.41533 -0.026086 -1.3767 -0.2494 -0.21149 -0.27717 -0.75952 0.62801 
0.49059 0.35203 -1.2625 -0.39778 0.30806 -1.595 1.1816 0.14263 0.49358 -0.25288 0.043795 -0.78796 
-0.39474 0.66069 0.5375 0.2377 0.27158 -1.0209 -0.76241 0.40351 0.011313 0.0095843 -0.55385 -
0.31926; 
 -1.3688 -0.52692 -0.21074 0.40208 -0.49653 -0.23046 -0.036601 -0.034666 -0.39005 -0.58429 0.55206 -
0.3455 -0.29986 0.86999 -0.45262 -1.4591 0.17064 -0.99505 -0.04477 0.2822 0.5848 0.32942 0.36773 
0.14258 0.63582 0.27326 0.46517 0.63749 0.079932 -0.12417 -0.5309 -0.63212 -0.57209 -0.63712 -
0.67117; 
 0.067794 -0.45955 1.1004 -0.19537 -0.46618 0.76897 -0.29954 -0.81603 0.1069 -0.18783 0.6097 
0.99482 -1.3654 0.51394 0.18744 0.5299 -1.2854 0.27815 0.15498 0.49157 0.44353 0.30748 0.56847 -
0.7709 -0.09634 -0.90435 -1.657 0.1487 -0.41868 0.068575 -0.37555 0.43382 0.47103 -0.55086 -0.1408; 
 -0.67012 -0.22183 0.17053 -0.66708 -0.20122 0.32058 0.26367 -0.35742 -0.37191 -0.07881 0.51379 -
0.34766 -0.37487 0.11681 -0.85251 -0.18141 0.47924 0.51668 -0.18332 0.29349 -0.42823 0.38375 -
0.42223 -0.21017 0.20165 -0.22613 -0.20027 -0.76302 0.27343 0.16861 0.30941 0.66949 0.26353 -
0.35203 -0.83811; 
 -0.30079 -0.45244 -0.36959 -0.38978 -0.23582 -0.02067 0.28523 -0.84013 0.28226 -0.60085 0.53508 
1.1112 -1.1861 0.34301 -0.063788 0.63513 -0.15234 -0.93268 0.46464 0.10315 -1.1959 0.94362 0.83562 
-0.5205 0.4551 1.1142 -0.98524 -0.078618 -0.40158 -0.61546 -0.26731 0.099991 -0.35746 -0.56976 -
0.17526; 
 -0.66101 -0.018699 -0.56883 -0.0012508 -0.55096 -0.33889 0.14019 -0.36607 0.17236 -0.29313 
0.025477 0.64751 -0.58474 -0.34733 0.52438 0.46734 0.30871 0.72455 0.62809 0.77604 -0.56914 
0.46147 0.034382 -0.73263 0.31404 -0.91629 -0.055692 -1.3777 0.019151 0.86271 -0.58024 0.35584 
0.38625 -0.76758 -0.078903; 
 0.51843 -0.2787 0.62731 -0.27979 -0.74681 -0.79144 0.23654 0.23535 -0.28814 -0.3767 0.55501 -
0.16908 -0.531 0.21491 0.21846 1.0959 -1.0659 0.47586 -0.48653 0.66045 0.058875 -0.27149 -0.56728 
-0.62132 0.38313 0.68826 0.14781 -0.34041 -0.14872 0.2342 -0.71345 0.34813 -1.1532 -0.78146 
0.45557; 
 -0.14556 0.035575 0.16672 0.75258 -0.45042 0.11183 0.65317 0.012577 -0.39317 -0.12007 0.49021 
0.29203 0.68971 0.21316 -0.68572 0.18562 -0.049189 -0.35021 -0.56222 0.36438 0.3429 0.62996 
1.3277 -0.70936 -0.10541 0.26723 0.061138 0.071135 -0.51577 -0.012361 0.1055 1.2352 0.39954 -
0.39893 0.15798; 
 -0.64604 -0.47498 0.72673 -0.03053 -0.41029 0.22052 -0.35207 0.31955 -1.1631 -0.55511 0.48285 
1.1915 0.20717 -0.76187 0.14621 0.028162 0.68518 -0.74801 0.45711 -0.017228 -0.22761 -0.18376 
0.65665 0.085489 0.50181 -1.0884 0.036299 0.27281 -0.06702 0.31095 -0.20077 0.063445 -0.46803 -
0.70287 0.11671; 
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 -0.63072 -0.72747 0.82577 -0.17257 -0.6292 -0.76144 1.2819 0.34797 0.21417 -0.25439 0.068862 
0.048425 0.76377 -0.38199 -0.15612 -0.4449 0.082724 1.2789 0.96198 0.20213 -0.28874 -0.20415 
0.4288 -0.37692 0.80417 -0.46659 -0.17325 -0.71745 -1.2611 -0.1396 -0.17267 0.047271 -0.8112 -
0.23361 0.66804; 
 -0.032531 -0.51265 -0.84962 -0.022925 -0.71711 -0.3469 0.3259 0.49526 -0.6043 -0.43689 0.39368 
0.52137 -0.65181 0.0016131 -0.33833 -0.69996 -0.090013 0.84502 -0.04866 0.55146 0.27733 -0.22216 -
0.54231 -0.74236 0.4064 -0.76426 0.21947 0.26436 -0.0082227 -0.25626 -1.4444 0.91716 0.22058 -
0.20923 0.16794; 
 0.27077 -0.13475 0.36233 0.00070036 -0.63846 -0.59954 -0.31189 -0.72961 -0.53541 -0.63251 0.81766 
0.78618 0.64993 0.36273 0.58305 -0.60392 0.11345 -0.78706 -0.82571 0.87904 -0.70411 -0.31088 -
0.44788 -0.30857 0.49811 0.29983 -0.42049 -0.83441 -0.61932 0.4457 -0.35668 0.37259 0.0095759 -
0.36843 0.075976; 
 -0.046177 -0.65591 -0.78917 -1.282 -0.22137 0.47174 -0.70709 -0.1985 -0.77975 -1.4153 0.87461 -
1.014 0.96835 0.41824 0.51466 -0.54134 -0.6506 0.28421 -0.69889 0.1293 -1.0086 0.24437 1.0033 -
0.78658 0.64594 -0.7705 0.075496 -0.20028 0.2632 -0.21563 0.015409 -0.31215 0.23701 -0.92992 -
0.2783; 
 -0.66066 -0.40275 -0.871 -0.39093 -0.61749 -0.30408 0.077377 0.84304 0.024565 -0.54618 0.62791 
0.13264 -0.36256 -1.129 -0.53815 1.0532 0.80494 -0.73136 0.43335 0.12625 -0.32452 0.49003 -0.86872 
-0.59636 -0.099799 0.50785 -0.6051 0.6242 0.16915 0.79516 -1.214 0.27295 0.83352 -0.44227 
0.076523; 
 -0.18227 -0.60278 0.031406 -0.083375 -0.57549 0.36288 0.82774 -0.31386 0.026657 -0.11086 0.32521 
-0.25676 0.55848 -1.0784 0.58173 0.61674 -0.20252 -0.37306 -0.67015 0.57362 -0.13422 0.15712 -
0.57902 -0.067274 0.43864 0.33628 -0.89326 0.12463 0.19942 0.52269 0.27112 0.080844 -0.097539 
0.16523 -0.46618; 
 -0.010304 -0.43788 -0.19397 0.27319 -0.42338 0.45441 0.33639 0.18383 -0.52026 -0.1667 0.34489 
0.83955 -0.094048 0.070629 0.37573 -0.22091 -0.87595 0.41503 -0.71809 0.64468 -0.020614 0.89486 -
0.1702 -0.54084 0.52514 -0.38192 -0.24907 0.1759 -0.033523 0.64493 0.25924 0.10936 -0.83066 -
0.2541 -1.8277; 
 -0.4687 -0.84897 -1.2442 0.038577 -0.1589 -2.8048 -1.7591 1.1397 -0.60626 -0.16105 0.90036 -0.27709 
0.93857 -1.9632 0.34945 -0.81848 -0.18411 -1.5029 -0.31678 0.25668 0.70859 1.6561 -0.072868 -
0.81981 0.64868 0.48771 0.054691 -2.2841 -1.6095 -0.34523 -0.15382 0.30716 0.024501 -0.38105 -
0.80389; 
 -0.83169 -0.38409 0.9496 -0.66819 -1.1389 2.8259 2.7076 0.3195 -0.92501 -0.87612 0.28017 -0.42328 
0.60949 1.5791 0.40449 0.38076 1.2243 1.5092 -0.18739 0.91793 2.2285 0.57156 -1.4124 -0.53684 
0.89181 -1.4472 -0.036904 0.33293 -1.9015 0.26894 0.31814 -0.12805 0.37712 -0.80256 0.18135; 
157 
 
 -0.23672 -0.56884 -0.21291 0.13882 -0.46784 0.98582 -0.19035 -0.46205 0.098452 0.05451 -0.091528 -
0.54824 0.5623 0.55934 -0.035081 -1.115 1.0395 0.19568 0.13382 0.19897 0.91299 -0.22714 0.35969 -
0.37996 0.63541 -0.69843 -0.88876 -0.68729 0.031976 1.1844 -0.080089 0.35838 -0.25347 -0.38321 
0.058399] 
Neural Network II 
[-1.8963 -0.28861 0.14693 0.52188 0.0021163 0.45367 -0.013661 1.0718 0.79166 0.12273 -1.8375 -
0.59678 0.28752 -1.3048 -0.47042 -0.05793 -0.95272 0.015503 -0.91325 1.3127 -0.27367 0.37804 
0.10196 0.70541 0.14261 -0.6733 0.87104 0.77295 0.53057 -2.6086 -0.16872 0.42282 -0.68744 
0.070333 -0.11818 -0.26445 1.035 0.71876 0.52489 -0.3909; 
 -0.6103 1.4528 0.46415 0.19778 -0.038254 0.78971 1.9252 0.94018 -1.231 -1.161 -0.25352 -0.66053 -
2.79 -0.17144 -0.20007 0.74797 -1.8342 -1.4451 -1.2396 1.7816 0.84104 -1.2499 1.0152 -1.4108 
0.016862 -1.0039 2.0336 -0.17936 1.7454 -0.27762 1.1661 0.21102 -0.68995 -2.4038 0.93152 0.77447 
0.99105 0.095405 0.93143 -0.5318; 
 -1.5563 0.24193 -0.40451 -0.63966 -0.55912 0.65793 -1.8159 0.22194 -0.56065 1.9859 -1.2999 -
0.96695 1.1348 -1.8683 -2.2907 1.1997 1.249 -1.4883 -1.4148 -0.094304 1.3466 1.373 0.42275 0.60905 
0.73467 -1.0269 0.71054 -0.34894 -1.3968 -0.71592 2.6769 1.0763 -0.15124 0.018598 -0.51099 0.71413 
1.1453 0.70292 1.4196 -0.34193; 
 -2.2961 -3.2184 -2.3318 -0.42701 -3.3586 0.41123 -1.4978 0.89366 1.7587 -4.8844 0.17496 0.099853 -
3.0581 -1.3049 1.3843 1.8752 0.24377 0.036169 -1.0718 2.1406 -2.4268 -0.51735 0.2829 1.411 -2.0611 -
0.48511 0.28103 1.1041 0.37915 -2.1335 -1.47 -0.32884 -1.4898 0.9789 -0.55056 -1.2076 0.24605 -
0.038974 0.3144 -1.5631; 
 4.1161 0.33019 1.4321 1.7449 2.4248 0.67933 2.0447 0.68722 -0.38552 2.4549 -0.30611 1.7623 3.2181 
2.4129 0.34921 -2.7354 0.68459 0.81391 2.3231 -3.3254 -1.3536 1.3529 -1.3844 -0.20604 1.9518 -
0.48443 -2.2806 -0.15088 0.74373 3.1507 -1.8506 0.17068 0.46448 2.2644 -1.1119 1.2558 0.017139 
0.63045 0.26262 2.0037] 
 
Appendix VII 
Date 
Published 
Reported Vulnerabilities from Security Focus Butraq  
ID 
Aug 06 2002 Microsoft Windows Window Message Subsystem Design Error 
Vulnerability 
 
5408 
May 25 2005 DavFS2 Failure To Enforce UNIX Filesystem Permissions Design Error 
Vulnerability 
 
13770 
Apr 14 2005 Opera SSL Security Feature Design Error Vulnerability 13176 
158 
 
Jul 01 2005 RaXnet Cacti Config.PHP Design Error Vulnerability 
 
14130 
Jan 11 2005 Bottomline Technologies WebSeries Design Error Vulnerabilities 
 
12231 
Dec 23 2004 Linux Security Modules Process Capabilities Design Error 
Vulnerability 
 
12093 
Jul 29 2002 Multiple Browser Vendor Same Origin Policy Design Error 
Vulnerability 
 
5346 
May 03 2005 PostgreSQL TSearch2 Design Error Vulnerability 13475 
Oct 03 2006 IBM Client Security Password Manager Design Error Vulnerability 
 
20308 
Aug 23 2004 SUPHP Design Flaw Local Privilege Escalation Weakness 112020 
Apr 30 2004 Web Wiz Forum Multiple Vulnerabilities 
 
10255 
Apr 20 2003 Microsoft Windows NTFS Failure To Initialize File Block Vulnerability 
 
7386 
Mar 08 2002 Check Point FW-1 SecuClient/SecuRemote Client Design Vulnerability 
 
4253 
May 10 2001 NetProwler Password Facilities Weak Design Vulnerability 2727 
Mar 02 2005 PHP Glob Function Local Information Disclosure Vulnerability 12701 
Mar 22 2004 PHP-Nuke MS-Analysis Module Multiple Remote Path Disclosure 
Vulnerabilities 
 
9946 
Feb 20 2003 Multiple Vendor ATM Hardware Security Module PIN 
Generation/Verification Vulnerability 
 
6901 
Sep 06 2005 MAXdev MD-Pro Arbitrary Remote File Upload 14750 
Dec 06 2001 Multiple Personal Firewall Vendor Outbound Packet Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
3647 
Nov 01 2005 IOFTPD Username Enumeration Vulnerability 
 
15253 
159 
 
Aug 27 2004 MeindlSOFT Cute PHP Library cphplib Input Validation Vulnerabilities 
 
11062 
Aug 05 2004 Libpng Graphics Library Unspecified Remote Buffer Overflow 
Vulnerability 
 
10872 
Jun 14 2004 Linux Kernel Floating Point Exception Handler Local Denial Of Service 
Vulnerability 
 
10538 
Apr 23 2004 Zonet Wireless Router NAT Implementation Design Flaw Vulnerability 
 
10225 
Jul 12 2001 ArGoSoft FTP Server Weak Password Encryption Vulnerability 3029 
Nov 28 2005 Microsoft Windows SynAttackProtect Predictable Hash Remote Denial 
of Service Vulnerability 
15613 
Aug 29 2005 BFCommand & Control Server Manager Multiple Remote 
Vulnerabilities 
 
14690 
Feb 18 2005 Tarantella Enterprise/Secure Global Desktop Remote Information 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
12591 
Dec 15 2004 Roxio Toast TDIXSupport Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
11940 
Nov 08 2004 Sun Java Runtime Environment InitialDirContext Remote Denial Of 
Service Vulnerability 
 
11619 
Nov 01 2004 Linux Kernel IPTables Initialization Failure Vulnerability 11570 
Dec 20 2002 Multiple Temporary File Monitoring Utility Vendor Stopped Process 
Vulnerabilities 
 
6451 
Feb 18 2002 Cigital ITS4 Software Security Tool Weakness 4120 
Aug 30 2000 Stalkerlab's Mailers 1.1.2 CGI Mail Spoofing Vulnerability 
 
1623 
Nov 16 2005 Multiple Vendor lpCommandLine Application Path Vulnerability  
 
15448 
Nov 16 2005 Counterpane Password Safe Insecure Encryption Vulnerability 
 
15455 
Nov 03 2005 F-Prot Antivirus ZIP Attachment Version Scan Evasion Vulnerability 
 
15293 
160 
 
Oct 19 2005 Yiff-Server File Permission Bypass Weakness 14150 
Sep 05 2005 Microsoft Windows Keyboard Event Privilege Escalation Weakness 
 
14743 
Jul 29 2005 Gopher Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
14420 
Jul 26 2005 IBM Lotus Domino Password Encryption Weakness 
 
14389 
Jul 23 2005 RealChat User Impersonation Vulnerability 
 
14358 
Jul 18 2005 MRV Communications In-Reach Console Servers Access Control 
Bypass Vulnerability 
 
14300 
Jun 06 2005 LutelWall Multiple Insecure File Creation Vulnerabilities 
 
13863 
May 25 2005 GNU SHTool Insecure Temporary File Deletion Vulnerability 
 
13767 
May 25 2005 xMySQLadmin Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
13913 
May 04 2005 NetWin DMail DList Remote Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 13497 
Apr 29 2005 RedHat Enterprise Linux Native POSIX Threading Library Local 
Information Disclosure Vulnerability 
13444 
Apr 28 2005 MyPHP Forum Post.PHP Username Spoofing Vulnerability 13429 
Apr 28 2005 MyPHP Forum Privmsg.PHP Username Spoofing Vulnerability 
 
13430 
Apr 12 2005 FreeBSD PortUpgrade Local Insecure Temporary File Handling 
Vulnerability 
 
13106 
Apr 07 2005 Macromedia ColdFusion MX Updater Remote File Disclosure 
Vulnerability  
 
13060 
Apr 06 2005 Vixie Cron Crontab File Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
13024 
Mar 30 2005 Kerio Personal Firewall Local Network Access Restriction Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
12946 
161 
 
Mar 16 2005 Woodstone Servers Alive Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 12822 
Mar 14 2005 Wine Local Insecure File Creation Vulnerability 
 
12791 
Mar 09 2005 KDE Konqueror Remote Download Dialog Box Source URI Spoofing 
Vulnerability 
 
12769 
Feb 28 2005 Mitel 3300 Integrated Communications Platform Web Interface 
Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
12682 
Feb 21 2005 Sun Solaris KCMS_Configure Arbitrary File Corruption Vulnerability 
 
12605 
Jan 25 2005 Bribble Unspecified Remote Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
12361 
Jan 25 2005 Libdbi-perl Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
12360 
Jan 21 2005 Ghostscript Multiple Local Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerabilities 
 
12327 
Jan 14 2005 SGI InPerson Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 12259 
Dec 23 2004 LPRNG LPRNG_CERTS.SH Local Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
12088 
Dec 23 2004 Docbook-To-Man Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
12087 
Dec 21 2004 Rosiello Security RPF Multiple Remote And Local Vulnerabilities 12073 
Dec 14 2004 Sun Java System Web And Application Server Remote Session 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
11918 
Dec 11 2004 Opera Web Browser Download Dialogue Box File Name Spoofing 
Vulnerability 
 
11883 
Dec 02 2004 FreeBSD Linux ProcFS Local Kernel Denial Of Service And 
Information Disclosure Vulnerability 
11789 
Nov 22 2004 Citrix MetaFrame Presentation Server Client Debugging Utility 
Information Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
11720 
Nov 20 2004 Computer Associates eTrust EZAntivirus User Interface Local 
Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
11717 
162 
 
Nov 19 2004 Opera Web Browser Java Implementation Multiple Remote 
Vulnerabilities 
 
11712 
Nov 15 2004 Fcron FCronTab/FCronSighUp Multiple Local Vulnerabilities 
 
11684 
Nov 12 2004 OpenSkat Weak Encryption Key Generation Vulnerability 11667 
Nov 03 2004 TIPS MailPost Remote Debug Mode Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
11595 
Nov 02 2004 Minihttp Forum Web Server Plain Text Password Storage 
Vulnerability 
 
11585 
Oct 19 2004 Sun Solaris LDAP RBAC Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
11459 
Oct 18 2004 Proland Software Protector Plus AntiVirus MS-DOS Name Scan 
Evasion Vulnerability 
 
11451 
Oct 18 2004 Gnofract 4D Remote Script Code Execution Vulnerability 11445 
Oct 18 2004 FIL Security Laboratory Twister Anti-TrojanVirus MS-DOS Name 
Scan Evasion Vulnerability 
 
11453 
Oct 12 2004 Microsoft Window Management API Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
11378 
Oct 12 2004 Adobe Acrobat Reader Remote Access Validation 11386 
Sep 15 2004 McAfee VirusScan System Scan Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
11181 
Sep 28 2004 Vignette Application Portal Remote Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
11284 
Sep 16 2004 Microsoft Internet Explorer User Security Confirmation Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
11200 
Sep 15 2004 McAfee VirusScan System Scan Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
11181 
Sep 13 2004 Lexar JumpDrive Secure USB Flash Drive Insecure Password 
Storage Vulnerability 
 
11162 
Aug 31 2004 D-Link Securicam Network DCS-900 Internet Camera Remote 
Configuration Vulnerability 
11072 
163 
 
Aug 26 2004 Webroot Software Window Washer Data Exposure Vulnerability 11054 
Aug 04 2004 DGen Emulator Symbolic Link Vulnerability 
 
10855 
Aug 04 2004 YaST2 Utility Library File Verification Shell Code Injection 
Vulnerability 
 
10867 
Jun 24 2004 ZaireWeb Solutions Newsletter ZWS Administrative Interface 
Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
10605 
Jun 16 2004 Check Point Firewall-1 Internet Key Exchange Information 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
10558 
Jun 14 2004 Immunix StackGuard Canary Corruption Handler Evasion 
Vulnerability 
 
10535 
Jun 09 2004 Symantec Gateway Security 360R Wireless VPN Bypass Weakness 10502 
 Jun 08 2004 U.S. Robotics Broadband Router 8003 Administration Web Interface 
Insecure Password Vulnerability 
 
10490 
May 27 2004 PHP Input/Output Wrapper Remote Include Function Command 
Execution Weakness 
 
10427 
May 17 2004 Microsoft Outlook 2003 Media File Script Execution Vulnerability 
 
10369 
May 13 2004 Multiple Vendor IEEE 802.11 Protocol Remote Denial Of Service 
Vulnerability 
 
10342 
May 12 2004 Linux Kernel Serial Driver Proc File Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
10330 
May 04 2004 IPMenu Log File Symbolic Link Vulnerability 10269 
Apr 20 2004 Cisco Internet Operating System SNMP Message Processing Denial Of 
Service Vulnerability 
10186 
Apr 19 2004 SSMTP Mail Transfer Agent Symbolic Link Vulnerability 10171 
Apr 15 2004 Linux Kernel EXT3 File System Information Leakage Vulnerability 10152 
Apr 13 2004 Microsoft Windows Object Identity Network Communication 
Vulnerability 
 
10121 
164 
 
Apr 13 2004 BEA WebLogic Local Password Disclosure Vulnerability 10133 
Apr 07 2004 Intel LAN Management Server Setup Utilities Configuration 
Vulnerability 
 
10068 
Apr 02 2004 Macromedia Dreamweaver Remote User Database Access 
Vulnerability 
 
10036 
Mar 26 2004 AIX Invscoutd Symbolic Link Vulnerability 
 
9982 
Mar 17 2004 Belchior Foundry VCard Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 9910 
Mar 15 2004 VocalTec VGW4/8 Telephony Gateway Remote Authentication Bypass 
Vulnerability 
9876 
Mar 09 2004 IBM AIX RC.BOOT Local Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
12992 
Feb 25 2004 Mozilla Browser Zombie Document Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability 
 
9747 
May 24 2002 LocalWEB2000 File Disclosure Vulnerability 4820 
Jan 11 2001 Microsoft Web Client Extender NTLM Authentication Vulnerability 2199 
Nov 18 2000 NetcPlus SmartServer3 Weak Encryption 1962 
Nov 18 2000 NetcPlus BrowseGate Weak Encryption Vulnerability 1964 
Sep 01 2000 QNX Voyager Webserver Multiple Vulnerabilities 
 
1648 
Aug 19 2000 Gnome-Lokkit Firewall Package Port Visibility Vulnerability 1590 
Apr 15 2000 QNX crypt() Vulnerability 
 
1114 
Mar 22 2000 Multiple Linux Vendor gpm Setgid Vulnerability 1069 
Feb 28 2000 OpenSSL Unseeded Random Number Generator Vulnerability 3187 
165 
 
Nov 25 2004 Sun Java Applet Invocation Version Specification Weakness 11757 
Jul 20 2000 Microsoft Outlook Express Persistent Mail-Browser Link Vulnerability 
 
1502 
Dec 23 2005 SCPOnly Multiple Local Vulnerabilities 16051 
Dec 20 2005 MetaDot Portal Server Site_Mgr Group Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
15975 
Nov 15 2005 Apple iTunes 6 For Windows Arbitrary Local Code Execution 
Vulnerability 
 
15446 
Sep 29 2005 Macromedia Breeze Plaintext Password Storage Weakness 14975 
Sep 26 2005 SecureW2 Insecure Pre-Master Secret Generation Vulnerability 
 
14945 
Sep 14 2005 LineControl Java Client Local Password Disclosure Vulnerability 14830 
Sep 12 2005 Mark D. Roth PAM_Per_User Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 14813 
Sep 07 2005 CSystems WebArchiveX ActiveX Component Arbitrary File Read and 
Write Vulnerabilities 
 
14760 
Jul 20 2005 Greasemonkey Multiple Remote Information Disclosure 
Vulnerabilities 
 
14336 
Jul 18 2005 EKG Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 14307 
Jun 20 2005 Cisco VPN Concentrator Groupname Enumeration Weakness 13992 
May 26 2005 Gentoo Webapp-Config Insecure File Creation Vulnerability 13780 
May 23 2005 Gibraltar Firewall Antivirus Scan Evasion Vulnerability 13713 
May 17 2005 MySQL mysql_install_db Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
13360 
May 02 2005 Apple Mac OS X Default Pseudo-Terminal Permission Vulnerability 
 
13467 
166 
 
May 02 2005 ARPUS Ce/Ceterm Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
13465 
Apr 26 2005 Rootkit Hunter Local Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
13399 
Apr 16 2005 Webmin And Usermin Configuration File Unauthorized Access 
Vulnerability 
13205 
Apr 11 2005 RSnapshot Local File Permission Manipulation Vulnerability 
 
13095 
Apr 04 2005 GNU Sharutils Unshar Local Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
12981 
Apr 04 2005 Remstats Local Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
12979 
Mar 23 2005 Mathopd Dump Files Local Insecure File Creation Vulnerability 
 
12882 
Mar 11 2005 Xerox WorkCentre Multiple Page Fax Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
12787 
Feb 18 2005 Yahoo! Messenger Download Dialogue Box File Name Spoofing 
Vulnerability 
 
12587 
Feb 14 2005 Debian Toolchain-Source Multiple Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerabilities 
 
12540 
Feb 11 2005 OpenPGP Cipher Feedback Mode Chosen-Ciphertext Partial Plaintext 
Retrieval Vulnerability 
 
12529 
Jan 27 2005 F2C Multiple Local Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerabilities 
 
12380 
Jan 26 2005 Apple Mail EMail Message ID Header Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
12366 
Dec 31 2004 ArGoSoft FTP Server Remote User Enumeration Vulnerability 12139 
Dec 23 2004 Debian Tetex-Bin Xdvizilla Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
12100 
Dec 22 2004 Debian Debmake Local Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
12078 
Dec 21 2004 Webroot Software Spy Sweeper Enterprise Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
12065 
167 
 
Dec 21 2004 Webroot Software My Firewall Plus Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
12064 
Dec 20 2004 GNU Troff (Groff) Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerabilities 
 
12058 
Dec 15 2004 MoniWiki Remote Server-Side Script Execution Vulnerability 11951 
Dec 10 2004 Kerio WinRoute Firewall Multiple Unspecified Remote Vulnerabilities 
 
11870 
Dec 07 2004 Gentoo MirrorSelect Local Insecure File Creation Vulnerability 11835 
Nov 23 2004 Van Dyke SecureCRT Remote Command Execution Vulnerability 
 
11731 
Nov 17 2004 Cscope Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerabilities 11697 
Nov 12 2004 GratiSoft Sudo Restricted Command Execution Bypass Vulnerability 
 
11668 
Nov 11 2004 Davfs2 Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 11661 
Nov 10 2004 Mozilla Firefox Download Dialogue Box File Name Spoofing 
Vulnerability 
11643 
Nov 02 2004 Haserl Local Environment Variable Manipulation Vulnerability 11579 
Oct 27 2004 Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
11554 
Oct 18 2004 H+BEDV AntiVir MS-DOS Name Scan Evasion Vulnerability 11444 
Oct 05 2004 Symantec Norton AntiVirus MS-DOS Name Scan Evasion 
Vulnerability 
 
11328 
Sep 30 2004 Perl Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 11294 
Sep 30 2004 OpenSSL DER_CHOP Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
11293 
Sep 30 2004 NetaTalk Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
11292 
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Sep 30 2004 MySQL Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
11291 
Sep 30 2004 Trustix LVM Utilities Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
11290 
Sep 30 2004 MIT Kerberos 5 SEND-PR.SH Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
11289 
Sep 30 2004 GNU GZip Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
11288 
Sep 30 2004 GNU Troff (Groff) Groffer Script Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
 
11287 
Sep 30 2004 GNU GLibC Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 11286 
Sep 30 2004 GhostScript Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 11285 
Sep 30 2004 GNU GetText Unspecified Insecure Temporary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
11282 
Sep 30 2004 PostgreSQL Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 11295 
Sep 23 2004 Motorola WR850G Wireless Router Remote Authentication Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
11241 
Sep 22 2004 Sophos Anti-Virus Reserved MS-DOS Name Scan Evasion 
Vulnerability 
11236 
Sep 21 2004 Symantec ON Command CCM Remote Database Default Password 
Vulnerability 
 
11225 
Sep 15 2004 Multiple Browser Cross-Domain Cookie Injection Vulnerability 11186 
Aug 17 2004 Gallery Remote Server-Side Script Execution Vulnerability 
 
10968 
Aug 05 2004 Mozilla Browser Non-FQDN SSL Certificate Spoofing Vulnerability 
 
 
10876 
Aug 04 2004 LILO gfxboot Plaintext Password Display Vulnerability 10866 
Aug 04 2004 Linux Kernel File 64-Bit Offset Pointer Handling Kernel Memory 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
10852 
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Aug 02 2004 Gnu Transport Layer Security Library X.509 Certificate Verification 
Denial Of Service Vulnerability 
 
10839 
Jul 21 2004 Serena TeamTrack Remote Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 10770 
Jul 20 2004 Sysinternals PsTools Remote Unauthorized Access Vulnerability 
 
10759 
Jul 13 2004 4D WebStar Symbolic Link Vulnerability 
 
10714 
Jun 17 2004 Sun Solaris Patches 112908-12 And 115168-03 Clear Text Password 
Logging Vulnerability 
 
10606 
Apr 22 2004 Xine And Xine-Lib Multiple Remote File Overwrite Vulnerabilities 10193 
Apr 21 2004 BEA WebLogic Server And WebLogic Express Configuration Log Files 
Plain Text Password 
10188 
Apr 19 2004 Softwin BitDefender AvxScanOnlineCtrl COM Object Information 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
10175 
Apr 19 2004 Softwin BitDefender AvxScanOnlineCtrl COM Object Remote File 
Upload And Execution Vulnerability 
 
10174 
Mar 30 2004 LinBit Technologies LinBox Plain Text Password Storage Weakness 
 
10011 
Mar 23 2004 Mythic Entertainment Dark Age of Camelot Encryption Key Signing 
Vulnerability 
 
9960 
Mar 19 2004 Samba SMBPrint Sample Script Insecure Temporary File Handling 
Symbolic Link Vulnerability 
 
9926 
Mar 12 2004 Macromedia Studio MX 2004 /Contribute 2 Local Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
9862 
Mar 12 2004 XInterceptTalk XITalk Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
9851 
Mar 09 2004 F-Secure SSH Server Password Authentication Policy Evasion 
Vulnerability 
9824 
Feb 25 2004 MTools MFormat Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 9746 
Sep 07 2003 Microsoft ISA Server HTTP Authentication Scheme Vulnerability 10481 
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Mar 05 2003 CatDoc XLSView Local Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
11560 
Oct 09 2002 Microsoft Windows NetDDE Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 5927 
Dec 28 2002 ShadowJAAS Command Line Password Disclosure Vulnerability 6498 
Feb 14 2002 Microsoft Visual C++ 7/Visual C++.Net Buffer Overflow Protection 
Weakness 
 
4108 
Feb 09 2002 Adobe PhotoDeluxe Java Execution Vulnerability 
 
4106 
Dec 18 2001 GTK Shared Memory Permissions Vulnerability 
 
3705 
Dec 01 2000 Microsoft Internet Explorer 'INPUT TYPE=FILE' Vulnerability 
 
2045 
Jan 16 2006 Albatross Remote Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability 
 
16252 
Sep 01 2005 PolyGen Local Denial of Service Vulnerability 
 
14722 
Mar 30 2005 GDK-Pixbuf BMP Image Processing Double Free Remote Denial of 
Service Vulnerability 
 
12950 
Jul 26 2002 T. Hauck Jana Server FTP Server PASV Mode Port Exhaustion Denial 
Of Service Vulnerability 
 
5325 
Jan 19 2006 Ecartis PantoMIME Arbitrary Attachment Upload Vulnerability 
 
16317 
Jan 12 2006 Microsoft Visual Studio UserControl Remote Code Execution 
Vulnerability 
16225 
Dec 23 2005 RSSH RSSH_CHROOT_HELPER Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
16050 
Dec 22 2005 WebWasher Malicious Script Filter Bypass Vulnerability 16047 
Dec 21 2005 Cisco Downloadable RADIUS Policies Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
16025 
Dec 20 2005 Clearswift MIMEsweeper For Web Executable File Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
15982 
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Dec 13 2005 Microsoft Internet Explorer COM Object Instantiation Memory 
Corruption Vulnerability 
15827 
Dec 13 2005 Opera Web Browser Download Dialog Manipulation File Execution 
Vulnerability 
 
15835 
Dec 08 2005 PGP Desktop Wipe Free Space Assistant Improper Disk Wipe 
Vulnerability 
 
15784 
Dec 06 2005 Sun Java System Application Server Reverse SSL Proxy Plug-in Man 
In The Middle Vulnerability 
15728 
Nov 21 2005 IBM WebSphere Application Server for z/OS Double Free Denial of 
Service Vulnerability 
 
15522 
Nov 07 2005 Zone Labs Zone Alarm Advance Program Control Bypass Weakness 
 
15347 
Oct 29 2005 PHP Advanced Transfer Manager Remote Unauthorized Access 
Vulnerability 
 
15237 
Oct 28 2005 Rockliffe MailSite Express Arbitrary Script File Upload Vulnerability 15230 
Oct 19 2005 HP-UX FTP Server Directory Listing Vulnerability 15138 
Oct 10 2005 SGI IRIX Runpriv Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
15055 
Oct 06 2005 Planet Technology FGSW-2402RS Switch Backdoor Password Reset 
Vulnerability 
 
15014 
Oct 04 2005 Microsoft Windows Wireless Zero Configuration Service Information 
Disclosure Vulnerability 
 
15008 
Sep 22 2005 Linux Kernel 64-Bit SMP Routing_ioctl() Local Denial of Service 
Vulnerability 
 
14902 
Sep 17 2005 Py2Play Object Unpickling Remote Python Code Execution 
Vulnerability 
 
14864 
Sep 17 2005 Tofu Object Unpickling Remote Python Code Execution Vulnerability 
 
14865 
Sep 13 2005 Linksys WRT54G Wireless Router Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities 
 
14822 
Sep 13 2005 Apple Mac OS X Untrusted Java Applet Privilege Escalation 
Vulnerability 
 
14826 
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Sep 02 2005 FileZilla FTP Client Hard-Coded Cipher Key Vulnerability 14730 
Aug 31 2005 Symantec LiveUpdate Client Local Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
14708 
Aug 30 2005 Maildrop Lockmail Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 14696 
Aug 22 2005 RunCMS Arbitrary Variable Overwrite Vulnerability 14634 
Aug 03 2005 Symantec Norton GoBack Local Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
14461 
Aug 02 2005 nCipher CHIL Random Cache Leakage Vulnerability 14452 
Jul 27 2005 Linux Kernel SYS_GET_THREAD_AREA Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
15527 
Jul 26 2005 Linux Kernel NAT Handling Memory Corruption Denial of Service 
Vulnerability 
15531 
Jul 26 2005 IBM Lotus Domino WebMail Information Disclosure Vulnerability 14388 
Jul 20 2005 Oray PeanutHull Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
14330 
Jul 19 2005 Multiple Browser Weak Authentication Mechanism Vulnerability 14325 
Jul 06 2005 eRoom Plug-In Insecure File Download Handling Vulnerability 
 
14176 
Jul 01 2005 OpenLDAP TLS Plaintext Password Vulnerability 
 
14125 
Jul 01 2005 PADL Software PAM_LDAP TLS Plaintext Password Vulnerability 
 
14126 
May 28 2005 Invision Power Board Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 13797 
Apr 24 2005 ACS Blog Administrative Access Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
13346 
Mar 17 2005 ThePoolClub IPool/ISnooker Insecure Local Credential Storage 
Vulnerability 
 
12830 
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Mar 10 2005 Multiple Vendor Antivirus Products Malformed ZIP Attachment Scan 
Evasion Vulnerability 
 
12771 
Feb 24 2005 Cyclades AlterPath Manager Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities 12649 
Dec 21 2004 PHPAuction Administrative Interface Authentication Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
12069 
Dec 14 2004 Multiple Kerio Products Universal Secret Key Storage Vulnerability 
 
11930 
Nov 12 2004 Alcatel Speed Touch Pro With Firewall ADSL Router DNS Poisoning 
Vulnerability 
 
11664 
Oct 18 2004 Best Software SalesLogix Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities 
 
11450 
Oct 08 2004 Nathaniel Bray Yeemp File Transfer Public Key Verification Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
11353 
Aug 10 2004 Sygate Secure Enterprise Enforcer Unauthenticated Broadcast 
Request Bypass Vulnerability 
10908 
May 26 2004 FreeBSD Msync(2) System Call Buffer Cache Implementation 
Vulnerability 
10416 
Oct 02 2003 Microsoft Windows PostThreadMessage() Arbitrary Process Killing 
Vulnerability 
8747 
Sep 10 2003 CacheFlow CacheOS HTTP HOST Proxy Vulnerability 8584 
Aug 11 2003 FreeBSD Ptrace/SPIgot Insufficient Signal Verification Denial of 
Service Vulnerability 
8387 
Jun 19 2003 Power Server FTP Addon Failure To Authenticate Vulnerability 7986 
Jun 13 2003 Cistron RADIUS Remote Signed NAS-Port Number Expansion 
Memory Corruption Vulnerability 
7892 
Apr 30 2003 ScriptLogic RunAdmin Service Administrative Access Vulnerability 7477 
Mar 17 2003 Multiple Cryptographic Weaknesses in Kerberos 4 Protocol 7113 
Dec 26 2002 Microsoft Windows File Protection Code-Signing Verification 
Weakness 
6482 
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Nov 15 2002 TightVNC Server Authentication Cookie Predictability Vulnerability 6905 
Oct 21 2002 Multiple Firewall Vendor Packet Flood State Table Filling Vulnerability 6023 
Aug 17 2002 Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Datasource Applet File Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
5490 
Jul 03 2002 Sun SunPCi II VNC Software Password Disclosure Vulnerability 5146 
May 17 2002 GRSecurity Linux Kernel Memory Protection Weakness 4762 
Apr 24 2002 Multiple Stack Protection Scheme Function Argument Overwrite 
Weakness 
4586 
Apr 16 2002 Pipermail/Mailman Insecure Archives Permissions Vulnerability 4538 
Feb 18 2002 Compaq Tru64 SNMP Agent Denial Of Service Vulnerability 4140 
Feb 14 2002 W3C CSS :visited Pseudo-Class Information Disclosure Vulnerability 4136 
Jan 21 2002 GNU Enscript Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 3920 
Jan 06 2002 Linksys DSL Router SNMP Trap System Arbitrary Sending 
Vulnerability 
3795 
Dec 17 2001 Microsoft Windows XP Unauthorized Hotkey Program Execution 
Vulnerability 
3703 
Dec 07 2001 Microsoft Windows File Locking DoS Vulnerability 3654 
Aug 02 2001 Identix BioLogon Client Biometric Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 3140 
May 15 2001 Logitech Wireless Peripheral Device Man in the Middle Vulnerability 2738 
Apr 02 2001 Lucent Orinoco Closed Network Unauthorized Access Vulnerability 
 
 
2538 
Mar 20 2001 OpenPGP Private Key Attack Vulnerability 
 
2673 
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Sep 02 1999 IEEE 802.1q Unauthorized VLAN Traversal Weakness 
 
615 
Jan 17 2006 Mozilla Thunderbird File Attachment Spoofing Vulnerability 
 
16271 
Jan 03 2006 Gentoo Pinentry Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 16120 
Dec 30 2005 Gentoo Linux XnView Insecure RPATH Vulnerability 16087 
Dec 22 2005 MediaWiki Inline Style Attribute Security Check Bypass Vulnerability 16032 
Dec 15 2005 Multiple Vendor Wireless Access Points Static WEP Key 
Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 
 
16068 
Dec 07 2005 Sun Solaris Sun Update Connection Web Proxy Password Disclosure 
Vulnerability 
 
15772 
Nov 15 2005 Macromedia Contribute Publishing Server Insecure Shared 
Connection Key Encryption Weakness 
15438 
Oct 07 2005 SuSE YaST Package Repositories Insecure Permissions Vulnerability 
 
 
15026 
Oct 07 2005 Oracle HTML DB Plaintext Password Storage Vulnerability 15033 
Sep 19 2005 Sybari Antigen for Exchange/SMTP Attachment Rule Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
14875 
Sep 06 2005 Gentoo Net-SNMP Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
14845 
Jul 29 2005 Novell eDirectory NMAS Authentication Bypass Vulnerability 14419 
Jul 28 2005 Opera Web Browser Content-Disposition Header Download Dialog 
File Extension Spoofing Vulnerability 
14402 
Jul 27 2005 BSD IPsec Session AES-XCBC-MAC Authentication Constant Key 
Usage Vulnerability 
14394 
Jul 19 2005 Apple Mac OS X AirPort Card Automatic Network Association 
Vulnerability 
14321 
Jul 15 2005 Macromedia JRun Unauthorized Session Access Vulnerability 14271 
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Jul 14 2005 BitDefender Antivirus & Antispam for Linux and FreeBSD Mail 
Servers Scan Evasion 
14262 
Jul 11 2005 Backup Manager Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
14210 
Jul 07 2005 PHPSlash Arbitrary Account Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
14189 
Jun 29 2005 FreeBSD TCP Stack Established Connection Denial of Service 
Vulnerability 
14104 
Jun 27 2005 Adobe Acrobat/Adobe Reader Safari Frameworks Folder Permission 
Escalation Vulnerability 
14075 
Jun 01 2005 I-Man File Attachments Remote Arbitrary PHP Script Execution 
Vulnerability 
13831 
May 17 2005 IgnitionServer Entry Deletion Access Validation Checking 
Vulnerability 
 
13654 
Mar 29 2005 Linux Kernel EXT2 File System Information Leak Vulnerability 
 
12932 
Feb 14 2005 Microsoft Internet Explorer Mouse Event URI Status Bar Obfuscation 
Weakness 
12541 
Feb 04 2005 Postfix IPv6 Unauthorized Mail Relay Vulnerability 
 
12445 
Jan 28 2005 WebWasher Classic HTTP CONNECT Unauthorized Access Weakness 
 
 
12394 
Jan 27 2005 Ingate Firewall Persistent PPTP Tunnel Vulnerability 
 
12383 
Dec 07 2004 MD5 Message Digest Algorithm Hash Collision Weakness 
 
11849 
Oct 01 2004 Sun Solaris Gzip File Permission Modification Vulnerability 
 
11318 
Sep 17 2004 Apple iChat Remote Link Application Execution Vulnerability 11207 
May 13 2004 Opera Web Browser Address Bar Spoofing Weakness 10337 
Apr 30 2004 Sun Solaris Patch Information Disclosure Vulnerability 10261 
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Mar 12 2004 Sun Solaris Patch Unexpected Security Weakness 
 
9852 
Nov 05 2003 Microsoft Internet Explorer Double Slash Cache Zone Bypass 
Vulnerability 
 
8980 
Jun 11 2003 Ethereal TVB_GET_NSTRINGZ0() Memory Handling Vulnerability 7883 
May 14 2003 Linux Kernel Route Cache Entry Remote Denial Of Service 
Vulnerability 
7601 
May 05 2003 Mod_Survey SYSBASE Disk Resource Consumption Denial of Service 
Vulnerability 
7498 
Apr 29 2003 Microsoft Log Sink Class ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Creation 
Vulnerability 
12646 
Apr 10 2003 Apple MacOS X DropBox Folder Information Disclosure Vulnerability 7324 
Dec 05 2002 Akfingerd Remote Denial Of Service Vulnerability 
 
6323 
Sep 19 2002 Microsoft Virtual Machine Multiple JDBC Vulnerabilities 
 
5478 
Sep 11 2002 KDE Konqueror Sub-Frames Script Execution Vulnerability 5689 
Jun 17 2002 Mozilla Netscape Navigator Plug-In Path Disclosure Vulnerability 5741 
May 29 2002 Core APM File Upload Execution Vulnerability 4922 
May 15 2002 Swatch Throttled Event Reporting Vulnerability 4746 
Apr 08 2002 Microsoft Office Web Components Local File Read Vulnerability 
 
4453 
Jan 31 2002 Microsoft Site Server LDAP Plain Text Password Storage Vulnerability 4000 
Dec 12 2001 Util-Linux Script Command Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability 
 
16280 
Nov 01 2001 LibDB SNPrintF Buffer Overflow Vulnerability  3497 
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Oct 05 2001 Symantec Norton Antivirus LiveUpdate Host Verification Vulnerability 3403 
Aug 14 2001 Dell Latitude C800 Bios Suspended Session Bypassing Vulnerability 3180 
Apr 07 1999 NetworkAppliance NetCache SNMP Default Community String 
Vulnerability 
2807 
Sep 30 1996 IETF RADIUS Dictionary Attack Vulnerability 3532 
Apr 28 2009 Multiple Symantec Products Alert Management System Console 
Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability 
 
34675 
Apr 02 2008 Symantec AutoFix Tool ActiveX Control Remote Share 
'launchProcess()' Insecure Method Vulnerability 
28509 
Mar 23 2007 Sun Java System Directory Server Uninitialized Pointer Remote 
Memory Corruption Vulnerability 
23117 
Mar 27 2009 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager Multiple Vulnerabilities 34285 
Mar 25 2009 Cisco IOS Secure Copy Remote Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 
 
34247 
Dec 29 2003 Microsoft IIS Failure To Log Undocumented TRACK Requests 
Vulnerability 
9313 
Dec 17 2008 Mozilla Firefox/Thunderbird/SeaMonkey Multiple Remote 
Vulnerabilities 
 
32882 
Oct 11 2008 Debian chm2pdf Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability 
 
31735 
 
Date 
Published 
www.cigital.com/whitepapers/dl/wp-qandr.pdf Secunia: ID 
Jul 03 2008 Drupal Outline Designer Security Bypass 30936 
May 29 2009 SonicWALL Global Security Client Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 35220 
Apr 29 2009 Symantec Products Alert Management System 2 Multiple Vulnerabilities 34856 
Mar  03 2009 Cisco Unified Communications Manager IP Phone PAB Information 
Disclosure 
34238 
Nov 26 2008 Crossday Discuz! Board Multiple Vulnerabilities 32731 
Oct 21 2008 Symantec Altiris Deployment Solution Privilege Escalation 31773 
Oct 08 2008 Adobe Flash Player "Clickjacking" Security Bypass Vulnerability 32163 
Jul 25 2008 RealNetworks RealPlayer Multiple Vulnerabilities 27620 
Jun 04 2008 Sun Java System Active Server Pages Multiple Vulnerabilities 30523 
179 
 
Feb 20 2008 Opera Multiple Vulnerabilities 29029 
Feb 08 2008 Mozilla Firefox Multiple Vulnerabilities 28758 
Nov 15 2007 IBM DB2 Multiple Vulnerabilities and Security Issue 27667 
Aug 01 2007 Mac OS X Security Update Fixes Multiple Vulnerabilities 26235 
Jul 20 2007 Citrix Access Gateway Multiple Vulnerabilities 26143 
Jul 12 2007 Apple QuickTime Multiple Vulnerabilities 26034 
Jul 02 2007 Firefox "OnKeyDown" Event Focus Weakness 25904 
May 30 2007 Apple QuickTime Java Extension Two Vulnerabilities 25130 
May 11 2007 Sun SRS Proxy Core "srsexec" Information Disclosure 25194 
May 10 2007 Symantec Products NAVOpts.dll ActiveX Control Security Bypass 
Vulnerability 
25172 
May 01 2007 VMware Products Multiple Vulnerabilities 25079 
Feb 22 2007 Cisco Secure Services Client Multiple Vulnerabilities 24258 
Feb 22 2007 Trend Micro ServerProtect for Linux Web Interface Authentication 
Bypass 
24264 
Feb 22 2007 Cisco Unified IP Conference Station / IP Phone Default Accounts 24262 
Jan 29 2007 smb4K Multiple Vulnerabilities 23937 
Oct 20 2006 Kaspersky Labs Anti-Virus IOCTL Privilege Escalation 22478 
Aug 01 2006 MySQL MERGE Table Privilege Revoke Bypass 21259 
Jul 10 2006 Flash Player Unspecified Vulnerability and "addRequestHeader()" Bypass 20971 
Jun 06 2006 Firefox File Upload Form Keystroke Event Cancel Vulnerability 20442 
Apr 25 2006 iOpus Secure Email Attachments Password Usage Security Issue 19771 
Apr 24 2006 Symantec Scan Engine Multiple Vulnerabilities 19734 
Mar 02 2006 NCP Secure Entry/Enterprise Client Two Vulnerabilities 19082 
Feb 20 2006 PHP-Nuke CAPTCHA Bypass Weakness 18936 
Jan 23 2006 Tor Hidden Service Disclosure Weakness 18576 
Jan 19 2006 Ecartis "pantomime" Functionality Attachment Handling Security Issue 18524 
Jan 18 2006 Oracle Products Multiple Vulnerabilities and Security Issues 18493 
Jan 11 2006 Symantec Norton SystemWorks Protected Recycle Bin Weakness 18402 
Jan03 2006 Cisco Secure Access Control Server Downloadable IP Access Control List 
Vulnerability 
18141 
Dec 23 2005 scponly Privilege Escalation and Security Bypass Vulnerabilities 18223 
Dec 23 2005 rssh "chroot" Directory Privilege Escalation Vulnerability 18224 
Dec 22 2005 Sygate Protection Agent Protection Bypass Vulnerability 18175 
Dec 13 2005 Microsoft Internet Explorer Multiple Vulnerabilities 15368 
Dec 12 2005 Blackboard Learning and Community Portal Systems Multiple 
Vulnerabilities 
17991 
Dec 05 2005 e107 "rate.php" Redirection and Multiple Rating Weakness 17890 
Nov 16 2005 PEAR Installer Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability 17563 
Sep 21 2005 Antigen for Exchange "Antigen forwarded attachment" Filter Bypass 16759 
 
 
 
 
